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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation seeks to understand the influence of non-governmental institutions 
on local public policy outputs. Within immigration policy, current shifts in the 
implementation of enforcement have allowed local law enforcement agencies to function 
as extensions of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement leading to an 
unprecedented rise in the deportations of immigrants from the interior of the country. By 
examining the outputs of the Secure Communities program from 2009 through 2014, this 
research evaluates how non-governmental institutions can influence the deportability of 
immigrants within a community. In influencing the deportability of immigrants, non-
governmental institutions alter Secure Communities outputs. The first part of this 
dissertation takes an empirical focus on theorizing how language as an institutional 
characteristic serves as a mechanism of representative bureaucracy. Using the theory of 
representative bureaucracy, linguistic congruence between local law enforcement agents 
and policy target should lead to decreased policy outputs. Using the Law Enforcement 
Management and Administration Survey, the results indicate that language can function as 
active representation decreasing Secure Communities outputs, but only in counties with 
small immigrant communities. The second section of this dissertation is a multi-method 
study that develops a conceptual framework for the philanthropic sector’s influence on 
public policy. Beginning with the empirical analysis, the first part of the framework 
focuses on establishing the link between the philanthropic sector's grant making patterns 
and immigration policy outputs. The results indicate an incredibly small effect between 
philanthropic foundations' immigration-related grant making patterns and the identification 
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of deportable immigrants. To understand the relationship between the philanthropic sector 
and policy outputs, the final part of this study takes a qualitative approach to study how 
nonprofit grant recipients and their work with the immigrant community alters immigrant 
deportability. The two studies together develop a conceptual framework that provides 
insights into how philanthropic funding translates into redefining citizenship at the 
community level with the aim to reduce the deportability of the immigrant community. 
This dissertation provides insights into how non-governmental institutions can shape the 
concept of citizenship and alter policy through citizen-state feedback.  
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States has long struggled to mend the tensions between its historic past as a 
nation of immigrants and its punitive immigration policies. Not since the Reagan 
administration has the United States been able to pass legislation providing a path to 
citizenship for the 11 million undocumented immigrants residing within the U.S. borders. 
With no comprehensive immigration reform and Congress’s inability to address the 
underlying causes of immigration, America’s deportation regime has only continued to 
grow expanding into our local communities (Jones-Correa & de Graauw 2013; Motomura 
2012; Ewing 2012; Bodvarsson & Van den Berg 2009; Daniels 2005). Current 
immigration enforcement programs stem from the last immigration policy passed in 
contemporary history, the Illegal Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
(IRIRA).  
The role of public policy centers on delineating “who gets what, when, and how” 
(Laswell 1950) thereby creating the boundaries of citizenship (Mettler & Soss 2004). 
Citizenship boundaries that not only include the political community but consequently 
feedback into society to influence the views of social membership and the creation of new 
policy (Cambell 2012; Mettler 2002; Soss & Schram 2007). IRIRA was no different. 
Overnight, IRIRA redefined citizenship within the U.S. The 1996 immigration policy 
increased the deportability of all immigrants residing within her boundaries regardless of 
legal status. IRIRA's core mechanism to increase "illegality" was its retroactive expansion 
of what “crimes” constituted inadmissibility to include non-violent offenses and crimes for 
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which immigrants had paid their debt to society (Motomura 2012; Ewing 2012; 
Bodvarsson & Van den Berg 2009). For example, in 1988, Mary Anne Gehris plead guilty 
to “pulling a woman’s hair,” a misdemeanor assault. In 1999, Gehris, an immigrant from 
Germany, applied for naturalization and because of IRIRA her misdemeanor assault 
became categorized as a “crime of violence.” Labeled as a violent criminal, instead of 
receiving naturalization she entered deportation proceedings. IRIRA allowed a conviction 
from eight years before its passage to make Gehris eligible for deportation three years after 
its enactment (Ewing et al. 2015). If Gehris had applied for naturalization before the 
enactment of IRIRA, it is unlikely that she would have gone into deportation proceedings 
for a prior misdemeanor.   
Today, the concept of citizenship is intimately intertwined with deportability as the 
U.S. remains unable to refocus the debate away from “illegal” immigration (Jones-Correa 
& De Graauw 2013).  As a consequence of lacking formal citizenship, individuals must 
live with the reality that any interaction with a state institution or by extension their 
representative can lead to their “exclusion, subjugation, repression” and ultimately the 
removal from their community (De Genova 2002, 427). Constitutionally, the federal 
government is the only branch of government allowed to set the boundaries of political 
citizenship. Yet, as the levels of government most affected by immigration patterns, states 
and municipalities increasingly exercise their power to regulate the lives of immigrants by 
setting laws that affect their ability to reside and move freely within their communities 
(Reich 2017; Provine et al. 2016; Monogan 2009). The devolution of federal immigration 
enforcement to local law enforcement agencies has given rise to the “multi-jurisdictional 
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patchwork of enforcement policies and practices (Provine et al. 2016, 3)” (Armenta & 
Alvarez 2017; Provine et al 2016; Decker et al. 2009). 
Bureaucracies serve as one of the central actors in our political system (Heffron 
1989). Despite their removal from electoral accountability, bureaucracies implement public 
policy to meet the expectations of citizens. Implementation of policy is driven through 
bureaucratic interaction with multiple actors within their policy environment such as 
political forces, industry forces, and citizen forces (Boyne & Meier 2009; Boyne 2003; 
Meier 1994).  As a consequence of devolution, citizen forces working to redefining 
deportability within their policy environment affect the implementation of local 
immigration enforcement. In the era of immigration devolution, this dissertation provides 
answers to the following question: how do non-governmental institutions can influence 
local policy implementation? The citizen forces of focus are non-governmental institutions. 
My first empirical chapter views an institution as an established practice conveying 
identity, norms, and values within a community (Institution 2018), in this case, language. 
The second definition of a non-governmental institution is an organization established to 
serve the community outside the bounds of the public sector, specifically the philanthropic 
sector.  
In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the specific interior immigration 
enforcement program enforcing IRIRA within local communities. In that section, I provide 
an overview of Secure Communities Program, the criticism of Secure Communities, and 
the policy outputs of interest. The final section focus on providing an overview of each of 
the studies and their unique contributions to the literature of public policy, public 
administration, philanthropy, and immigration policy. 
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La Migra, La Policia, La Misma Cosa1 
True to his campaign promises, President Trump signed the “Enhancing Public Safety in 
the Interior of the United States” Executive Order thereby reviving Secure Communities 
five days after inauguration. Unlike the previous enforcement programs and the first 
Secure Communities Program under President Obama, Trump’s Secure Communities 
allowed for the removal of all immigrants convicted or charged with committing a crime 
even “where such charge has not been resolved” (E.O 2017). Two administrations, two 
different goals, one strategy. A strategy reliant upon leveraging local law enforcement 
agencies to serve as force multipliers in identifying immigrants for removal from the 
interior of the United States.  
The mission of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is “to identify, arrest, 
and remove aliens who present a danger to national security or are a risk to public safety, 
as well as those who enter the United States illegally or otherwise undermine the integrity 
of our immigration laws and our border control efforts.  Enforcement and Removal 
Operations (ERO) upholds America's immigration laws at, within and beyond our borders 
through efficient enforcement and removal operations (ICE 2016)”.  As the way of 
achieving this goal, the Department of Homeland Security implemented the Secure 
Communities program from 20092 to 2014. Secure Communities served as an 
intergovernmental tool leveraging the policing efforts of local law enforcement agencies to 
achieve ICE’s mission. By tapping into local law enforcement arrests, Secure Communities 
drastically expanded the identification of deportable immigrants by ICE from the interior 
                                                
1 ICE, the Police, the Same Thing  
2 Under the Bush Administration, a select number of counties activated in October 2008.  
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of the United States. sComm's full initiation began in 2009 with a staggered county-level 
implementation achieving nationwide partnerships in 20133. Figure 1 displays the 
activation pattern of Secure Communities across the 48 continental U.S. states. The 
partnership “shared” fingerprint background checks with FBI to help identify policy targets 
eligible for deportation (Kohli et al. 2011; ICE 2016).  
Secure Communities was a priority level enforcement program focusing on the 
removal of deportable immigrants based on three priority levels. The priority levels4 
centered on the intersection between an immigrant’s criminal background and an 
evaluation of their threat to public safety and national security. Level one priority offenders 
include immigrants “convicted of “aggregated felonies”…or two or more crimes 
punishable by more than one year, commonly referred to as “felonies” (IDENT 2014).” 
Immigrants identified as a level one priority deportable immigrant are considered the 
highest level threat to public safety and national security. Immigrants falling under level 
two priority include immigrants “convicted of any felony or three or more offenses 
punishable by less than one year, commonly referred to as a “misdemeanor” (IDENT 
2014).” The final priority level includes immigrants convicted of “offenses punishable by 
less than one year (IDENT 2014).” Under Secure Communities, level two and three 
offenders are not a high priority for removal as their records contained only misdemeanors 
                                                
3 Although ICE states nationwide activation, twelve counties were not reporting outputs: 
Kalawao, HI; Bronx, NY; Kings, NY; Queens, NY; Richmond County, VA; Shannon, SD; 
Emporia City, VA; Fairfax City, VA; Manassas City, VA; Poquoson City, VA; Doddridge, 
WV.  
4 Level one, high priority immigrants, offenders have committed aggravated felonies. 
Level two and three offenders are immigrants convicted of misdemeanors including 
offenses involving minor drugs, property crimes, public disorder, DUI, traffic violations. 
(Pedroza 2013).   
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or civil immigration violations. Unlike any other immigration enforcement program, the 
Department of Homeland Security released detailed interoperability reports on the outputs 
of Secure Communities providing a rich dataset by which to evaluate its implementation 
and enforcement at each step of policy implementation.   
The policy reports for Secure Communities were released between three to four 
times a year, but never in a uniform manner. For all activated counties at the time of the 
report, each report detailed cumulative statistics for each level of implementation. Policy 
outputs were disaggregated to show the efforts at each step of the implementation process, 
the local and federal. The first two measures are local immigration outcomes: submissions 
and matches, the best measures for this research. The final policy outcome of removals 
from the country measures federal immigration outcomes5. Regardless of the level of 
government to which the policy output belongs, all outcomes are reported at the county 
level. 
Submissions measure the total number individuals who were arrested and booked 
into jail. Upon processing the fingerprints, a background check is run by the FBI and 
Homeland Security to scrutinize the arrestee's deportability. A match is reported if the 
individual has met any of the inadmissibility criteria. Matches are then spilt into the 
deportable high and low priority categories. With this information, if ICE officials deem 
the immigrants a deportation priority, the local law enforcement agency receive a detainer 
                                                
5 The total deportation and deportations by priority level is of high interest and importance, 
but out of scope for the purposes of this research. Local law enforcement agencies are 
responsible for identifying deportable immigrants, but do not have the power to create 
deportation orders or place them into deportation proceedings.  
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to place a 48-hour hold on immigrants. Matches6 indicate the local law enforcement 
agency’s force multiplier effectiveness in helping achieve the federal immigration 
bureaucracy’s ultimate policy outcome of "removing all removable aliens." The final and 
only federal outcome reported is the total deportations that occurred within the county. 
This outcome, like matches, is broken down into high and low priority immigrants.  
For this research, I have chosen to focus on examining the influence of non-
governmental organizations at the local level rather than the federal level. The local level 
output is a measure of the implementation by local law enforcement agencies operating on 
a daily basis within the community. The proximity of the local bureaucracy to the non-
governmental institutions of interest create a shorter distance by which citizen forces can 
influence the implementation of immigration policy. Immigrants’ level of deportability 
increases by linking ICE’s ability to identify immigrants from the interior through the daily 
policing within communities. Prior to Secure Communities, interactions with police before 
only lead to increased deportability through the Criminal Alien Program. The Criminal 
Alien Program identified immigrants for deportation after they served time for criminal 
convictions (Kandel 2016). Secure Communities increased immigrants’ deportability 
simply through interacting with a local law enforcement agent regardless of the reason for 
the interaction. As Motomura (2011) notes enforcement discretion is the most important in 
the process of immigration enforcement. The discretion exercised by local law 
enforcement agencies is crucial to helping reduce the overzealous nature of deportation in 
                                                
6 Matches and identification of deportable immigrants are used interchangeably throughout 
the research. Both terms refer to an arrest of a deportable immigrant.   
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the U.S. of non-criminal immigrants with roots in the community (Motomura 2011; Jones-
Correa & De Graauw 2013).  
Throughout the tenure of Secure Communities, deportations skyrocketed with more 
than two million removals resulting in a 400% increase since 1996 (Kohli et al. 2011; 
TRAC 2014). A majority of the sComm deportations encompassed individuals whose most 
serious crime was a traffic violation. A crime that labels them as criminal immigrants 
constituting a “threat” to public safety and, ultimately, disqualifying them from 
membership in the U.S. (TRAC 2014a,b). By linking local law enforcement agencies and 
ICE, the identification and removal of immigrants through this program further strengthen 
the “illegality” of their membership and the ever infamous crimigration narrative (Abrego 
et al. 2017; Ewing 2017; Ewing et al. 2015; Stumpf 2006). The 400% increase in 
deportations was only possible through the more than 43 million fingerprint submissions. 
Of these 43 million fingerprint submissions, local law enforcement agencies were effective 
0.05% of the time in identifying deportable immigrants. Of those deportable immigrants 
matched, local law enforcement agencies were almost three times more likely to match a 
low priority deportable immigrant than a high priority deportable immigrant (IDENT 
2014).  
Criticism of Secure Communities Program 
Officially the Secure Communities program was discontinued by Jeh Johnson, Secretary of 
the Department of Homeland Security in November of 2014. In his memo, Johnson stated, 
“the reality is the program has attracted a great deal of criticism, is widely misunderstood, 
and is embroiled in litigation; its very name has become a symbol for general hostility 
toward the enforcement of our immigration laws (2014).” The Secure Communities was 
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intended to act as an efficient way of identifying criminal aliens from the custody of local 
law enforcement agencies. Contrary to sComm’s stated goal, critics argued that its 
implementation facilitated legal violence by targeting “an entire class of people mostly 
with noncriminal social characteristics such as language spoken or physical appearance, 
that associate them with a particular immigrant appearance (Menjívar & Abrego 2012, 
1388).”  
The two main criticisms of sComm centered on the racial profiling and its inability 
to reduce crime within communities (Ramos 2011; Cox & Miles 2013; Miles & Cox 2014; 
Treyger et al. 2014; Martinez & Iwama 2014). As counties became active jurisdictions for 
Secure Communities, local law enforcement agents received no training to identify 
“criminal immigrants” unlike the training received in the predecessor local immigration 
enforcement 287(g) program (Ramos 2011). Coupled with early activation of counties with 
high Hispanic populations, Secure Communities led to racial profiling of the Hispanic 
community. Although, Hispanic immigration represents 53% of the immigrant population 
it disproportionately represented 75% of deportations (Kohli et al. 2011). Additionally, 
contrary to popular belief, immigrant communities are associated with lower crime rates 
than their native counterparts (Davies and Fagan 2012; Martinez and Lee 2009; Hagan et 
al. 2008; Rumbaut and Ewing 2007). In leveraging local law enforcement agents under the 
guise of safety, the implementation of Secure Communities created a rift in community 
policing and weakened trust between the immigrant community and local law enforcement 
agents. These negative consequences undermined their ability to carry out their first and 
foremost mission of serving and protecting and had no significant effect on decreasing 
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crime across counties (Waslin 2010; Solomon et al. 2017; Abrego 2011; Koper et al. 2013; 
Miles & Cox 2014).  
The consequences of Secure Communities culminated in the creating social 
disorganization and legal violence against immigrant community as local law enforcement 
agents identified and helped deport immigrants who posed no threat to community safety. 
Figure 2 illustrates the identification outputs for each year that Secure Communities 
operated. The heightened state of deportability that immigrants experienced caused them to 
socially isolate themselves not only from community connections but from reaching out to 
any state institution because of the fear of deportation. Not only does the effects of 
heightened deportability affect immigrants, documented and undocumented, but it spills 
over to their families especially in mixed-status households (Leyro & Stageman 2018; 
Warren & Kerwin 2017; Abrego et al. 2017; Hagen et al. 2015; Leyro 2013; Hagan et al. 
2011; Arbona et al. 2010; Hagan et al. 2008; Rodriguez & Hagan 2004). Most significant 
is the feedback that Secure Communities provides to the immigrants and their families 
about their “citizenship” within the community (De Genova 2002).  
Local Policy Outputs 
The focus of this research is understanding the influence of non-governmental institutions 
on the implementation of local immigration policy outputs. In order to construct the policy 
outputs of interest, I selected to create the policy outputs measures from the local policy 
output of matches. This measure reflects the local implementation of immigration policy. 
Matches focuses on the total number of identifications that local law enforcement agencies 
contribute to the federal immigration regime. Figure 2 provides an illustration of the yearly 
total matches, the total identification of deportable immigrants, from 2009 through 2014. 
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As previously mentioned, matches is the total number of identified deportable immigrants 
who have their information relayed to Immigration and Customs enforcement for possible 
deportation.  To measure the influence of local law enforcement agencies in acting as a 
force multiplier for ICE, I focus on three policy outputs and a disparity enforcement 
measure. Secure Communities provided between three and four, yearly, interoperability 
reports beginning in October 2009 through December 2014. I created a panel dataset to 
include all U.S. counties from 2009 through 20147 that included all policy outputs. Due to 
the rollout basis of Secure Communities, for the analysis, non-active counties with no 
policy outcome to report were each re-coded to have a value of zero and each measure is 
logged to adjust for the non-normal distribution and skewness towards zero8. 
Each of the policy outputs is operationalized as a per capita measure to illustrate the 
impact of enforcement relative to the size of the policy target population. The per capita 
measure is created using the total policy target population, noncitizen population, within a 
county. This measure includes all noncitizens that have not naturalized, including 
documented and undocumented immigrants. The policy outputs include the overall goal of 
Secure Communities to act as a force multiplier for ICE and each priority level 
enforcement output. The final measure of interest is the enforcement disparity ratio. With 
the uneven priority enforcement, I create a disparity ratio to measure the disproportionate 
identification of low priority to high priority deportable immigrants within the county. 
                                                
7 In the empirical analysis, I exclude the counties in Alaska and Hawaii based on their 
locations.   
8 To create the final logged measures, I, uniformly, added one to each variable in order to 
keep the observations that had a policy outcome of zero, structural or non-structural.  
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Figure 3 illustrates the yearly enforcement disparity ratios for Secure Communities from 
2009 through 2014.  
Outline of Dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine how non-governmental institutions impact 
policy implementation and outputs. This research is unique in that it focuses on studying 
local law enforcement agencies tasked with implementing immigration policy. Unlike 
analyzing state and local immigration policy, the devolution of enforcement to local law 
enforcement agencies increases the ability to influence the deportation regime in the 
United States. At the national level, non-governmental institutions are unable to stop ICE 
from detaining immigrants for deportation processing as ICE’s strategy used to be on 
executing final removal orders and workplace raids. With the enforcement devolution, 
non-governmental institutions can influence the implementation of local enforcement 
through their work in the local policy environment. At the local level, non-governmental 
institutions can affect the deportability of immigrants before ICE identifies them for 
deportation. This dissertation is composed of two quantitative chapters and a qualitative 
chapter examining three non-governmental institution’s influence on local law 
enforcement’s implementation of immigration policy. 
¿Hablas Español9? Linguistic Accommodation & The Theory of Representative 
Bureaucracy 
Using the theory of representative bureaucracy, chapter two focuses on the role of 
language in structuring the interactions between the immigrant community and 
                                                
9 Do you speak Spanish? 
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bureaucracy tasked with implementing immigration policy. English may be the 
institutionalized language for most Americans and the bureaucracies we interact with, but 
this is not always the case for the immigrant community. Language can provide 
information shortcuts to bureaucrats about their client’s identity, culture, and needs. If the 
client’s language is not English, this can signal their immigration status affecting their 
level of deportability. Theoretically, bilingual bureaucrats are better positioned to 
overcome immigrant stereotypes and exercise more discretion in policing when 
encountering immigrants. Therefore, language as an institution serves as a mechanism to 
affect the implementation of Secure Communities. Using data from Law Enforcement 
Management and Administration Survey and Secure Communities, I test how institutional 
commitment to hiring bilingual officers influences the implementation of Secure 
Communities. The results indicate that commitment by a sheriff’s department to 
incentivize bilingual officers does serve as a mechanism to altering the implementation of 
immigration enforcement, but the direction of influence is dependent on the foreign-born 
population within a county.  
In testing the role of language in policy implementation, this chapter contributes to 
the literature on representative bureaucracy and bureaucratic incorporation. First, it is the 
first study to focus on language as a mechanism of representation. The theoretical 
contribution extends the theory of representative bureaucracy to encompass non-inherited 
or mutable traits by illustrating how linguistic congruence can lead to increased 
representation for non-English clients.  Additionally, the empirical analysis focuses on 
testing representative bureaucracy outside traditional policy issues and redistributive 
bureaucracies.  Unlike the research on policing and representative bureaucracy, this 
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research focuses on studying the effects of representation on not only a racial minority but 
a population with limited to no political rights.  
Second, in finding that language serves to help immigrants dependent on the share 
of the foreign-born population, this research has implications for bureaucratic 
incorporation. Studies on bureaucratic incorporation have focused on the service aspect of 
bureaucracies seeking to meet the needs of immigrants by providing language access or 
programs to help incorporate the immigrant community. The results in this chapter indicate 
institutional commitment to meeting language needs does not always lead to bureaucratic 
incorporation of the immigrant community. In counties with large shares of foreign born 
populations, incentivizing bilingual abilities increases immigration enforcement potentially 
leading to the alienation of the immigrant community.  
¿Government’s Amigos o Rebeldes10? The Effect of Philanthropy on Local Immigration 
Policy Outputs 
The final two studies use a multi-method approach to studying the role of the philanthropic 
community in influencing local immigration enforcement. Together these studies, provide 
a conceptual framework for understanding how philanthropy seeks to influence public 
policy especially within the communities they serve. Chapter three is one of the first 
studies to quantitatively analyze the assumption across the philanthropy literature that 
foundations use their privileged position and resources to influence public policy. No 
previous studies have quantitatively tested the role of philanthropic funding on local policy 
outcomes. The results indicate an association between philanthropic funding and local 
                                                
10 Government’s Friends or Adversaries?  
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policy implementation. To test the assumption that foundations influence public policy, I, 
purposefully, choose a policy output that would be difficult to shape based on the location 
of foundations in relation to the public policy process and the local implementation of 
policy. The association found in the results is incredibly small, but illustrates that the 
philanthropic funders are leveraging their grant dollars in funding nonprofits with services 
and advocacy aimed at engaging and creating inclusiveness for the immigrant community.   
    As philanthropic funders are disconnected from directly impacting the public 
policy process, chapter four examines the role of nonprofit organizations in serving the 
immigrant community and the effect their services have on policy. This qualitative study 
provides a understanding on how funding to nonprofit organizations affects not only the 
level of deportability of immigrants but the policy environment. As nonprofits influence 
policy targets and advocate for changes in the policy environment, their work leads to 
changes in local implementation and enforcement patterns. A unique contribution of this 
qualitative research is it focuses on interviewing recipients of foundation grants related to 
immigration and granted specifically to immigrant-serving nonprofits. Using a theoretical 
thematic analysis, the study of foundation grantees shows that nonprofit organizations use 
their position in the community to influence policy through two strategies. The first 
strategy is through the creation of “citizenship” for the immigrant community leading to 
micro-level changes in the population of policy targets. The second strategy focuses on 
macro-level changes through advocacy efforts to change the policy environment to be 
more immigrant-friendly. Using both approaches or employing only one, nonprofit 
organizations can influence policy implementation, but their effect is neither rapid nor 
uniform.  
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This multi-method research contributes to the literature on philanthropy in three 
ways. The first is by being one of the first to empirically test the link between total dollars 
leveraged within a community and its influence on local immigration policy outputs. This 
research adds to the literature of one other scholar who empirically tested the relationship 
between education-related grant making and education policy reform. Its final contribution 
is the development of a conceptual framework that illustrates the role of the philanthropic 
community, foundations and nonprofit organizations, and their strategies for influencing 
public policy. The final contribution is the descriptive analysis and illustration of the grant 
making patterns related to immigration that goes beyond focusing on grants make for civic 
engagement of immigrants such as voting registration drives (Brown 2013).  
Conclusion 
The policy targets of the U.S. federal immigration bureaucracy and by extension of local 
law enforcement agencies constitute a substantial part of the U.S. population. Currently, 
about 14% of U.S. population is at risk of being identified for deportation by, simply, 
interacting with a local law enforcement agent (Krogstad 2014). This dissertation seeks to 
shed light on how non-governmental institutions can shape the implementation of 
immigration policy at the most proximate level of government to the policy target. I assess 
how linguistic connection and the philanthropic community can change the policy 
environment and discretion exercised by local bureaucrats tasked with the mission of 
Secure Communities. The influences that these non-governmental organizations exert on 
policy provide insights into how the idea of citizenship can be shaped from the bottom up 
rather than from policy down. The findings presented in this dissertation have significant 
implications for the study of politics and its intersection with immigration policy. 
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Specifically, it addresses the use of force multiplier tools in achieving federal policy goals 
and the methods reshaping policy through local community forces. In the final chapter, I 
discuss the implications of this dissertation in greater detail, consider the generalizability 
and limitations of my research, as well as provide guidance on future directions.  
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CHAPTER II                                                                                                                          
¿HABLAS ESPAÑOL?: LINGUISTIC ACCOMMODATION & THE THEORY OF 
REPRESENTATIVE BUREAUCRACY 
 
“Speaking Mexican” during a campaign event earned, then Republican presidential 
candidate Jeb Bush, criticism from fellow candidate President Donald J. Trump. President 
Trump’s criticism devalued Bush’s bilingual skills failing to acknowledge how linguistic 
abilities help candidates connect with non-English speaking communities. To the detriment 
of America’s economic vitality and national security, she stands as one of the only nations 
whose citizenry is more likely to be monolingual (Simon 1980; Cutshall 2004).  
 Although laws are in the books regarding the official languages that should be used 
for official state documents and institutional settings, many remain symbolic as state 
governments and public agencies continue to provide bilingual materials to their non-
English dominant immigrant community (López & Bialik 2017). The rise of these 
symbolic laws illustrate a nativist backlash to the changing demographics, increases in the 
vitality of non-English languages, especially Spanish, and ties to immigration (Barker et al. 
2001). Padilla et al. (1991) suggest that this movement has “a wider more far-reaching, and 
more negative agenda than simply advocating an official English Language policy. (120).” 
These laws create an environment where language-minorities and their “non-American” 
identities are at risk of being “disadvantaged, denigrated, and demeaned” (Crawford 1989). 
Research in representative bureaucracy illustrates the positive effects of increasing the 
racial/ethnic and gender diversity of our institutions on minority outcomes without 
disadvantage to the majority (Meier 1993a,b; Mosher 1982; Selden 1997; Keiser et al. 
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2002; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty 2006). These studies have failed to take into account how 
language ability plays a role in representation.  
Language is foundational to the expression of one’s identity representing which 
identities are important from macro-level institutions down to the micro-level (Miller 
2000). The manner in which our social or racial/ethnic identities are, institutionally, 
constructed and communicated through everyday practices such as which language is 
spoken or is allowed to be spoken indicate the vitality, status, and power of their respective 
groups and identities (Barker et al 2001). With increasing demographic changes, and more 
than 350 languages spoken in the United States (U.S. Census 2015), public organizations 
will continue to rely on bureaucrats’ ability to understand and communicate with their 
constituents in order to provide effective and efficient services. This research addresses the 
question: does increasing bilingualism within our institutions lead to redressing 
inequitable service delivery to underserved and underrepresented communities?  
  A majority of Americans agree that being able to speak English is very important to 
truly being considered American (Stokes 2017; Newman et al. 2012; Citrin & Wright 
2009; Citrin 1990; Citrin et al. 1990 a,b). This view of the American identity, opens the 
door to the potential discrimination of limited English proficient communities from of 
denial of services (Westphal 2000) to the questioning of one’s citizenship. In light of the 
devolution of immigration enforcement to local law enforcement agencies, interactions 
with the state actors who view speaking English as an integral part of the of American 
identity could lead to increasing deportability of non-English proficient immigrants. Using 
data from the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration Enforcement and Customs’ 
Secure Communities Immigration Enforcement program, I expand the theory of 
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representative bureaucracy to test the effect of bilingualism on local immigration policy 
outputs. The results indicate that institutional commitment to bilingualism is related to the 
implementation of immigration enforcement, but its effect depends on the linguistic 
landscape.  
Literature Review 
Representation is a central value of our democratic society. Not surprisingly, it is expected 
that our political institutions and public bureaucracies be representative of our society in 
order to foster inclusivity and unity. From historical barriers to current changes in the 
demographics of our population, representation within and across all offices of our 
government and public sectors have fallen short of holding to this value. Central to 
ensuring the democratic strength of public institutions, the study of representation centers 
on provides insights into the mechanism to increase political representation (Kastellec 
2013; Preuhs 2007; Hero & Tolbert 1995; Pitkin 1967) in order to ensure bureaucratic 
responsibility and to address the problem of inequitable service delivery to 
underrepresented and marginalized populations (Kingsley 1944; Mosher 2003, 1982; 
Krislov 1974; Meier 1975, 1993a; Selden 1997).  
The theories of representation center around two mechanisms to facilitate 
representation, passive and active. In it most fundamental form, representation occurs in a 
passive manner without need for action on the bureaucrat’s part. Passive representation 
occurs when the social and demographic characteristics of bureaucrats/elected officials are 
congruent with the clients and populations they serve. With passive representation, the 
congruence between a population or client’s identities and backgrounds serve as the 
catalyst that allows bureaucrats and elected officials to represent these individuals. By 
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sharing similar identities or backgrounds with the population they serve, bureaucrats will, 
also, share similar values and beliefs allowing better understanding of and service delivery 
to the community with which they share identities (Selden 1997; Meier 1993b; Mosher 
2003, 1982; Kingsley 1944; Krislov 1974). With passive representation present, 
bureaucrats or elected officials with the proper discretionary power can actively engage not 
only on behalf of, but also directly for, the interests of the individuals whom they serve, 
when the policy issue at hand is salient to their identity (Keiser 2010; Mosher 1982; Meier 
1975).  
Using these the mechanisms of representation, scholars have applied the theory of 
representation across a broad range of policy areas including the political arena (Butler and 
Broockman 2011; Prenuhs 2007;Pantoja & Segura 2003; Pitkin 1967), education 
(Grissom, Kern & Rodriguez 2015; Atkins et al. 2014; Roch, Pitts & Navarro 2010; Rocha 
& Hawes 2009; Pitts; 2005; Keiser et al. 2002; Meier 1993a,b;  Meier & Stewart 1992), 
health (Atkins & Wilkins 2013; Zhu & Walker 2013; Thielemann & Stewart 1996), law 
enforcement  (Hong 2016, 2017; Riccucci et al 2014; Wilkins & Williams 2008, 2009; 
Theobald & Haider-Markel 2008; Meier & Nicholson-Crotty 2006), welfare (Watkins-
Hayes 2006; Keiser et.al 2004), child support (Wilkins & Keiser 2006; Wilkins 2007) and 
within the nonprofit sector (Gazely, Chang & Bingham 2010; LeRoux 2009; Guo & Musso 
2007; Brown 2002 a,b) finding an influence of representation on policy outcomes and 
service delivery. Lim (2006) doubts the extent to which research has truly shown the direct 
substantive effects of passive representation translating into active representation.  
As part of Lim’s (2006) argument, Selden’s (1997) research is the foundational 
study showing the direct effects of active representation through her theoretical argument 
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that bureaucrats in the Farm Home Administration’s Rural Housing Loans program took 
on the minority representative role and additionally active representation occurred through 
an administrative role perception. Similar findings can be found for African American 
substantive political representation. Within the judicial branch, Kastellec (2013) finds that 
a black judge on a panel with two non-minority judges increases the support shown for 
affirmative action cases by influencing non-minority behavior. Juenke and Preuhs (2012) 
find that when there is a minority dimension to issues during legislative voting, minority 
representatives are able to provide substantive representation through representation that 
“resembles the trustee model for minority interests (pg. 713)”.  
Despite, the numerous studies illustrating the increases made in minority outcomes 
with increased minority presence and action within an organization, inclusivity does not 
always equate with improved outcomes. Studies across the fields of representation (Hero 
and Tolbert 1995; Casellas 2007; Wilkins and Williams 2008, 2009) are beginning to lay 
the foundations that discuss the obstacles to the positive effects of representation. Within 
positions of elected office, Hero and Tolbert (1995) and later re-evaluated by Casellas 
(2007) find that increased descriptive representation in legislatures by Latinos did not 
directly equate to substantive representation on legislative voting. The ethnic connection 
between the elected officials and their Latino constituents, did not influence their voting 
patterns. Rather partisanship helped pass legislation that was salient to their Latino 
constituents. Notwithstanding the enactment of legislation for Latinos, partisanship here 
superseded the representative connection between Latino officials and their Latino 
constituents.  
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Another factor impeding the effects of passive to active representation is 
organizational socialization (Wilkins and Williams 2008, 2009). To ensure that street level 
bureaucrats adhere to implementing their organizational mission, organizations seek to 
structure bureaucratic decision making by replacing personal identities and values with “a 
common set of assumptions and way of looking at the world (Wilkins & Williams 2008, 
656).” By socializing the world view of bureaucrats, organizations seek to ensure that 
bureaucratic behavior does not deviate from promoting organizational loyalty and mission 
objectives (Downs 1967; Meier & Nigro 1976; Simon 1957; Weber 1946; Thompson 
1976; Romzek 1990). Specifically, socialization within a punitive context creates obstacles 
of creating equity within the justice system. Wilkins & Williams find that increasing 
Latino (2009) and African Americans (2008) representation within local police forces 
increases the stops of minorities. Instead of decreasing the number of stops for people of 
color, increasing police officers of color leads to increases in racial profiling.  This is a 
surprising finding with respect to race and punishment, as studies of increased gender 
representation within law enforcement continues to produce positive outcomes for 
increased child support payments (Wilkins and Keiser 2006; Wilkins 2007) and the 
reporting of sexual assault crimes and arrests (Meier and Nicholson-Crotty 2006; Riccucci 
et al. 2014). The culture and socialization of their job altered the connection (salience) 
between themselves as minority bureaucrats and the individuals they stopped through the 
course of their job (discretion). 
Traditionally, the focus on studying representation centers on illustrating the effects 
of increasing bureaucrat’s observable demographic characteristics. There are currently only 
two exceptions to the traditional supply side of representative bureaucracy (Gade & 
  
 
24 
Wilkins 2012; Thielemann & Stewart 1996). The advantageous of having a representative 
bureaucracy can be seen in policy outputs, but do clients have a preference and recognize 
differences in service delivery by co-identity bureaucrat? In their study, Thieleman & 
Stewart (1996) examine the relationship between clients’ desires to be served by 
bureaucrats with their similar characteristics. For people living with AIDS, it was 
especially important for the face of service delivery to match the sexual orientation and 
gender of client seeking services. Similarly, Gade & Wilkins (2012) focused on a mutable 
identity of the bureaucrat, a bureaucrat’s previous professional experience. The authors 
evaluated whether Veterans’ seeking services from Veteran’s Affairs reported a higher 
level of satisfaction from their service delivery if their rehabilitation counselor was a 
fellow Veteran. Their results indicate that Veterans were more satisfied with services from 
a bureaucrat they perceived to be a fellow Veteran. Veteran clients were comfortable 
asking, during the course of service delivery, if their counselors had previously served in 
the military. Counselors acknowledged the importance of portraying their professional 
identity truthfully.  Both of these studies, unique to the previous literature, concentrate on 
understanding how client’s feel about representative service delivery. Its not only 
important for the policy outputs to show increases in service delivery, but the clients must 
also feel that connection in order to feel comfortable coming to the bureaucracy for 
services (Soss 1999). 
Increased passive representation can help organizations demographically reflect 
their clients, but this does not ensure clients will be able to communicate or interact with 
the organization. One marginalized community frequently overlooked is the U.S. 
noncitizen community (Lucio 2016). The U.S. is home to a foreign-born community of 
  
 
25 
43.3 million people. Of this 43.3 million, a little more than half at 22.6 million are non-
citizen immigrants (CAP & Nicholson 2017). Providing services to the foreign-born 
community brings a set of barriers, the two most prominent are the citizenships status and 
language barrier. If representation continues to place a premium on physical traits, then 
organizations will continue “reifying the dominant language [English] in public discourse 
[and] ensures that institutions of public life will be remote to those whose orientations 
encompass other languages (Rodriguez 2001, 135)”.  
Language 
Language is deeply intertwined with racial and ethnic identities as it has “social, cultural 
and functional features that parallel other ascriptive legal categories but nevertheless 
require that language be treated uniquely (Rodriguez 2001,140).” It stands alone as a 
multipurpose tool that can be acquired and deployed with no prerequisite of having the 
speaker be a member of a particular ethnic identity. Aside from its connections to racial 
and ethnic identities, language serves to develop understanding and belonging to all who 
share in its external and internal collective identity (Gravier 2018). Language congruence 
is not simply the act of speaking a language other than English. Bilingualism allows for the 
bureaucrats to not just speak another language, but to have cultural knowledge, sensitivity, 
and responsiveness that helps ease clients (Porras et.al 2014; Cho 2000; Zhou 1997a,b; 
Church & King 1993).  As Justice Kennedy acknowledged in the Hernandez v. New York 
ruling, “Language permits an individual both to express a personal identity and 
membership in a community, and those who share a common language may interact in 
ways more intimate than those without this bond. Bilinguals, in a sense, inhabit two 
communities, and serve to bring them closer (1991; Rodriguez 2001). Theoretically, with 
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no limit to the number of languages a bureaucrat can speak, what effect does bilingualism 
within a bureaucracy have on policy outputs? Specifically, can bilingualism in a 
bureaucracy provide representation to the immigrant community? If so, does the immigrant 
community receive the “advantageous” of a non-neutral bureaucracy? This research will 
build on the theory of representative bureaucracy by incorporating aspects of 
Communication Accommodation Theory to illustrate how language can serve as active 
representation the U.S. immigrant community. 
Passive representation is linked to a bureaucrat’s demographically inherited traits 
that identify their racial/ethnicity or gender. Language can be suppressed or chosen to be 
invoked during interactions, it does not meet the requirements to be considered a 
mechanism for passive representation as it is not a demographic characteristic that is easily 
observable to clients. For language to produce active representation for non-English 
dominant clients two conditions must be met, discretion and salience (Meier 1993; Selden 
1997; Meier & Bohte 2001; Keiser et al. 2002; Sowa & Selden 2003; Wilkins & Keiser 
2006).  
Traditionally, scholars have defined salience to indicate a policy issue and its 
outcome is important to both the bureaucrat and the client. Keiser et al. (2002) argue that a 
policy is considered salient for women, because of direct benefits to women, the influence 
of a bureaucrat’s gender on the relationship with their client, and the issue has been defined 
as a women’s issue through the political process. Adapting this framework of saliency to 
linguistic representation, the most important component is the linguistic relationship 
between client and bureaucrat. Linguistic (in)congruence will alter the relationship 
between a bureaucrat and client either in a bridging or alienating manner. Dependent on 
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the mission of the bureaucracy, salience will be related to the direction of the effect of 
linguistic representation based on the marriage of the first and third component of the 
framework. If the political process has created a narrative (Ingram & Schnedier 1991; 
Schnedier & Ingram 1993; Soss 1999; Mettler 2002; Mettler & Soss 2004; Schneider & 
Sidney 2009) of the non-English language that is being spoken it can influence the 
direction of benefits for the specific non-English dominant client by the bureaucrat. 
However, all policies across the spectrum of issues from health to criminal justice system 
are important to non-English dominant communities. In the case of gender, where the 
“content of women’s issues is fluid and changes over time (Keiser et al 2002, 556)”, issues 
of language create barriers to services and inclusivity making every policy or service not 
available in an accommodating language salient to the non-English dominant community.  
The second condition of active representation is the discretion of the bureaucrat to 
act on behalf of the client. Discretion is the sphere of influence from which the bureaucrat 
can deviate or advocate for specific clients. Within the sphere of influence, a bureaucrat 
has two types of discretion that may interact or contradict each other. The organizational 
structure of the bureaucracy may afford discretion during service delivery, but this 
discretion can be altered by the social conditions or socialization that the bureaucrat has 
experienced outside of the formal rules or span of control (Meier 1993b; Sowa & Selden 
2003). For linguistic abilities to influence the outputs of a bureaucracy, a bureaucrat must 
have the discretion to use their linguistic repertoire to assist clients. The discretion to 
express their linguistic ability can be motivated by their connection to the community, their 
personal values, or the shared life experience that is communicated through language, but 
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can also be limited by formal policies of English official laws or by the dominant vitality 
of the English language in the bureaucracy. 
 Next to public schools, local law enforcement agencies are the most proximate 
bureaucracy with whom individuals will interact most during their lifetime. These 
organizations function as a mixed-service bureaucracy organized in a hierarchical and 
quasi-military structure to protect and above all enforce law and order (Sklansky 2005). 
The core “mission of police is to fight crime, and following this, that individual officers are 
celebrated and rewarded for making arrests (Epp et al. 2014, 29).” These officers, street-
level bureaucrats, enjoy a great deal of discretion when policing their community during 
traffic stops, investigatory stops, and throughout the course of criminal investigations 
(Epp, Maynard-Noody, Haider-Markel 2014, Wilkins & Williams 2008, 2009; Sklansky 
2005; Vinzant & Crothers1998; Lipsky 1980; Muir 1977; Davis 1975).  
Previous research in representative bureaucracy has led to the contradicting results 
on the influence of racially diversified police forces. Within the U.S., Wilkins and 
Williams (2008 & 2009) find that increasing Latino and Black officers result in higher 
racial profiling. Due to organizational socialization, these finding are opposite of the 
theorized advantageous outcomes for the represented racial group. The authors attribute 
this to the idea of the blue-wall mosaic or in other words “Blue is blue: the job shapes the 
officer, not the other way around (Sklansky 2006, 1210; Walker et al. 2012).” Hong (2017) 
re-visited the issue of representative police forces and their influence on racial profiling 
finding contradictory results to Wilkins & Williams. Focusing on a ten-year period where 
the United Kingdom and Wales enacted targeted demographic police reform, Hong finds 
that increases in the racial composition of police forces reduced the proportion of ethnic 
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minority citizens “stopped and frisked” within police departments with a preexisting 
inequity of racial profiling. The focus of these studies centers on racial identities and 
racialized outputs, but they overlook the intragroup citizenship differences11. The outcomes 
of racial and ethnic representation gloss over the intersection of criminal and immigration 
enforcement. This opens a new venue for research on how representation of the immigrant 
community influences immigration enforcement.   
Theory 
Socialization may impede passive representation, but in order for police officers to do their 
job, they must be able to communicate during any social or institutional stop. The internal 
migration patterns of the U.S. immigrant community have begun to expand out of 
traditional states into new destination states and counties (CAP & Nicholson 2017; Millard 
et al. 2004). In order for local law enforcement agencies to serve a newly arriving 
immigrant community or an established one, they must overcome barriers such as cultural 
practices, fear of deportation, and home country trauma at the hands of police (Farris & 
Holman 2017; Lewis & Ramakrishnan 2007; Culver 2004; Menjívar & Bejarano 2004; 
Song 1992; Pogrebin & Poole 1990) to achieve their mission of protecting and serving.  
One key mechanism that will help facilitate the interactions to work through these barriers 
is having the proper linguistic ability to communicate and understand one another. 
Bilingual officers are not a panacea to ending the tension between police and communities, 
but they are a way to help bridge two communities.  
                                                
11 Wilkins & Williams (2009) discuss the role of racial profiling in the Latino community 
and its association as a marker enforcing immigration law. The authors do point out that 
while most of the Latino community is a citizen or has formal status, the Latino 
community bears the burnt of race-based immigration enforcement. 
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During patrol or when responding to calls, police officers are trained to assess the 
situation on hand using the entirety of the information that is available to them. The ability 
to communicate and interact is vital to prompt assessment of the situation. Herbst & 
Walker (2001) and Culver (2004) conducted qualitative research on local law enforcement 
agencies to evaluate whether language was a barrier to accomplishing their duties. Both 
studies concluded that language is barrier leading to frustration, conflict, and time delays in 
providing services and fostering relationships with Hispanic communities. In linguistically 
incongruent interactions, officers were unable to fully assess situations or gain clear and 
comprehendible information about the suspect, victim, or situation. Officers in an attempt 
to overcome the language barriers admitted to “muddling through” (334), calling a 
translator service, or using a bystander, family member, even children to help 
communicate during their service calls or stops. The inefficiency of each option leads to 
ineffective service or the break down of relationships. At the time of the research, 
immigration enforcement was not as intimately intertwined with local policing as it is 
today. Officers admitted that “after ten to fifteen minutes, when you can’t get ahold of 
anyone to interpret, its wrong but I just say go home. Sometimes I am just stuck in a traffic 
situation…when I just have to let them go and I don’t know I have just left a felon go or 
not (Culver 2004, 336).” In today’s world of immigration enforcement devolution, this 
situation might end differently. 
 Officers train using the Reid Method to help them evaluate the level of 
suspiciousness of individuals based on their verbal and non-verbal cues such as lack of eye 
contact, hand gestures, stutters or repeated speech interrupters (Johnson 2006). If an officer 
is unable to communicate because the individual they stopped cannot speak or respond in 
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English, stutters, or speaks broken English, the result may end up with an arrest that can 
lead to their deportation, even if no crime was committed during the stop. The author notes 
one officer expressed frustration in being unable to gather any information after a traffic 
accident or explain procedure led to an arrest in hopes that maybe someone in the station 
could translate. “Now see, if I could have spoke with him, he probably wouldn’t be going 
to jail (Herbst & Walker 2001, 335).” 
Expanding the theory of representative bureaucracy to include language 
representation follows that in situations where officers are hired, incentivized, and 
encouraged to use their linguistic abilities, departments will produce positive policy 
outcomes for the immigrant community. The magnitude of the effect of linguistically 
diverse department maybe dependent on the linguistic landscape of the community. As 
previously stated linguistic differences during service provision increase saliency and 
officers have the discretion when on call as to whether, according to Communication 
Accommodation Theory, maintain the linguistic divergence or linguistically converge to 
provide adequate services (Dougherty et al. 2010; Giles & Ogay 2007; Giles et al. 1977). 
Within linguistic landscapes (Cenoz & Gorter 2006; Barker et.al 2001; Landry & Bourhis 
1997) where the vitality of the English language remains dominant, the discretion to 
accommodate linguistic differences will yield the largest positive effect for the immigrant 
community.  In communities where the linguistic landscape has multiple vital languages, 
in addition to English, such as Spanish, Mandarin, or Tagalong, etc. it is unlikely that 
accommodation will influence immigration outcomes as strongly.  
The positive influence on policy outputs occurs when during the interaction of 
bilingual officers with non-English dominant individuals. During a stop, call, or taking the 
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statement of a victim, a bilingual officer has the discretion to decide between two linguistic 
strategies. The first is accommodation through language congruence, the officer is able to 
speak the non-English language of the individual and so chooses to conduct the rest of 
their interaction in that language. In the previous example from research, the officer was 
not bilingual and could not get the necessary information on the identity of individual at 
the scene of an accident. He was unable to discern whether he was talking with the victim 
or the suspect. Additionally, the individual was unable to understand the basic questions 
asked pertaining to his identity causing the officer to prematurely arrest him. If an officer 
can respond and interact in the language of the immigrant, the chances of frustration and 
premature arrests that could lead to increases in immigration enforcement decrease, 
especially in communities that have smaller immigrant populations. This scenario yields 
the most positive outcomes for the immigrant community and relationship building 
between police departments and the broader immigrant community. During an interaction, 
language congruence opens the lines of communication reducing the fear and possibility of 
deportation, fostering trust between the officer and immigrant, and increasing the chances 
of future co-production in community safety (Porras et.al 2014).  
The second communication strategy that can be employed by bureaucrats is 
linguistic divergence indicating either natural or intentional language incongruence during 
an interaction (Giles & Ogay 2007; Dougherty et al. 2010; Giles & Johnson 1987) For 
example, an officer continues to speak in English despite the immigrant being unable to 
speak proficiently in English. In this case, an officer may or may not be able to speak in 
the language of an immigrant and chooses to maintain the interaction in English. During 
these interactions, an immigrant’s probability of being considered suspicious increases if 
  
 
33 
they are attempting to communicate in their non-dominant language with an officer as 
issues of fear affect the smoothness of their speech patterns. Due to the Reid method of 
detecting “suspicious” individuals, if an immigrant with limited English proficiency 
attempts to converge with the officer’s English language, their inability to communicate 
clearly in English without stuttering or stammering can stereotype them as “suspicious” 
immigrants, criminal or undocumented, even if they were not committing a crime before 
they were stopped. In today’s climate of heightened concern over immigration and push for 
stricter enforcement, lack of English abilities and bilingualism in law enforcement can lead 
to increased stereotyping of noncitizens resulting in arrests assisting fulfill their mission of 
immigration enforcement.  
Diversity of linguistic landscape is tied to the size of its immigrant population. In 
communities with diverse linguistic landscapes, bilingualism within the workforce is more 
likely to be readily available, incentives and use of this skill will not have as strong of an 
effect in policy outputs. A diverse linguistic landscape represents not only a vitality among 
non-English languages but a policy target rich environment. In communities with a high 
foreign born population, policing is likely to help immigration enforcement despite 
bilingual officers being able to communicate and assess situations because they are more 
likely to come across non-citizen members of the immigrant community. In these 
communities, in order to protect the trust that is being built with the immigrant community, 
bilingual officers are more likely to contribute to increasing the focus on high priority 
criminal immigrants rather than immigrants with misdemeanors or simple civil 
immigration violations. In these counties, bilingual officers would be more likely to 
prioritize arresting immigrants who pose a real threat to the safety of their community, 
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over immigrants who are low priority and non-threatening. With overzealous enforcement, 
despite being able to speak with the officers, it is unlikely that the immigrant community 
would seek out help or report crimes due to the fear of getting caught in the ever increasing 
immigration force.  
Therefore, in counties with bilingual officers who can converge their language to 
match the language of an immigrant, bilingualism will be related to a decrease in the 
arresting of deportable immigrants and will shift priority to identifying criminal 
immigrants that pose a threat to the community over non-criminal immigrants with civil or 
misdemeanor violations. The strength of the effect will be dependent upon the linguistic 
landscape of a community. In communities with a growing immigrant population where 
English remains dominant, the influence of bilingual officers will be stronger than in 
communities with a large population of immigrants. In these counties, immigrants have 
replenished their linguistic vitality and are a larger share of the population causing 
outcomes to be based on policing rather than misunderstanding or stereotyping on non-
English speakers due to language incongruence.  
Based on traditional representative bureaucracy and the findings of Wilkins and 
Williams (2008, 2009) and Hong (2017), hypothesis one will test the basic theory of 
representative bureaucracy by focusing on the two largest racial/ethnic groups 
representative of the largest immigrant communities, Hispanic and Asian12.  
                                                
12 I acknowledge that grouping the pan-ethnic identities into one racial/ethnic category 
overlooks their cultural differences, but for the purposes of this research, it was the only to 
be able to capture the Hispanic and Asian identity. 
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H1: Increasing the passive representation of Hispanic and Asian officers will 
influence the total level of immigration enforcement and the outputs for each priority level 
identification of deportable immigrants.  
Hypothesis two focuses on testing linguistic representation. This hypothesis, unlike 
the previous one, illustrates theory of representative bureaucracy through language 
congruence in interactions without focusing on their racial/ethnic identity. By not focusing 
on racial identity, I make the assumption that linguistic representation can occur without 
any racial/ethnic prerequisite of the bureaucrat or bureaucracy. The first hypothesis is a test 
of passive representation linked to the benefits of increasing the representation of racial 
minorities in local law enforcement agencies without making any assumptions of their 
linguistic abilities.  
H2: As a linguistic landscape begins to diversify, bilingual law enforcement 
agencies will be related to the decreased immigration enforcement, and increasing the 
effectiveness of identifying deportable criminal immigrants.  
Data and Research Methods 
To empirically evaluate the role of linguistic congruence on policy outcomes, the level of 
analysis chosen is the county level where deportation inputs for ICE are identified from the 
interior of the U.S. For this analysis, data from the Law Enforcement Management and 
Administrative Statistics (LEMAS) Survey of 2007 and 2013 is matched with the county 
level interoperability reports from the Secure Communities Program. These two datasets 
serve as the foundation of a panel dataset for the years 2009 through 2014 that included 
county level policy environment variables from the U.S. Census Bureau’s publically 
available data.  
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 By participating in Secure Communities, local law enforcement agencies 
experience a pressure to overemphasize their regulatory mission at the expense of their 
service mission (Marrow 2009). This balancing act leads to policy outcomes that are 
inversely related to each other. In increasing their immigration enforcement, local law 
enforcement agencies may be neglecting policing duties or if the local agencies prioritize 
their core mission of policing to create a safe community, they could be considered 
“ineffective” force multipliers. As the outcomes have the potential to influence each other, 
a traditional Ordinary Least Squares Regression would not be able to account for the 
interdependent nature of the policy outcomes. In order to control for the possibility of 
correlation among the error terms of the immigration policy outputs explored, a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression with clustered standard errors13 is best fit for analyzing the influence 
of linguistic representation simultaneously on two different policy outputs affecting the 
lives of the immigrant community (Zellner 1962; Moon & Perron 2006).  
Policy Outcomes: Immigration 
From the policy outputs reported, two sets of measures are constructed that 
evaluate local law enforcement’s balancing act and the second set that further measures 
effective policing in prioritizing criminal offenders. A summary of the policy measures can 
be seen in Table 1 found in the appendix. The first immigration policy outcome measures 
the strength of local agency to act as a force multiplier for the federal government. The 
goal of Secure Communities was to locate deportable immigrants from the interior of the 
                                                
13 Analysis with year-fixed effects were run and the relationships hold. These models were 
excluded from the results shown because of the multi-collinearity in the year 2009 that 
omits it from the analysis. In having only 282 counties across less than 30 states, state-
fixed effects were not included due to the limited variation both within and across states  
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U.S as inputs for ICE’s deportation regime. To capture the strength of the force multiplier 
in identifying deportable immigrants, the total number of matched deportable immigrants 
is divided by the total noncitizen population. This measure captures how many immigrants 
per capita are being identified as deportable. Communities with a higher noncitizen 
population14 can be considered as an environment “rich” in policy targets. The larger this 
measure, the stronger a county acts a force multiplier. On average, a county had a 
noncitizen per capita identification of 0.02 with a standard deviation of 0.04. Most counties 
were not strong multipliers. There are exceptions, the highest value in the sample data had 
about a noncitizen per capita identification of deportable immigrants of 1.2715.  
 Despite having deportation priorities focusing on immigrants with felony 
convictions, Secure Communities disproportionately identified at higher rates immigrants 
with misdemeanor convictions. Representative bureaucracy helps redress the inequities in 
policy, so a disparity ratio is operationalized as the total low priority immigrant 
identifications to high priority immigrant identifications. A lower the disparity ratio 
represents a local law enforcement agency focusing on policing over immigration 
enforcement. The average county sheriff in our sample data had a disparity ratio of about 3 
immigrants with a standard deviation of about 4 low priority immigrant matches to every 1 
high priority immigrant match. At highest end, counties with a focus on immigration 
                                                
14 Noncitizen population includes both documented and undocumented immigrants, but 
does not include the foreign born naturalized citizens. Each yearly measure comes from the 
5-year estimates of the American Community Survey. 
15 This was Cameron Parish, LA. Its noncitizen population had a great deal of variation 
from 2009 through 2014. In 2012, ACS reported no noncitizens and sComm reported 7 
total matches. In 2014, the noncitizen population was 11 and sComm reported 14 total 
matches. Controlling for this county in the model, does not change the results.  
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enforcement were identifying about 78 low priority immigrants to every one high priority 
immigrant.   
 Whether Secure Communities was an effective priority enforcement program is out 
of the scope of this research, understanding the effect of linguistic representation on each 
priority level outcome is not. To investigate in more detail, the balancing act between 
policing and immigration enforcement each of the three priority levels are individually 
analyzed to understand if the effects of representation differ when assessing priority policy 
outcomes. The two priority population of deportable immigrants of interest, high priority 
deportable immigrants and low priority deportable immigrants, are measured as the 
noncitizen per capita rate of total priority level immigrants identified16. Law enforcement 
agencies viewing immigration enforcement as a secondary mission by focus their attention 
to policing and creating safe communities will be more effective in identifying high 
priority matches. While departments with a large low priority per capita immigrant 
matches indicate a focus on immigration enforcement over policing. 
Representation in Local Law Enforcement Agencies 
 To capture the various measures of representation, this research uses the Law 
Enforcement Management and Administrative Survey from 2007 and 2013. Administered 
by the Bureau of Justice Statistics roughly every 3 to 4 years, the LEMAS survey is a cross 
sectional nationally representative sample of state and local law enforcement agencies, 
including sheriff’s agencies. Each survey contains roughly around 3,000 agencies with 
                                                
16 For High Priority Per Capita= Total Number of Matched High Priority Immigrants/ 
Total Number of Noncitizens 
For Low Priority Per Capita= Total Number of Matched Low Priority Immigrants/ Total 
Number of Noncitizens 
  
 
39 
response rates over 85%17. Each survey period has a sheriffs’ sample size18 of 95119 in 
2007 and 89520 in 2013. The LEMAS survey contains a core set of questions related to the 
administration and management of law enforcement agencies such as the personnel, 
expenditures, operations, pay and incentives. Each survey contains a unique one-time 
subset of questions pertinent to current issues within law enforcement. For this research, 
the special topics of interest were found within 2007 survey only. The question of interest 
was the number of personnel, sworn and civilian, that were bilingual. As a proxy for this 
question, both surveys included a question on the commitment of the agency to provide 
incentive pay for officers with bilingual abilities. This is just as important as the number of 
bilingual officers. Incentivizing pay for bilingualism shows institutional commitment to 
incorporating and improving relations with the immigrant community (Marrow 2009; 
Jones-Correa 2008 a,b; Lewis & Ramakrishnan 2007) and increases discretion on the part 
of officers in their line of duty. The second set of variables important to this research found 
on both questionnaires focused on personnel, total officers by race and the racial 
composition of the sheriff’s department.  
 To create a panel dataset covering the tenure of Secure Communities, the two cross 
sectional datasets were merged to find overlapping sheriffs departments responding in both 
years. This yielded a total of 28521 usable sheriff’s surveys roughly about 30% to 32% of 
                                                
17 91.8% in 2007 and 86% in 2013. 
18 Surveyed Sheriff’s departments were identified using a stratified simple random sample. 
Stratums are based on the number of sworn personnel.  
19 87% response rate  
20 80% response rate 
21 Originally it was 312 sheriffs’ departments surveyed in both years, but only 285 
departments answered the key variables in both surveys. The variables that were not 
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each sample. For each of the variables of interest, except for bilingual incentive pay, a 
linear ratio imputation22 was used to fill in the years of 2009 through 2012 and 2014.  
To test the traditional hypothesis of representative bureaucracy, the variables 
pertaining to the total number of Hispanic, Asian, and total officers reported by race, total 
employees (sworn and civilian, full and part-time) are retained for analysis. From these 
variables, I operationalized the percentage of Hispanic and Asian officers, as these two 
racial and ethnic groups represent the two top ethnic immigrant groups in the United 
States. In the sample data, from 2009 through 2014, the average percentage of Hispanic 
officers is about 6% with a standard deviation of about 11.6%. Asian officers constituted a 
much smaller percentage of sheriffs’ departments, on average the representation of Asian 
officers constituted less than 1% of sheriffs with a standard deviation of 1.30%.  Table 2 
contains a summary of the local law enforcement representation statistics.  
To test the if language diversity can act as a mechanism of representative 
bureaucracy, two variables are operationalized. The first variable of interest that comes 
from the LEMAS survey is a dummy variable that captures the commitment of a sheriff’s 
department to hire bilingual officers. Both surveys contained a version of  the following 
question23: 
As of January 1, 2013, which of the following include INCENTIVES for FULL-TIME 
SWORN personnel? Check either 'yes' or 'no' for each item. Incentives include either 
                                                
answered in both budget (25 departments) and Hispanic and Asian Officers (1 department 
each).  
22 For example, for the 2009 total officers= (2007 value*.8) + (2013 value*.2), 
 for 2012 value= (2007 value*.2) + (2013 value*.8) 
23 For 2008 the wording stated: Does your agency authorize or provide any of the 
following for sworn personnel? (2008) – Bilingual ability pay 
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increased salary or additional paid leave. 
- Bi-lingual or Multi-lingual ability 
Of the counties in the sample, 18.25% of the sheriffs’ departments offer incentive pay 
for bilingual abilities. Linguistic institutional commitment is a dummy variable coded with 
a 1 if the sheriff’s department has a pay incentive and zero if they do not. The 2007 value 
was inputted as the value for the years of 2009 through 2011 and the 2013 value for the 
years of 2012 and 2014. Between the two survey time periods, 9 counties switched to 
having an incentive pay representing roughly about 3 percent of the data and about 5 
percent or 13 counties removed their incentives for bilingual abilities. In 2007, the survey 
asked a question about the total number of sworn officers that were certified bilingual in 
our sample, the average department had about 4% certified full time officers with a 
standard deviation of about 11%. For sheriffs’ departments’ with incentive pay, the 
average percentage of bilingual officers increased to about 6.42% compared to the average 
3.42% percent of bilingual officers in departments with no incentive pay. In the sample 
data, there were between 50 departments with incentive pay from 2007 to 2011 and 54 
departments with incentives for bilingualism from 2012 to 2014.   
 The second variable needed to test the relationship between linguistic 
representation and immigration outcomes does not come from the LEMAS survey, but 
from the American Community Surveys five year estimates. Linguistic landscape is 
operationalized as the percentage of foreign born population24 with larger immigrant 
                                                
24 Linguistic landscape includes all over-all foreign born population, naturalized and 
noncitizens. Naturalization changes an immigrant’s deportability, but does not erase their 
ability to speak in their native tongue.  
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communities indicating more language diversity25. The higher the foreign born population 
in a county, the more likely that English is not the only vital language with more non-
English languages spoke across public, private, and social spaces. In the sample data, 
linguistic landscape was not very diverse, on average, the foreign born population was 
about 8% with a standard deviation of about 7.66%. 
Controls 
This research views immigration policy outcomes as bureaucratic organizational 
performance. The following empirical analysis uses a basic model that controls for 
bureaucratic implementation and enforcement of immigration policy by including controls 
for organizational capacity and policy environment (Brewer and Seldon 2000; Boyne 
2003; Boyne & Meier 2009). Table 3, found in the appendix, contains a full summary of 
each of the control measures. 
For bureaucratic capacity, the model controls for the capacity of the local sheriff 
and the local police departments within the county. For the sheriff capacity, from the 
LEMAS Survey, using the same linear imputation from the variables of interest, total 
operating budget and total employees are included. Scholars (Jaeger 2016; Farris & 
Holman 2017) have identified that a local sheriff’s budget is related to their compliance in 
enforcing immigration policy. To control for total human capital of a sheriff’s department, 
the logged total employees both civilian and sworn officers is used.  
                                                
25 Although the percentage of foreign born population does not describe the demographic 
differences in the population or how many languages are in the population, it still indicates 
how vital bilingualism in public organizations is needed. A landscape is diverse even if 
only one other non-English language is by immigrants.  
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To control for the influence of the local city police departments have on the level of 
enforcement, the total capacity of local law enforcement officers (total employment of the 
county, city, and sheriff law enforcement) and the total operating budget for police 
protection are logged normalize distribution. Both measures are, unfortunately, not 
reported at each county level. Rather, the Annual State and Local Government 
Employment Survey reports aggregates all local totals up to the state level reporting it as 
one measure. Despite not having individual county estimates, the measure is kept to help 
control for the the co-production of public safety across localities.  
Policy outputs depend on the inputs into the organization and policy environment 
in which bureaucrats operate. To control for the most basic level of inputs into both local 
and federal enforcement bureaucracies, I control for the total submissions of fingerprints 
within a county. As previously mentioned, total submissions illustrate the total number of 
recorded attempts to reduce crime or identify immigrants by recording each arrest 
processed into county jail. Because of the wide variation and the over dispersion of 
structural zeros, the final operationalization of submissions logged.  
In order to control for the influence of the policy environment, a set of controls 
capturing the social, political, and economic climate affecting immigration enforcement are 
used in each model. The first set of controls accounts for the policy targets and non-policy 
targets of the community. According to past research (Cox and Miles 2013; Wong 2012), 
the activation and enforcement of sComm occurred in counties with high levels of specific 
populations, Hispanics and noncitizen. In addition to Hispanics being the face of 
immigration, historical immigration narratives focused on the Asian population within the 
United States (Daniel 2005). In addition to Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asian populations, 
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included in the model is the percentage of non-Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic African 
Americans. The final social measure captures the level of education with a county. As the 
percentage of individuals with less than a high school education increases it is expected 
that so will the pressure for immigration enforcement.  
Historically and contemporarily, immigration policy has never remained a 
politically neutral issue with both sides of the aisle arguing for different enforcement and 
reform typically fueled by rhetoric concerning economic distressed caused by immigration. 
Anti-immigration rhetoric spikes during times of crisis with the Republican party calling 
for stricter immigration policies (Chand & Schreckhise 2015; Koulish 2010; Daniels 2005; 
Tichenor 2002; Welch 2002). Due to the differences among political parties, controls for 
the restrictive political economy of immigration enforcement (Calavita 2010, 1996, Ngai 
2004; Tichenor 2002) are expected to increase the inequalities in policy outputs.  
Partisanship is operationalized as the percentage of votes26 in the 2008 and 2012 election 
for the Republican candidate (i.e., McCain in 2008 and Romney 2012).  
To account for economic conditions that might influence a push for stricter 
immigration enforcement, six variables are included that cover financial stability, non-
homeownership, employment conditions, use of public benefits. Financial stability of a 
county is captured by using the logged median income in 2016 constant dollars. The 
percentage of non-homeowners is included as a measure of economic vitality in 
community. As unemployment rates increase, narrative of the immigrants taking American 
                                                
26 Voting percentages at the county level were collected from the Data.gov website that is 
managed by the U.S. General Administration, Technology Transformation Service. The 
website is follows the Project Open Data schema that requires all datasets to report: title, 
description, tags, last update, publisher and contact name.  
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jobs is used to bolster support for stricter immigration enforcement, as such the rate of 
unemployment is included. The final set of economic variables focus on controlling for the 
narrative of immigrants as public charges (Moloney 2012). The percentage of the 
population that is on public assistance is included expecting that take up rates of public 
assistance increases so will the immigration enforcement in a community.  
Results 
Within the context of Secure Communities immigration policy outputs, this research tests 
two main hypotheses, a traditional passive representation and an extension of the theory by 
focusing on linguistic representation, using two seemingly unrelated regression models 
each containing two sub-models related to the balancing act of local law enforcement 
agencies. The traditional representative bureaucracy hypothesis predicts increasing the 
passive representation of Hispanic and Asian officers will have an influence on 
immigration policy outputs, but does not predict the effect of the direction.  
 The results in Table 4 indicate support for traditional representative bureaucracy 
hypothesis where by increasing the passive representation of racial/ethnic groups is related 
to immigration policy outputs. Interestingly, the effect of passive representation differs 
based on which racial/ethnic group is of focus. Increasing the passive representation of 
Hispanic officers has a statistically significant relationship in decreasing the department’s 
force multiplier effect and decreasing the disparity in enforcement. A ten percent increase 
in the share of Hispanic officers, almost one standard deviation above the mean, is related 
to decreasing the total per capita identifications of deportable immigrants 20% within a 
county, all else being equal. This same increase is related to an 8% decrease local law 
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enforcements’ immigration enforcement disparity ratio between the identification of 
deportable low to high priority immigrants.  
 Passive representation of Asian officers and immigration outcomes reveals 
relationships different from the effects of Hispanic officer representation. Representation 
by Asian officers is unrelated to the force multiplier effect of a department, but increasing 
their share of officers is statistically related to decreasing their disparity in enforcement by 
identifying a lower ratio of low priority immigrants to high priority immigrants. All else 
being equal, a one percent increase, about a one standard deviation increase, is related to a 
4% decrease in the identifications of low priority deportable immigrants to high priority 
immigrants within a county.  
  Based on the analysis in Table 4, support is found for linguistic pay incentives on 
Secure Communities immigration policy outputs, but not for policing. The results indicate 
that institutional commitment to linguistic representation decreases the per capita total 
matches of deportable immigrants. There is no relationship between bilingual incentive 
pay and disparity in enforcement patterns.   
 Figure 4 illustrates the results of the marginal effects of pay incentives across a 
changing linguistic landscape. Increases in the percentage of the foreign population within 
a county increases the vitality of foreign languages spoken. The marginal effect of having 
an incentive of bilingual pay decreases the percentage of per capita matching from 19% to 
88% in counties with a foreign born population of 5% or lower, but as the share of 
immigrants increases the opposite relationship emerges. The shift in the direction of the 
relationship is unexpected. In counties with a foreign born population over 16%, incentives 
for bilingualism are statistically significant and related to increasing the percentage of per 
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capita matches of deportable immigrants from a 27% to about a 74% increase. There is no 
support for the hypothesis that incentive pay for bilingual abilities is related to easing 
disparities in enforcement across any share of the foreign born population.  
 Secure Communities was a priority enforcement program seeking to identifying 
deportable immigrants based on their risk to community safety. If an immigrant’s criminal 
record contained a felony conviction their threat level was the highest and as such force 
multipliers were to focus on identifying high priority immigrants for deportation. The 
second policy priority outcome encompasses the two remaining levels of deportable 
immigrants, level two and three. Table 5 contains the second set of models focusing on 
evaluating the effect of linguistic representation on sComm’s main two priority levels.  
For traditional representative bureaucracy, the results indicate opposite 
relationships for Hispanic and Asian officers. This analysis reveals an important distinction 
not seen in Table 2.4 in the relationship between Asian officer representation and their 
negative influence on the disparity in identification enforcement. The effects of passive 
representation by Hispanic officers is further supported by the results reported in the two 
sub-models in Table 5. As Hispanic representation increases, there is a 2% percent 
decrease in the low priority matching per capita and about a 2% decrease in the per capita 
identification of high priority deportable immigrants. The opposite relationship is found for 
the effect of Asian representation in sheriff’s departments. Increases in the share of Asian 
officers has a positive and statistically significant effect on increasing both priority level 
per capita matches with a larger effect on high priority immigrants than low priority 
immigrants by 4%. A one percent increase in Asian officers is related to an 7% increase in 
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the identification of low priority per capita deportable immigrants and an 11% increase in 
the identification of the high priority deportable immigrants per capita.   
 Figure 5 illustrates the marginal effects of linguistic incentive pay on immigration 
policy outputs. Similar to the relationships observed in Figure 4, in counties with foreign 
born populations at or lower than 10%, linguistic incentives reduce the per capita matches 
of both low and high priority deportable immigrants. For low priority immigrants, the 
marginal effect decreases identification from 88% at the lowest population share to about a 
19% decrease at a peak of foreign born population share of 10% foreign. For high priority 
per capita deportable immigrant matches it is from 88% to about a decrease of 14% across 
the same share of foreign born population. It is important to note that the effect of 
linguistic representation is not statistically significant for high priority per capita matches 
at higher shares of foreign born individuals in a county, but there is a positive effect on low 
priority immigrants. As counties have an increasing foreign born population of more than 
26% the marginal effects of bilingual pay incentives increase the per capita identification 
of low priority deportable immigrants by 25% all the way up to about 50%.  
Implications and Discussion 
This research makes two contributions. Its most important, is it extends the theory of 
representative bureaucracy to include linguistic representation. The second contribution is 
moving out into a new policy area, immigration policy, and focusing on the punitive policy 
outcomes for marginalized community with limited English proficiency and limited to no 
political rights. The results contribute not only to the literature on representative 
bureaucracy, but to the literature on bureaucratic incorporation. The results of this research 
  
 
49 
provide insights into how the effects of representation follow two paths dependent on the 
size of the target population.  
Passive Representation 
The hypothesis for traditional representative bureaucracy was partially supported revealing 
interesting results. Hispanic representation is related to decreasing Secure Communities 
policy outputs and redressing the disparity in immigration enforcement by local law 
enforcement agencies. Additionally, increases in Hispanic officers relates to decreasing 
identifications across both per capita priority levels. Increased Hispanic officer 
representation is associated with a slightly larger decrease in the identification of per capita 
matching of low priority immigrants than high priority immigrants. No support was found 
for the effect Asian officer representation on increasing the total policy outcomes of Secure 
Communities, but is related to decreasing the disparity ratio between the identification of 
low to high priority deportable immigrants. Upon further analysis, the effectiveness of 
Asian representation is actually increasing the identification of per capita matching within 
both priority levels. There is larger effect on high priority matching per capita by 11% and 
7% increase in the identification of low priority per capita matches. Representation of the 
Hispanic community within local law enforcement agencies leads to a focus on policing 
rather than on immigration enforcement with the opposite being true of representation of 
the Asian community.  
The results of this research indicate that Hispanic representation in local law 
enforcement decrease the strength of the agency to act as ICE’s force multipliers across all 
immigration policy outcomes and redressed the disparate patterns of identification in 
enforcing Secure Communities for the most vulnerable immigrants. Asian representation 
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may not increase the overall strength of a local law enforcement agency to act as ICE’s 
force multiplier, but they do increase the identification of both per capita priority level 
identifications with a 4% difference between the levels. Asian officers are related to 
increasing the policing of the immigrant community.  The results of Hispanic 
representation provide support for the results found by Hong in UK police departments, 
but the results of Asian representation fall in line with the results found by Wilkins and 
Williams (2008, 2009) where increased representation by Asian officers leads to increased 
immigration enforcement for selected Secure Communities policy outcomes. In the era of 
immigration devolution, the results suggest that organizational socialization follows 
different patterns for different racial groups.  
One possible explanation for the differing patterns of passive representation 
between the two racial/ethnic groups of officers and immigrants can be explained using 
social identity theory as it intersects with the social constructions of immigrant policy 
targets (Ingram & Schneider 1991; Schneider & Ingram 1993). Social identity theory 
posits that individuals being associated with a specific group can do one of three things, 
accept the association, work to get out of the group, or change the view of the group 
depending on how the groups position in the socio-political hierarchy (Tajel & Turner 
1979). For Hispanics, their social identity is intertwined with the social construction of an 
immigrant. The narrative paints the picture of that Hispanics as criminal “illegal” 
immigrants and vice versa (Abrego et al. 2017; Ewing et. al 2015; Hartman et.al 2014; 
Chavez 2001, 2013; Newman 2013; Vasquez 2010; Daniel 2005; Huntington 2004). I view 
the results to suggest that in enforcing Secure Communities, Hispanic officers would 
continue to perpetuate this narrative in the minds of individuals with more deportations 
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being associated with Hispanics potentially causing similar racial affronts to their 
community like those described by Romero (2006) after the 1997 “Chandler Round-up” 
immigration raid. Instead, as the results indicate, Hispanic representation in a local law 
enforcement shows that Hispanic officers decrease the identification of removal 
immigrants especially those that pose no threat to the community. Using social identity 
theory, this occurs because Hispanic officers are trying to change the view that immigrants 
are criminals, especially, Hispanic immigrants as criminals.  
Linguistic Representation 
With immigrant patterns of settlement changing from traditional immigrant destinations to 
new destinations, so too are the linguistic landscapes. A linguistic landscape captures the 
strength of non-English languages’ vitality as the share of the foreign born population 
changes. Linguistic landscapes with high immigrant populations will have higher vitality 
of non-English languages than in areas with lower immigrant populations. Vitality 
indicates the breadth and depth of the frequency of a language spoken in all areas of public 
and private life within a community. As linguistic landscapes begin to change, public 
organizations will need to have the proper linguistic representation in order to serve the 
non-English dominant clientele.  
The theoretical arguments about linguistic representation extend the central 
argument of representative bureaucracy to include language as a form of active 
representation. Linguistic congruence occurs in situations where a bureaucrat converges 
their spoken language to meet the language spoken by their client. In the cases of language 
accommodation through language convergence, limited English dominant clients are likely 
to experience better policy outcomes and more efficient and effective service delivery than 
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in cases were there is language divergence during bureaucratic interactions. The argument 
theorized that the strength of effect of linguistic representation would depend on the 
linguistic landscape, but would produce positive service delivery effects for the limited 
English proficient community. The results found support for a relationship, but not, 
always, in the hypothesized direction. This research was unable to test the effect of the 
passive representation of bilingual officers, instead it focused on examining the role of 
institutional commitment to increasing language representation during service delivery by 
offering pay incentives for bilingual abilities. The results indicate in communities with 
small foreign born populations, commitment to linguistic accommodation decreased the 
total per capita identification of deportable immigrants from a county. While, communities 
with a foreign born population share above 10% experience a positive marginal effect 
increasing the total per capital identification of deportable immigrants. Linguistic 
representation results in local law enforcement agencies acting as a force multiplier in 
counties with higher foreign born populations than in counties with small or growing 
immigrant communities. No support was found for the hypothesis that institutional 
commitment to linguistic representation leads to readdressing disparities in immigration 
enforcement.  
The second set of models further evaluated the theoretical arguments by focusing 
on each individual priority policy outcome. The findings suggest similar relationships 
between institutional commitment to linguistic representation and priority level per capita 
outcomes. There is one important difference the marginal effect of linguistic representation 
in higher shares of foreign born populations increases the identification of only low 
priority deportable immigrants, but has no effect on high priority identifications. The effect 
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of the relationship is similar to the first set of models where the marginal effect of 
linguistic representation has a negative effect by decreasing the per capita priority level 
matches across foreign born populations under 10%, and a positive effect in increasing the 
per capita priority level low priority immigrant matching when the foreign born population 
reaches about 26% and higher.  
The implications of this research should not be viewed as indicating bilingualism 
be barred from institutions in counties with a large immigrant population. Despite finding 
that in these counties with a large immigrant population, incentivizing linguistic skills 
relates to increasing a majority of Secure Communities policy outcomes. Additionally, this 
research only looks the punitive context and does evaluate the effect of bilingualism on the 
service mission of local law enforcement agencies. It is possible that local law enforcement 
agencies in counties with smaller immigrant communities, seek to incentivize bilingual 
abilities as a way to create trust and legitimacy in communities with arriving immigrant 
communities. Having local law enforcement agents use translators or have them “muddling 
through” can prevent effective service delivery across any linguistic landscape. Linguistic 
representation can still facilitate client’s reaching out to the bureaucracy for services as 
suggested by the finding in Gade & Williams (2012) and Thielemann & Stewart (1996). 
As communities continue to live in a heightened state of deportability, bilingual officers 
with their linguistic abilities will remain best equipped to communicate with the immigrant 
community during any bureaucratic interaction from policing to service.   
America has become the “graveyard for languages” (Rumbaut 2009; Lieberson 
et.al 1975). As a nation more likely to be monolingual, the value of linguistic skills differs 
across communities. A possible explanation of the change in the direction of the 
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relationship is that in established traditional destination states, nativist views like those 
articulated by Huntington (2004) affect the socialization of local law enforcement officers. 
Rather than viewing bilingualism as an asset for connecting to the community, 
bilingualism is viewed as a “nuisance” representing un-American values that should not be 
accommodated in public organizations. The blue wall mosaic serves as an explanation for 
the linguistic representation amplifying a local law enforcement’s force multiplier effect. 
According to ethnolinguistic theory (Giles & Johnson 1987), “little cognitive effort may be 
involved in maintaining one’s own dialect or language within the private and “safe” 
confines of home and other cohesive in-group settings, but it is another mater as to whether 
this strategy will generalize to the immediacy of intergroup encounters (70).” As García-
Bedolla (2003) notes that Latinos experience an identity paradox with language as it 
denotes their cultural identity and connects them to their immigrant community, but also 
serves as a social stigma when immigrants and bilingualism are not viewed upon favorably 
in the larger social context. Bilingual officers may have no problem speaking a different 
language at home and when encountering immigrants in a social setting, but when in 
uniform they are still police officers tasked with enforcing Secure Communities.  When 
communicating with their “brothers in blue” and carrying out their policing directives, the 
language is English. In these cases, socialization trumps viewing bilingualism as cultural 
connection, but deploy their bilingualism to promote the mission of the organization where 
Secure Communities prioritizes the regulatory over the service.  
Limitations & Future Directions 
As a nation, as leaders, and as communities, the decision will have to be made as to 
whether bi/multilingualism is a burden to phase out in immigrant children or human capital 
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on which to build a stronger multi-cultural democracy (Ruiz 1984). Scholars (Padilla & et. 
al 1991; Baker et al 2001) have illustrates the range of benefits bilingual agents bring to 
organizations and clients such as increasing the appropriate medical services to limited 
English proficient clients or their children (Tsai et al. 2004; Quesada 1976; Malgady & 
Constantino 1998; Traylor et al. 2010; Brach & Fraserirector 2000; Malgady & Zayas 
2001; Perez-Stable et al. 1997; Ferguson & Candib 2002; Fernandez et al. 2004; Fiscella et 
al. 2002; Flaskerud & Liu 1990; Yeh et al. 1994), extending markets into new communities 
(Callahan & Gándara 2014; Angouri 2013; Duchêne 2011; Thomas 2008), and exploring 
the academic benefits of bilingualism for children’s educational and cognitive development 
(Callahan & Gándara 2004a,b; Mitchell 2012; Wong & Hughes 2006). With the exception 
of a handful of studies, understanding the role of the bilingual bureaucrat within public 
administration and policy has largely remains underdeveloped.  
 This research works to fill the gap on how bilingualism functions to induce active 
representation within public organizations. Rather than testing the direct link between 
bilingual bureaucrats and outcomes, this research tested the macro-level mechanism that 
helps induce the hiring of bilingual bureaucrats and changes the overall characteristics of 
the bureaucracy. The assumption is that this mechanism will lead to the advantages laid out 
in the theoretical arguments. As previously mentioned, ideally, the analysis would have 
provided a direct test of the level of bilingual representation and its influence on policy 
outcomes. Unfortunately, the data on the certified bilingual officers was only available in a 
subset of the 2007 LEMAS questionnaire 3 years before Secure Communities began. 
Future research would benefit from having adequate measures of bilingual bureaucrats to 
fully test theory of language representation. According to the research in Callahan & 
  
 
56 
Gándara (2014a,b), studies do not always measure bilingualism in organizations and 
individuals effectively often overlooking gender characteristics or proficiency levels. In 
not having data that properly details a gender breakdown of officers and civilian police 
department employees, the next step is to collect data on the levels of proficiency in the 
non-English language, which non-English language is spoken, and the gender of the 
bureaucrat.  
Conclusion 
While President Trump may have dismissed Jeb Bush’s use of language accommodation to 
make a community feel included in the political process, this March, a local police 
department in Texas hired it first female deaf officer whose linguistic abilities allow her to 
provide police services or render aid in four different sign languages to the deaf 
community (Powell 2018). Creating incentives for linguistic skills in local public 
institutions aids in providing better service delivery to non-English dominant communities. 
In the case of immigration enforcement outcomes during the Secure Communities, active 
representation occurs by creating incentives for linguistic abilities to be used during service 
or protection provision. Language is a form of representation and should be seen as such 
throughout all institutions of government. Creating language laws may serve the purpose 
of streamlining “efficiency” by only producing official documents, conducting business, or 
hosting meetings in English, but will lead to ineffective and alienation of citizens and 
communities alike who are non-English proficient or dominant. It is in the best interest of 
democracy to encourage culturally responsive and representative institutions of 
government, not just demographically but linguistically too.  
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CHAPTER III                                                                                                          
¿GOVERNMENT’S AMIGOS O REBELDES?:THE INFLUENCE OF 
PHILANTHROPIC FUNDING ON IMMIGRATION POLICY OUTCOMES 
 
In 2017, the Grantmakers Concerned with Immigrants and Refugees (GCIR) spearheaded a 
collaborative effort with 200 U.S. foundations to issue a statement illustrating support for 
the millions of immigrants and refugees living in the United States. In their joint statement, 
the foundations recognized their commitment to "creating healthy communities, promoting 
diversity and inclusion, building a vibrant democracy, and advancing equity and equality 
for all people, regardless of gender, race, religion, sexual orientation, gender expression, 
immigration status, and national origin (GCIR 2017). " As overt discriminatory 
nationalism increases, the statement stood as a signal to public officials and the broader 
community that the American philanthropic sector was taking a political stance against the 
new administration’s immigration policy and rhetoric.  
Uniquely positioned in our American democracy, foundations hold private 
resources they leverage to promote their private values within the socio-political 
environment (Anheier & Daly 2006). The independence and mostly unregulated nature of 
foundations, primarily private and family, allow them to exert influence across the domain 
of public policy from reform to the delivery of good and services. Most research on 
foundations qualitatively examines the roles and strategies (Anheier & Hammack 2010; 
Hess 2005; Dowie 2002; Reckhow 2012) used to influence changes in policy reform in 
line with their values and mission, leaving, largely, unaddressed how funding influences 
current local policy outputs in communities receiving the foundations’ monetary resources. 
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Furthermore, attention centers to traditionally important policy issues of education and 
health, leaving immigration policy underdeveloped.  
The 2016 presidential election brought to the forefront extensive negative rhetoric 
targeting immigrants and their migration to the U.S. Although not a new phenomenon, the 
presidential rhetoric expressed in 2016 was radically different from the narrative and 
policy positions of the Obama administration. From 2008 through 2014, a time of 
heightening deportations, the philanthropic sector granted about 1.85 billion dollars for 
immigrants and immigration-related services.  With the government failing to pass 
comprehensive immigration reform or provide funding for integration programs, what is 
the influence of immigration-related philanthropic funding on local punitive immigration 
policy outputs? 
Adapting the theoretical framework of strategic giving (Frumkin 2008), this 
research argues that grant making related to immigrants or immigration services can help 
initiate social change and alter more than policy reform. Grant making by foundation helps 
fund changes in the deportability of immigrants within the community served by nonprofit 
grantees. These changes result in affecting local policy outputs. Through the funding of 
nonprofit organizations, foundations’ influence is like a “Russian nesting-doll,” occurring 
through inter-linked organizations (Brown 2013, 91). To understand the influence of the 
philanthropic sector’s “nested dolls,” this research takes a multi-method approach. This 
research contributes to the literature by quantitatively and systematically analyzing the 
influence of foundations’ grant making patterns on current policy outputs using a newly 
constructed dataset on immigration-related grant making and county immigration policy 
implementation. Specifically, I test the link between philanthropic influence on punitive 
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immigration policy outcomes because of the difficulty in stopping deportations. The 
outcomes of a policy implemented across the U.S. and tied to everyday policing is hard to 
influence as grants for nonprofits are far removed from directly influencing the actions of 
the street-level bureaucrats. It was an intentionally rigorous test to see if total grant dollars 
leveraged influence in policy. Albeit an extremely small effect, I find support that 
philanthropic giving assists in reducing the identification of deportable immigrants within 
counties.  
The next chapter will unpack foundations’ indirect influence on local policy 
outputs through qualitative interviews with the nonprofit grantees. The following section 
reviews the current qualitative work on foundation’s influence on policy. Following the 
literature review, I develop a theoretical framework on the role of strategic giving and its 
effects on punitive immigration outputs. Next, I examine the relationship between funding 
and policy outputs with a quantitative analysis testing the theoretical framework. I 
conclude the first part of this multi-method research with a discussion of the results and 
implications.  
Literature Review 
As separate institutions from their private and government counterparts, foundations and 
nonprofit organizations are vital to service delivery for underserved and marginalized 
individuals and communities (Steuerle and Hodgkinson 2006). As autonomous 
organizations free from constituencies and government, foundations and their 
“philanthropists have not typically engaged directly in politics without the cushion of 
intermediaries (Reckhow 2012, 13).” This independence allows foundations the freedom to 
extend funding to nonprofits for issue advocacy or public service provision in intentional 
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and individualistic ways aligning with their missions and values (Frumkin 2008; Anheier 
and Hammack 2010; Nielsen 2001).  In this manner, philanthropic giving by foundations 
helps create cultural legitimacy (Hwang and Powell 2009), raises the prominence of issues 
and service providers, and the encourages by the broader public to support their desired 
actions and positions (Hammack and Anheier 2010).   
Research on the U.S. philanthropic foundations’ role in reform focuses on a 
handful of major foundations historical to contemporary influence in evolving issues and 
initiating change within the policy areas of education, healthcare, and social welfare policy 
(Anheier and Hammack 2010). The majority of this research is conducted through a 
qualitative lens to evaluate their strategies in depth and follow their influence leading to 
policy reform or the initiation of private-public partnerships. Stemming from this line of 
research, scholars have attempted to classify foundation’s roles into strategic patterns and 
actions by examining foundations influence as intermediary organizations (Scott and 
Jabbar 2014), institutional entrepreneurs (Quinn, Tompkins-Stange, and Meyerson 2013) 
and responsive actors (Mosley and Galaskiewicz 2015). As a mechanism of accomplishing 
their mission, foundations act as innovators or institutional entrepreneurs that promote 
innovation and fund research for market interventions, think tanks, policymakers, and the 
broader public (Clemens and Lee 2010; Scott and Jabbar 2014).   
A handful of studies have approached the study of foundations, qualitatively. The 
studies by Mosley and Galaskiewicz (2010, 2015) do not look at how funding influences 
policy outputs. Instead, they seek to understand how responsive foundations are to changes 
in their policy environment. Prior work placed foundations as catalysts for change but did 
not discuss how foundations responded to shifts within their policy environment. Mosley 
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& Galaskiewicz examine the role of 1,000 largest philanthropic foundations by analyzing 
their patterns of giving from 1993 to 2001. Using data from the Foundation Center, they 
tested their theoretical arguments about foundations charitable and social innovation role 
by analyzing the relationship between state-level welfare funding and population need. The 
results indicated an inverse relationship between foundation funding for welfare related 
activities and welfare policy salience. Their results illustrated foundations’ funding 
responsiveness is dependent upon local conditions rather than national agenda focus. 
Foundations were more generous within states that were experimenting with their welfare 
policy and spending more on waivers and non-cash assistance programs. Their patterns of 
giving reflected a social innovation role, but only when looking at in-state grant making. 
For grant making out of state, large foundations played a smaller scaled charitable role in 
helping alleviate high non-marital birth rates. Although foundations are considered to help 
serve a population at risk, the results of the studies by Mosley and Galaskiewicz indicate 
that local foundations efforts are not always driven by alleviating social needs.    
Reckhow (2012) provides the first systematic analysis of the top 15 grant making 
foundations by analyzing the factors that influenced their grant making patterns. 
Additionally, by using social network analysis and qualitative interviews, she explains the 
policy consequences their funding had on two of the largest school districts in the United 
States. Her multi-method approach provides a quantitative analysis that points to 
foundations grant making patterns motivated by centralized power structures and 
organizational capacity of the nonprofit sector rather than by a charitable orientation. She 
finds that school districts with a centralized locus of power such as superintendents or 
mayoral control received higher amounts of funding. With the centralization of power, 
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foundations can identify points of entry by which to use their grant dollars and grantees to 
influence education reform. Whereas school districts with an active school board 
democratized power and made policy reform more difficult to achieve. Centralization of 
power not only shaped the political reform process, but had implications for the ability of 
foundations to help introduce or raise the prominence of new actors engaged in advocacy. 
As a means of achieving their end goal of education reform, foundations leveraged their 
monetary resources in school districts with a highly developed and professionalized 
nonprofit sector. The third sector’s characteristics illustrate their ability to create a system 
of advocacy that would maximize the funding from foundations to lobby for education 
reform. In studying the New York and Los Angeles school districts, she explains that 
although foundations may have achieved reforming the education system, reform is not 
permanent. The permanence of foundations’ influence is shaped by the actors that helped 
reform the system. Using policy feedback, she explains that in school districts where 
funding was granted to centralized power structures, reform occurred at a faster pace. 
However, the policy victory experienced did not always recieve positive policy feedback 
leading to the possibility of undoing “policy reform victories.” In contrast, funding in the 
LA School District was allocated among education organizations who worked on advocacy 
campaigns and on policy recommendations. By funding advocacy organizations and 
nonprofits over the school district, policy changes, while slower, had time to build support 
and legitimacy to provide long-term, gradual, “policy victory.” Reckhow’s research is one 
of the first scholars to address the influences on grant making patterns and their 
consequences on lasting policy reform, quantitatively. However, lacking from her research 
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is how the funding that flowed into school districts influenced the current education 
outcomes of students.  
The influence of philanthropic foundations in public policy revolves around two 
central narratives describing a strategic role where grant making is driven by a charitable 
desire to alleviate social needs or as social innovators seeking to find solutions to social 
problems. In both narratives, government, for a multitude of reasons, has not been able to 
provide the adequate solution or address the needs of the community (Hammack & 
Anheier 2010; Fleishman 2007; Sandfort 2008). By concentrating on the end goal of policy 
reform, researchers unintentionally overlook the influence that their grant making which 
supports the “framing of issues, developing public will, supporting advocacy 
organizations, and funding policy implementation and evaluation (Ferris 2003, 5)” exert on 
current policy outcomes.  This research seeks to bridge the gap by building upon the 
qualitative research by systemically examining the effect of foundation giving on local 
policy implementation and outputs. 
 Theoretical Development 
“Philanthropy translates the private expressive desires of donors into public action aimed 
at meeting needs…enabling communities to solve problems and allowing individuals to 
express and enact their values (Frumkin 2008, 21)”. Foundations, their donors, and their 
grant officers may view themselves as policy entrepreneurs or policy change agents. In one 
of the most recent examples, the Chan Zuckerburg Initiative was funded with the intention 
to alleviate the U.S. education system’s inability to provide the proper educational 
strategies for students. To address this issues, the Chan Zuckerburg Initiative will invest 
their funds aiming to develop strategies and viable approaches to "whole-child 
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personalized learning" (Herold 2018). Another example is the recent realignment in the 
mission and funding priorities of the Ford Foundation’s, the nation’s second largest 
foundation. In refocusing on alleviating the causes of structural inequality and doubling its 
total giving, the foundation seeks to create change by building a "social-justice 
infrastructure" within the nonprofits and leaders they fund (Daniels 2015).   
Alongside vocalizing support, one of their strongest methods of influencing policy 
outcomes and reform comes from the granting of monetary resources. Grant making allows 
foundations the ability to indirectly affect policy at a local level by providing funding to 
intermediary, nonprofit, organizations engaging in direct service delivery to constituents 
and advocating across all levels of government and society to achieve the goals that align 
with the foundation mission. 
Theoretical Modification 
As a way of creating lasting social systemic change, foundations have turned more to 
“results-oriented giving” (Frumkin 2008; Ferris & Williams 2010; Reckhow 2012). 
Frumkin (2006) extends the basic theoretical assumption of philanthropic policy influence 
by viewing grant making as a strategic tool used instrumentally to achieve the greatest 
impact. Expressive giving is at the core of all philanthropy as it symbolizes 
“uncomplicated benevolence that takes the simple form of a gift (Frumkin 2008; 157).” 
Without knowing the intention of every foundation, I construct my arguments with the 
assumptions that foundations grant funding to accomplish change or alleviate a social 
problem. Going beyond satisfying the personal, charitable goodwill of donors, instrumental 
giving views grant making as a mechanism to fund the implementation of solutions to 
address problems in the community or society (Frumkin 2008; Sandfort 2008; Fleishman 
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2007). With this assumption, I argue that foundations providing grants related to 
immigrants or immigration policy are seeking to help immigrants’ integration process or 
advocate for immigration reform. By providing funding to either cause, foundations will 
indirectly affect local policy outputs associated with the current implementation of 
immigration policy enforcement.  
The United States has two bureaucracies whose mission focuses on the U.S. 
immigrant community. The United States Citizen and Immigration Services focuses on 
admittance and formal processing of visas, permanent residency, or naturalization services. 
While its sister bureaucracy, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, focuses on the 
removal of foreign-born individuals who meet the criteria for deportation such as 
immigrants with a criminal history, visa overstayers, and individuals with undocumented 
entry into the country. Except for minor grants awarded to nonprofits for citizenship 
information, neither bureaucracy focuses directly on immigrant integration (De Graauw & 
Bloemraad 2017) thereby affecting their level of deportability.  
The theory of leverage focuses on the tools that foundations use to fund the process 
of addressing social issues. Focusing on grant making as the tool of leverage, foundations 
who provide a more substantial the amount of money nonprofits provide a significant 
larger amount of for nonprofit organizations to engage in alleviating social issues. 
Instrumental giving is grant making based on the decision of funding nonprofits or 
programs believed to provide funding for the most adequate solutions to addressing their 
choice of social issue. Focusing on immigration, instrumental giving to nonprofit 
organizations can be given to fund three major nonprofit programs and services: 
citizenship services, integration programs, and government advocacy. Each instrumental 
  
 
66 
grant category funds different solutions for addressing problems faced by the immigrant 
community or advocating for immigration reform. The first two grant categories address 
micro and meso level changes in the immigrant community and the third focuses on 
macro-level changes. Each instrumental giving pattern will be related to influencing the 
immigrant community's level of deportability and chances for identification as deportable.  
Foundation funding for citizenship services to the immigrant community focus on 
helping change the political status of immigrants. In these cases, funding to nonprofits will 
help address the individual’s level of deportability. For example, an individual who is a 
permanent resident looking to apply for naturalization may not find the adequate help at 
USCIS. So, they turn to their local nonprofit offering citizenship courses and help with the 
application process. Another example would be that of an undocumented immigrant 
looking to gain formal status within the U.S. Similar to the previous permanent resident 
example, this individual can turn to their local nonprofit providing citizenship and or legal 
services for residency applications. In both cases, grant funding for immigrant/immigration 
citizenship services changes the deportability level of immigrants by adjusting their formal 
political status. Changes from resident to naturalized citizen provide the most significant 
level of change in an individual’s deportability compared to status adjustments from 
undocumented to documented. Thus, status adjustments culminate in decreasing the size of 
the deportable target population. By decreasing the deportable target population, increasing 
grants targeted for citizenship services will be related to a decrease in the identification of 
deportable immigrants.  
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H1a: As grants targeted for citizenship services increases, there will be a decrease in the 
size of the deportable immigrant community. Thus, foundation funding will be related to 
decreasing the identification of deportable immigrants. 
With no formal bureaucratic organization focused on helping immigrants integrate 
into life within the U.S., nonprofits have stepped in to fill the void with financial help from 
foundations. Foundations have legitimized this underserved and marginalized community 
with limited to no sociopolitical citizenship through their grant making for immigrant 
services and immigrant-serving nonprofits. In this way, the philanthropic sector provides 
non-naturalized immigrants, including undocumented immigrants, with what Bosniak 
(2008) terms the “citizenship of noncitizens,” by including immigrants in their service 
provision extending them the opportunity to access basic life necessitates without regard to 
formal political status. With an unmet need for services and policy reform, foundations' 
grant making supports nonprofits in creating environments and relationships where the 
immigrant community is unafraid to seek out services and engage compared to an 
environment where immigrants fear of deportations isolates them from reaching out to 
local government for aid (Cordero-Guzman 2005; Frasure and Jones-Correa 2010). De 
Graauw (2016) details how nonprofits within San Francisco not only advocated for 
changes in local policies but worked alongside local government to help with the 
incorporation of immigrants into their local communities. With nonprofits unable to 
expend more than 20% on political efforts, nonprofits have used their administrative 
capacity to create advocacy alliances for collaboration efforts across sectors and targeted 
issue framing to change the perception of immigrants needing services (De Graauw 2016).  
Although this illustrates a particular case in San Francisco, the strategies explored resonate 
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to the broader community of immigrant-serving nonprofits across the U.S. looking to close 
the gap between immigrants and local governments that might expose them federal 
scrutiny by providing a range of services from language training to health care access 
(Andersen 2010; Blooemrad 2006; Cordero-Guzman et al. 2008; de Graauw 2004;2016; de 
Leon et al. 2009; Gleeson 2012; Jones-Correa 2008a,b; Modares and Kitson 2008). 
Integration services and programs are often facilitated through collaborating organizations 
seeking to not only integrate immigrants, but address the larger community’s perspective 
of immigrants as non-members of the community. The multi-method approach from 
service to advocacy focuses on providing holistic changes to an immigrant’s deportability 
from the micro all the way up to the macro-level. In this way, increasing the funding for 
integration will be related to decreasing the identification of deportable immigrants.  
H1b: Increasing grants associated with integration services will be related to decreases in 
the identification of deportable immigrants.  
The last instrumental pattern of giving captures funding for solutions related to 
government advocacy such as policy advocacy at all levels of government to policy 
education campaigns in the community or with political actors. Funding for government-
related activities is different from grants made to integration and citizenship because 
funding in those areas is explicitly given to support programs and services for the 
immigrant community. In both cases, the outcome is to Americanize them which will have 
an adverse effect on their level of deportability. It is unlikely that a foundation with an 
anti-immigrant stance would give funds to nonprofits providing integration or citizenship 
programs to immigrants.  While grant making to support nonprofit lobbying of government 
can lead to stricter or tightening of immigration policy or enforcement. Brown (2013) 
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points out that despite the surge in pro-immigration funding by foundations, the growth of 
the Tea Party in 2008, spurred grant making by conservative foundations to promote anti-
immigrant rhetoric pushing for policies aimed at making immigrants' ability to reside in the 
U.S. difficult to the increased border enforcement. The policy change cycle is not 
immediate and the window for change even smaller, increasing grants related to macro-
level changes will be related to influences in policy implementation. However, as this 
instrumental category is a catch-all for immigration policy advocacy, no direction is stated 
as grants can be given both maintain the status quo of current laws or to induce reform.  
H1c: Increasing grants related to government will affect the identification of deportable 
immigrants.  
If as one of their end goals, foundations seek to build thriving communities 
(Frumkin 2008), then funding will also be related to the types of immigrants identified for 
deportation. Immigrants with criminal backgrounds involving felony crimes pose a threat 
to community safety and well-being. While identifying immigrants who are part of the 
community and pose no threat may lead to community instability as identification creates 
fear of interacting with state actors and subsequently the possible deportation of 
immigrants (Shoichet 2018; Nichols et al. 2018; Warren & Kerwin 2017; Leyro 2013; 
Hagan et al. 2011; Abrona et al. 2010; Mendoza & Olivos 2009; Watson 2014). So, 
foundation funding relating to integration and providing legal services for immigrants that 
pose no threat to the community would lead to reducing their deportability at a higher level 
compared to high priority deportable immigrants. Immigrants with felony convictions 
might have a more difficult time being able to qualify for naturalization or they may not 
even seek out aid from the nonprofit community. As such, funding for integration or 
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citizenship would be unlikely to influence the identification of high priority per capita 
immigrants. Therefore, foundation funding would help reduce the disparity in over-
identification of low to high priority immigrants as grants related to social or political 
citizenship increase. As previously mentioned, it is unlikely that conservative or anti-
immigrant foundations would provide funding for integration programs and citizenship 
services, but they would fund nonprofits that advocate for anti-immigrant legislation or 
strict immigration policy. So, funding for government advocacy would be related to 
increasing the identification of high priority immigrants over low priority per capita 
immigrants. Additionally, increasing the funding related to government advocacy will 
increase the level of identification high priority deportable immigrants unlike the negative 
effect of funding for integration and citizenship services on the per capita identification of 
low priority immigrants.  
H2: Increasing grant funding targeted for citizenship or integration services, is related to 
reducing the enforcement disparity between low and high priority deportable immigrant 
identifications. Funding for government advocacy is unrelated to affecting the enforcement 
disparity.  
H3: While government advocacy grant funding will be related to increasing high priority 
immigrant identifications, increasing grant funding targeted for citizenship or integration 
services will negatively affect the identification of low priority immigrants and be 
unrelated to the identification of high priority immigrants.  
Data & Research Methods 
To test the theoretical arguments about on relationship between philanthropic funding and 
immigration policy outcomes, a newly compiled dataset spanning the tenure of Secure 
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Communities under the Obama administration was joined with grant making data collected 
by the Foundation Center.  The dataset contains information for the 48 continental states 
and the District of Columbia.  
The data collected for this analysis comes from three main sources. The dependent 
variable, the measure for policy outcomes, is obtained from semi-annual interoperability 
reports released by the Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement and Removal Operations. Grant information was purchased from 
the Foundation Center for the years of 2008 to 2014. The final sources of data for the 
control variables comes from U.S. Census’ datasets:  American Community Survey's 
(ACS) five-year estimates and the yearly U.S. Census of State and Local Government. 
This research employs a seemingly unrelated regression analysis (SUR) with clustered 
standard errors27 by county to analyze the effects of philanthropic funding on immigration 
policy outcomes. As the policy outputs are mutually exclusive, unlike a traditional 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression, SUR is able to control for the interdependent nature 
that can lead to the possibility of correlation among the error terms (Zellner 1962; Moon & 
Perron 2006). 
The first set of models will evaluate the influence of giving on the overall 
immigration policy outcomes and its influence on redressing disparities in enforcement. 
The second focuses on philanthropic influence on individual priority level outcomes. Each 
                                                
27 Models with state fixed effects and year fixed effects are not reported, but were run. The 
relationships between philanthropic funding and policy outcomes remain unchanged when 
state fixed effects or year fixed effects are included. Year fixed effects are not included 
because of multi-collinearity experienced between the year 2014 and a variable measuring 
prosecutorial discretion.  
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model analyzes each instrumental giving strategy as a mechanism affecting immigration 
outputs. It should be noted that not every county received grant funding for immigration.  
Policy Outputs: Immigration 
The first immigration measure focuses on measuring the strength of local agency to act as 
a force multiplier for the federal government. The goal of Secure Communities was to 
locate deportable immigrants from the interior of the U.S. To capture the strength of the 
force multiplier in identifying deportable immigrants, the total number of matched 
deportable immigrants is divided by the total noncitizen28 population. This measure 
captures how many immigrants per capita are being identified as deportable by the local 
sheriff’s department. The larger this measure, the more strongly a county acts a force 
multiplier. On average, a county had a noncitizen per capita identification of 0.07 with a 
0.40 standard deviation. Table 6contains the summary statistics of each policy output.   
 Despite having deportation priorities, Secure Communities disproportionately 
identified higher rates of immigrants with only misdemeanor convictions or a civil 
violation of unlawful presence on their records rather than identifying and deporting 
individuals with felony criminal records. To measure the influence of philanthropy on 
creating equity in policy outcomes, I operationalized an enforcement disparity measure as 
the ratio of low to high priority deportable immigrants identified. In the sample data, the 
average disparity in enforcement is about 2 low priority immigrants to every one high 
priority immigrant with a standard deviation of about 3 low priority immigrants.  
                                                
28 Noncitizen population contains the counts of all persons foreign born that are not 
naturalized citizens.  
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 The last two measures capture the influence of philanthropic funding on the 
individual immigration priority policy outcomes. As the mission of foundations is to create 
healthy and thriving communities, grant funding will influence the priority policy 
outcomes of Secure Communities differently. The two measures are operationalized by 
taking the total number of immigrants identified in each priority level over the total 
number of non-citizens in a county. The average county had a high priority per capita 
measure of 0.04 with 0.18 standard deviation. On average, the low priority per capita 
identification was slightly more than double the high priority per capita at 0.6 with a 
standard deviation of 0.37.   
Philanthropic Funding  
Grant making data comes from the Foundation Center29. The data was purchased with the 
parameters to receive all grants that were made with the words “immigrants”, “immigrants 
and migrants”, “undocumented immigrants”, and “immigration” within the nonprofit 
population or grant activity fields. The Foundation Center provided about 27,000 grants 
related to immigration. For this sample, from 2008 to 2014, U.S. foundations made close to 
26,000 grants domestically related to immigrants or immigration-related services.  
As foundations leverage their private resources to help fund nonprofits promoting 
their private values, immigration-related giving was not a top funding priority of the 
philanthropic community. During the era of Secure Communities (2008 through 2014), 
                                                
29 Reckhow (2012) notes that she collected 990 forms rather than use the Foundation 
Center data based on Greene’s (2005) observation that the Foundation Center data is 
biased. The bias occurs as the Foundation Center categorizes grants based off of reports 
and self-classifications from their reporting foundations. The idea is used here because it is 
optimal and indicative of instrumental giving for immigration especially if the foundation 
has coded the grant themselves.  
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there was an average of 81,000 grant-making foundations in the United States which gifted 
a little over 378 billion dollars across nonprofits for a range of policy issues. From this 
$378 billion30, only 1.85 billion in philanthropic grants were designated for immigration-
related services within the forty-eight continental United States and the District of 
Columbia. Figure 6 shows the yearly aggregated funding related to immigration from 2008 
through 2009. With the economic downturn in 2008, the first four years of funding steadily 
show giving between $232 million to $246 million. In about 2012, giving related to 
immigration begins to pick up with the highest amount awarded in 2014 at $335 million. 
Each of the years after 2011 increased an average of $30 million for total giving related to 
immigration. Foundations awarded the nonprofit community with $84 per non-citizen over 
a seven-year period.  Yearly, nonprofits operated with an average of 11 philanthropic 
dollars for every non-citizen in their community, an amount that is unlikely able to provide 
long-term integration services and much less for legal services to attain political 
citizenship. Figure 7 shows the total aggregate funding received by U.S. counties from 
2008 to 2014. The average county received about $84,000 dollars in total for immigration-
related giving with a standard deviation of about $1.3 million. The figure illustrates a 
pattern of unequal funding distribution where many communities with immigrants received 
even less per immigrant if any funding at all. To operationalize grant making for each year, 
all individual grants are coded into one of the three instrumental categories, based on their 
overriding grant activity. Then, the individual grant amounts are adjusted into 2016 
constant dollars and aggregated up to the county level by category. Table 3.2 contains the 
                                                
30 All dollar amounts have been adjusted for inflation and represent 2016 constant dollars.  
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summary statistics on each instrumental funding category. Each county receives a value for 
all three instrumental categories, but if the county received no philanthropic funding that 
value is zero.  
Using the information provided by the Foundation Center, I coded each individual 
grant into respectively into one of the three instrumental categories that best matched their 
overriding grant activity. Each grant received up to five activity codes illustrating the 
various programs or services the grant will help fund, but operationalization was based on 
the separate variable provided by the foundation center that identified the overriding grant 
activity providing the top description for the basis of the grant31. Based off the theoretical 
arguments, I created the following instrumental grant funding categories based off the 
overriding grant activity:  
1.  Immigration Services (Citizenship Services): Immigrant Rights, Immigrant 
Services, Immigration & naturalization, Immigration Law 
2. Integration Services (Social Citizenship): Education, Health, Human Services, 
Community Development, etc.  
3. Government Advocacy: Freedoms, Rights, Community Policing, National 
Security, Police Agencies, Customs & Border Control, etc.  
Based on yearly giving patterns, foundations averaged larger grant funding 
allocations for instrumental funding focused on providing integration services for the 
immigrant community over citizenship services or government advocacy. The average 
county received about $39,000 for integration services with a standard deviation of under 
                                                
31 For a full description of all grant activities, see Appendix B.  
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$500,000 compared to average $24,000 with a standard deviation of less than $480,000 for 
citizenship services. Government advocacy had the lowest average funding of about 
$20,000 with a standard deviation of about $411,000. Figure 8 illustrates philanthropic 
foundations’ yearly instrumental patterns of giving. Each of the instrumental categories 
fluctuates in their total share of funding, but integration services continually remained the 
largest share awarded. Beginning in 2010, the share of funding for integration begins to 
decreases with both political citizenship and advocacy equally expanding their total share 
of funding.   
Controls 
This research views immigration policy outputs as bureaucratic organizational 
performance. The following empirical analysis will use a basic model that controls for 
bureaucratic implementation and enforcement of immigration policy by including controls 
for organizational capacity and policy environment (Brewer and Seldon 2000; Boyne & 
Meier 2009). Table 8 contains the summary statistics for the control variables included in 
all the models.  
To control for the capacity of local law enforcement agencies in identifying 
deportable immigrants, I include a measure of the size of the total police protection that 
includes the total employment of officers within county and city law enforcement officers. 
The local law enforcement presence, unfortunately, is not reported at each county level. 
Rather, the Annual State and Local Government Employment Survey reports aggregates 
up to the state level all local law enforcement agencies budgets and personnel. The second 
measure is the aggregated total operating budget of local law enforcement agencies. Jaeger 
(2016) and Farris & Holman (2017) have identified that local sheriff’s budgets are related 
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to their willingness to comply with ICE. Both measures are used to help control for 
bureaucratic capacity to enforce immigration policy and are logged to normalize 
distribution. 
Policy outcomes depend on the inputs into the organization and policy environment 
in which bureaucrats operate. To control for the most basic level of inputs into both local 
and federal enforcement bureaucracies, I control for the total submissions of fingerprints 
within a county as it illustrates the total number of recorded attempts to reduce crime or 
identify immigrants. Because of the wide variation and the over dispersion of structural 
zeros, the final operationalization of submissions is logged.  
In order to control for the influence of the policy environment, a set of controls 
capturing the social, political, and economic climate influencing immigration enforcement 
are in each model. The first set of controls accounts for the policy targets and non-policy 
targets of the community. According to past research (Cox and Miles 2013; Wong 2012), 
the activation and enforcement of sComm occurred in counties with high levels of specific 
populations, Hispanics and noncitizen. In addition to Hispanics being the face of 
immigration, historical immigration narratives focused on the Asian population within the 
United States (Daniel 2005). As the two foremost policy target populations, as these 
populations increase in a county, they will cause an increase in the disparity of 
enforcement between low priority to high priority matches within a county. In addition to 
Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asian populations, included in the model is the percentage of 
non-Hispanic Whites and non-Hispanic African Americans. The final social measure 
captures the level of education with a county. As the percentage of individuals with less 
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than a high school education increases it is expected that so will the pressure for 
immigration enforcement.  
Historically and contemporarily, immigration policy remains polarized with both 
sides of the aisle arguing for different enforcement and reform typically fueled by rhetoric 
concerning economic distressed caused by immigration. Anti-immigration rhetoric spikes 
during times of crisis with the Republican party calling for stricter immigration policies 
(Chand & Schreckhise; Daniels 2005; Tichenor 2002; Welch 2002). Due to the differences 
among political parties, controls for the restrictive political economy of immigration 
enforcement (Calavita 2010,1996; Ngai 2004; Tichenor 2002) are expected to increase 
policy outcomes.  Partisanship is operationalized as the percentage of votes32 in the 2008 
and 2012 election for the Republican candidate (i.e., McCain in 2008 and Romney 2012). 
The years from 2008 to 2010 contain the 2008 percentage and the years from 2011 through 
2014 have the 2012 voting percentage.  
To account for economic conditions that might influence a push for stricter 
immigration enforcement, six variables are included that cover financial stability, non-
homeownership, employment conditions, and use of public benefits. Financial stability of a 
county is captured by using the logged median income in 2016 constant dollars. The 
percentage of non-homeowners is included as a measure of economic vitality in 
community. As unemployment rates increase, the narrative of the immigrants taking 
American jobs is used to bolster support for stricter immigration enforcement, as such the 
                                                
32 Voting percentages at the county level were collected from the Data.gov website that is 
managed by the U.S. General Administration, Technology Transformation Service. The 
website is follows the Project Open Data schema that requires all datasets to report: title, 
description, tags, last update, publisher and contact name.  
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rate of unemployment is included. The final set of economic variables focus on controlling 
for the narrative of immigrants as public charges (Moloney 2012). The percentage of the 
population that is on public assistance is included expecting that take up rates of public 
assistance increases so will the immigration enforcement in a community.  
Results 
Scholars have long focused on illustrating the role of foundations in influencing policy 
reform. A role that often takes years of resources and advocacy to see the desired policy 
change accomplished at any level of government. However, not all philanthropic funding 
targets changing current policy. Philanthropic foundations allocate their grants with a 
broad mission of helping create healthy thriving communities by helping address social 
problems. This line of research leads to the theoretical argument that philanthropic dollars’ 
influence policy outcomes. Based on the analysis of the three different patterns of 
instrumental funding, the results provide support for the hypotheses that philanthropic 
funding is related to policy outputs. Additionally, support for the theory that variation in 
instrumental funding influences policy outcomes differently based on how the policy 
outcomes relate to their mission is also supported.  
Philanthropic Funding & Secure Communities 
Table 9 displays the results of the analysis of each respective instrumental funding 
category on total per capita enforcement and the enforcement disparity ratio. Grant 
activities of every grant in the dataset were coded into three categories that address 
different aspects of an immigrant’s life affecting their deportability and identification for 
deportation.  The first category focuses on influencing the political status of immigrants. 
This category captures all grants awarded to help change the individual political status of 
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immigrants. Support for the influence of instrumental giving is found for total enforcement 
and redressing issues in immigration enforcement. A one percent increase in funding for 
political citizenship negatively influences immigration enforcement per capita by 0.02% 
and decreases the disparity in identifying more low priority deportable immigrants to high 
priority deportable immigrants by 0.007%, all else being equal.  
 The second category of instrumental giving based on grant activity captures 
integration of immigrants into their larger community. This category provides social 
citizenship by creating programs and services that help ensure immigrants have access to 
meeting their most basic life necessities. Not only does integration encompass addressing 
the basic needs of immigrants to participate fully in all spheres of public and private life, 
but it also seeks to alter the policy environment to ensure community is receptive to an 
established or arriving immigrants. Funding these activities changes the policy 
environment, where more receptive immigrant environments are less likely to pressure 
local law enforcement agencies to enforcement immigration. If federal immigration policy 
is enforced, local law enforcement agencies will prioritize immigrants posing a threat to 
the community over not community members that are non-threatening low priority 
immigrants. Funding related to integration services has a statistically significant and 
negative relationship with the per capita total enforcement and leads to a reduction in the 
enforcement disparity. A one percent increase in integration services decreases the total 
enforcement per capita in a county by 0.04% and decreases the identification of low 
priority to high priority deportable immigrants by 0.01%.  
 The final category captures funding related to government advocacy. This category 
embodies the spirit of engaging in macro-level policy process from community education 
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issue campaigns to political advocacy by nonprofits. In aggregating grant making up to the 
county level, the political orientations of foundations and nonprofits are muddled. It is hard 
to detail the exact direction of the effect funding should exhibit on policy outputs. For 
example, a conservation foundation granting to a conservation, anti-immigration nonprofit 
will be advocating for anti-immigrant legislation or stricter immigration reform opposite of 
the strategy of progressive, pro-immigrant foundations and nonprofits. However, 
conservative foundations are unlikely to award funding for the immigrant community to 
access services or programs that help them attain formal political citizenship or integrate 
into the community.  As such, funding to government can influence immigration policy 
outcomes in either direction. The results indicate that instrumental giving related to 
government activities has a statistically significant and positive influence on total per 
capita identification of deportable immigrants, but is negatively associated enforcement 
disparity ratio, helps redress the disparity in immigration enforcement.  A one percent 
increase in funding for government activities, increases the total per capita enforcement 
within a county by 0.05%. This is the largest influence of funding across all three 
categories of instrumental giving by grant activity. While very small, a one percent 
increase in government funding is related to closing the disparity between the 
identification of low priority immigrants to high priority immigrants by 0.01%, all else 
being equal.  
The previous analysis illustrated that funding related to creating political and social 
citizenship negatively influence the total per capita enforcement and helps create equity in 
identification patterns. Probing the relationship between instrumental funding and sub-
policy outcomes, Table 10 contains the results of instrumental funding’s influence on 
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priority level identification outcomes. Instrumental giving for social and political 
citizenship services has a negative effect on each priority level output with a slightly larger 
influence on the per capita identification of low priority immigrants compared to the effect 
on per capita identification of high priority deportable immigrants. Increasing funding 
related to political citizenship by one percent decreases the identification of low priority 
per capita immigrants by 0.02% and high priority per capita immigrants by 0.01%. Social 
citizenship funding has a stronger effect on the outcomes than does political citizenship 
funding by 0.01% for each priority level outcomes. All else constant, a one percent 
increase in the philanthropic funds for social citizenship decreases the per capita 
identification of low priority deportable immigrants by 0.03% and high priority immigrants 
by 0.02%. It is surprising that funding for government, regardless of the threat level posed 
by immigrants, increases the identification of both priority level per capita outcomes by 
0.05%.  
Implications and Discussion 
 Identifying which issues to prioritize, to what extent, and where to devote time and 
resources will constantly remain vital questions in the minds of foundations. Some 
foundations may have narrow and direct missions, others have broad and overarching 
missions allowing them the freedom to address a variety of social issues and policy 
problems as they see fit. 
During the era of Secure Communities, there was an average of 81,000 grant 
making foundations in the United States. The philanthropic sector targeted less than 0.50% 
of their total giving for the immigrant community. At the same time, local law enforcement 
agencies matched more than 2 million non-citizens, legal permanent residents, visa 
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holders, or undocumented immigrants, with deportable offenses and provided their 
information to Immigration and Customs Enforcement Secure Communities Program 
(IDENT 2014). The theoretical argument developed focuses on funding affecting policy 
outputs through the total grant dollars leveraged to the nonprofit sector across the United 
States. In the next chapter, I argue the nonprofit community uses the funding as a means to 
provide the immigrant community with programs and services for their integration and 
attainment of formal citizenship. Although the results indicate an association between 
philanthropic funding and policy immigration outputs, they are at best a prediction of what 
can happen in the long term, but I would not expect philanthropic funding to have 
immediate influence on the deportation regime within the U.S.  
In comparing the magnitude of the three categories, theoretically it was expected 
that funding for immigration services would have the highest influence on outcomes, 
because it focuses on changing the policy target’s political status of deportable to non-
deportable citizen. The greater the amount of grant funding for political citizenship allows 
nonprofits the means to increase their legal services for the immigrant community. This 
instrumental funding creates opportunities and helps fund deportability changes on the 
micro-level among the immigrant community. However, the influence of this instrumental 
funding category on policy outcomes relates to the smallest influence across all of the 
funding categories. The micro-level changes to deportability do not occur rapidly or on a 
large scale. Rather the individual change supported by grant funding, causes small 
individual incremental changes in the size of of the policy target population. As nonprofits 
serve as intermediaries for immigrant incorporation into the larger society by providing 
social citizenship leading to integration beyond political citizenship through segmented 
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assimilation (Portes & Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997a,b; Nee & Alba 2012), integration funding 
targets change across more than one structure in the policy environment leading to the 
largest impact.  The results suggest funding for integration services relates to the largest 
negative impact on local immigration enforcement and assists in reduces the disparity in 
enforcement. A 25% increase in integration funding relates to a 1% decrease in total per 
capita enforcement and a 0.25% decrease in the enforcement disparity ratio. 
Not only did giving for social citizenship have the largest impact across 
enforcement outcomes, these funding patterns and funding for political citizenship also 
created protection for high priority immigrants. I find increasing a county’s funding for 
integration services relates to a 0.75% decrease in low priority identifications and a 0.50% 
decrease in identification of deportable high priority per capita immigrants. The rhetoric 
around immigration has typically centered on perpetuating the narrative of “criminal and 
highly threatening” immigrant. Secure Communities continued to perpetuate this narrative 
of “criminal” immigrants undeserving of immigration reform by framing deportations on 
the basis of “criminal” acts. In examining the priority categories closely, not all high 
priority immigrants identified or deported committed felony aggregated assaults. State 
sentences that incarcerate immigrants for more than 364 days are considered felony 
convictions if the individual is a non-citizen (Keenan 2007). These individuals who serve 
at least 365 days in jail for a misdemeanor at the state level are considered by ICE and the 
federal government as a high priority “criminal” offender. With foundations seeking to 
improve communities and focus on addressing social problems, high rates of deportation, 
especially of embedded and non-criminal immigrants, would lead to destabilization of 
communities.  
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Foundations are inherently political, and do not always grant with the intention of 
advocating for pro-immigration reform (Brown 2013). It is unlikely conservative, anti-
immigrant foundations would provide grants instrumentally for programs or services to 
help aid immigrants, especially undocumented immigrants. It is more likely that these 
foundations would provide instrumental grant making to lobby government to ensure no 
pro-immigration reform occurs or for tougher anti-immigration policy reform. The results 
indicate instrumental funding for government advocacy is associated with the largest 
increase in total per capita enforcement. A 25% increase in grant funding for government 
advocacy leads to a 1.25% increase in the total per capita identification of deportable 
immigrants within a county, and the same increase in both priority per capita identification 
outcomes. Despite philanthropic foundation’s dedicating funding to immigration related 
advocacy, no national reform has occurred leaving in place IRIRA’s the criteria for 
exclusion which increased the deportability of the immigrant community by expanding the 
types of crimes eligible for deportation. Additionally, the clause allowing retroactive 
application of IRIRIA allowed for an even larger number of immigrants to be eligible for 
deportation. So long as advocacy fails to aid in passing pro-immigration reform, the 
population of policy targets eligible for deportation continues to grow increasing 
immigration outputs. At the state level, advocacy may help pass pro-immigrant legislation, 
but state-level legislation does not offer protection from identification or deportation.  
Foundations might have deep pockets, but the funding in them is finite especially 
for an issue that is not a top priority only gaining salience during elections or wide-spread 
immigration protests (Brown 2013). The bureaucracies tasked with identifying and 
removing immigrants at the borders and across the interior of the United States will dwarf 
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any amount of philanthropic funds awarded to nonprofits for immigrants’ political or 
social citizenship.  
Limitations & Future Research  
This research aimed at providing not just an empirical test of the influence of philanthropic 
funding on policy, but at developing a theory of foundation influence on the public policy 
process. The limitation of this research exists in overgeneralizing the motivation of 
strategic and instrumental giving to all foundations’ grant making. Not all foundations are 
motivated to give in the same manner. With different types of internal structure and 
funding, foundations motivations, strategies, and reasoning for giving will vary. At the end 
of the day, it is hard to theorize the intention of the foundation to give and what they hope 
their resources will produce. More work needs to focus on studying foundations’ black box 
of grant making to work towards creating a theory that speaks to similarities across 
philanthropic foundations.  
It also made major assumptions about the the intermediaries influence on the 
outcomes. This work served as a first foundational systematic analysis of total grant dollars 
leveraged, the next should systematically examine these relationships using a mediated 
structural equation model to be able to test each link in the theory. Future research should 
focus on testing the direct influence of philanthropic funding on redistributive immigration 
outcomes related to political and social citizenship. For example, polls indicate that a 
majority of Americans believe that in order to truly be considered “American” individuals 
must have status and ability to speak English (Stokes 2017). A next step, in this research, is 
collecting the number of applications for permanent residency and naturalization and 
analyzing the influence of philanthropic funding on the size of the application pool for 
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each type of formal political status within a county. Additionally, gathering information on 
the backlog of applications, both on the duration and size of backlog, would allow a more 
direct test of the influence of foundation funding related to influence immigration and 
citizenship. Most cases that appear before an immigration judge are rarely granted stays 
from their deportation. Statistics reported by the EOIR indicate that during the years of 
2010 to 2014, immigrants appearing before a judge were removed on average between 70 
and 75% of the time (EOIR 2015). Foundation funding may not be able to help the 
identification of deportable immigrants, but by funding legal representation during 
immigration court proceedings, foundations might have a larger impact on keeping an 
immigrant in the country by helping them attain a stay or extension in their ability to reside 
within the U.S. over protecting them from being identified as deportable.  
Lastly, similar to Reckhow’s work on school district funding, the data gathered 
lend itself to further exploration about what characteristics of a community or nonprofit 
increase the likelihood that immigration funding will be awarded to them. This would 
allow states and counties experiencing new immigrant settlement the ability to help speed 
up the process of immigrant incorporation to creating systems of bureaucratic 
incorporation (Marrow 2009; Lewis & Ramakrishan 2007; Jones-Correa 2008 a,b) that can 
enable protection from the current deportation regime.  
Conclusion  
American philanthropic organizations from large private foundations to smaller more grass 
roots community based organizations have constructed a strong, vibrant, independent 
sector focused on addressing social problems and building community. Through its 
targeting of monetary resources, instrumental and expressively, philanthropic foundations 
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have engaged communities, individuals, elected officials to the larger political structure to 
influence public policy (Babcock 1998). Despite the extensive detailed historical analysis 
of foundations’ strategies and roles, research understanding the systematic leverage of total 
philanthropic dollars’ influence on local policy outcomes remains underdeveloped. During 
the time period of interest, the U.S. experienced a massive expansion of the federal 
deportation regime into the most interior of our communities, leaving the philanthropic 
sector to once again step in and help improve the marginalization and inhumane treatment 
of the U.S. immigrant community (Cohen 2009).  This research was one of the first to 
systematically examine the influence of philanthropic dollars on punitive policy outcomes. 
The next chapter will, qualitatively, examine the mechanisms supported by philanthropic 
foundations. I examine how these nonprofit mechanisms relate to altering the deportability 
of the immigrant community its relationship with immigration enforcement policy outputs.  
Whether foundations award grants to merely satisfy the altruistic tendencies of their 
donors or as way of initiating social change, their funding has implications for local policy 
outcomes beyond reforming current policy. Philanthropic grants constitute a base part of 
the operating budgets for nonprofit organizations. The funding foundations provide the 
nonprofit community may not be an extremely large part of the nonprofit organizations’ 
budgets, but it remains a vital part of the keeping nonprofits programs and services open to 
the immigrant community. The quantitative analysis in this chapter revealed an association 
between funding and influence in punitive policy outputs, but it does not reveal the ways 
that nonprofits mediate and create citizenship for non-citizens. To further explore the 
foundations’ “nesting doll” influence, the next chapter will examine the direct mechanisms 
funded by foundations, nonprofits and the programs that lead to a direct influence on 
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policy targets and the policy environment within which Secure Communities is 
implemented.    
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CHAPTER IV                                                                                                             
FOUNDATION’S DON’T FUND REVOLUTIONS, BUT THEY DO FUND THE 
RESISTANCE 
 
In April 2018, the state of Connecticut passed bill extending in-state college financial aid 
to undocumented immigrants (Gomez-Aceves 2018). During the passage of the 
Connecticut measure, the gallery was full of immigrant organizers from the state’s regional 
United We Dream Network who had worked tirelessly for the past five years advocating 
for undocumented immigrants’ inclusion and access to higher education. United We 
Dream, national office, received a total of $7 million in philanthropic grants from seven 
foundations in New York, Texas, and California from 2010 to 2014. The twelve grants 
awarded were to help this immigrant serving nonprofits build alliances, establish networks, 
and advocate for issues affecting immigrant youth (including higher education), and 
expanding support systems for Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals applications. 
Although, the national was the major recipient of philanthropic grants, the philanthropic 
funding it was awarded played a role in Connecticut’s United We Dream’s advocacy.  
The devolution of immigration enforcement to local law enforcement agencies 
(Provine et al. 2016; Decker et al. 2009) and government services to local third sector 
organizations (Salamon 2012; Eikenberry 2006; Clemens 2006; Grønberg & Paarlberg 
2001) has created the ideal place for foundations to indirectly affect local policy outputs by 
financing mediating organizations. In their positions within the community, nonprofits are 
ideally positioned to address the needs of immigrants unconstrained by bureaucratic red 
tape (De Graauw 2008; Douglass 2001; Thayer & Scott 2001). Although the philanthropic 
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community is unable to grant formal political citizenship, a right reserved to the federal 
government, their charitable work seeks to influence the direction of public policy from 
implementation to outcomes.  The philanthropic sector provides a framework for the 
integration of the immigrant community, documented and undocumented alike. This 
framework helps confer citizenship and promotes receptive environments to promote 
democratic inclusion and incorporation, in light of government’s gridlock on 
comprehensive immigration reform and its historic stance on barring the incorporation of 
immigrants through social policy benefits (Bloemraad & De Grauuw 2012).  
    Building on the quantitative analysis, this chapter focuses on the role of the 
nonprofit community in affecting local policy outputs. This part of my multi-method 
approach will provide insights into the theory developed in the previous chapter about the 
use of philanthropic funds by the nonprofit community. Research is rich on the role 
nonprofits play as intermediary organizations facilitating immigrant integration to political 
incorporation (Brown 2013; de Graauw 2007, 2008, 2014, 2016; Martin 2012; Leitner & 
Strunck 2014; Wilson 2013; Villalón 2010; De Leon et al. 2009; Handy & Greenspan 
2009; Hung 2007). Yet, the link between foundation funding and immigration policy 
outputs remains underdeveloped. This research uniquely contributes to the literature by 
conducting semi-structured interviews with grantees that received philanthropic grants 
during the era of Secure Communities. Using an inductive theoretical thematic analysis, 
this research is one of the first to study grantees of foundations and their work as it relates, 
ultimately, to the affecting the deportability of immigrants within the community.  
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Theoretical Background 
Foundations’ monetary resources alone cannot change the public policy process, but 
through the intentional distribution of their resources, philanthropic foundations can equip 
the nonprofit organizations implementing programs and services aimed at helping 
community members in need. With no attached constituency and no immediate ability to 
lobby, foundations must rely on nonprofits ability to serve as mediating institutions that 
bridge “the individual in his private life and the large institutions of the modern society 
(Kerrine & Nehaus 1979, 11).” As organizations within the third sector of society, 
nonprofits contribute to the American democracy by developing civically engaged 
members, educating the public on issues, and creating a voice for the underrepresented 
(Salamon 2012; Boris & Steuerle 2006; Warren 2003; Clemens 2001). 
 Theories abound focusing understanding the relationship of the nonprofit sector 
with the community and government (Ott 2001; Salamon 2012; Smith & Grønberg 2006). 
Furthermore, as organizations operating within communities and serving those in need, 
nonprofits have a unique insight into the private problems of their community unaddressed 
or aggravated by government. With the devolution of public goods and services to the 
nonprofit community, nonprofits have become integral in service delivery that has gained 
them access to networks and influential actors allowing them the ability to advocate and 
promote the needs of their members (Smith & Grønberg 2006).  
The theoretical approach most appropriate to describe the role of immigrant-serving 
nonprofits is the civil society and social movement model. The civil society and social 
movement model (CSSM) argues the role of the nonprofit community is both 
revolutionary and reactionary as a consequence to government’s creation of public policy 
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that has negatively affected members of society, re-defined their membership and rights, 
and reallocated benefits and punishments. With regards to contemporary immigration 
policy and the immigrant community, government’s passage of IRIRA along with the 
devolution of immigration enforcement fuels the rise of hostile rhetoric and environments 
for the immigrant community. With only the DACA program providing a new temporary 
protected status for a sub-set of the immigrant population, government has largely failed to 
provide a pathway to citizenship for 14% of the U.S. population. No pathway for 
citizenship and no programs for immigrant integration has left a void for service delivery 
that the nonprofit community has continually stepped up to help provide.  
Following the theoretical arguments of CSSM, the role of immigrant-serving 
nonprofit organizations stems as a consequence to the years of punitive immigration and 
social policy that has harmed not only the lives of immigrants but their ability to reside 
within U.S. communities. As a result, immigrant-serving nonprofits are vital actors 
engaging in not only service provision to promote integration but also revolutionaries 
advocating for reform within our social and public spheres of life for pro-immigration 
policy. In their positions within the community, nonprofits might face constraints to 
providing complete inclusionary service delivery, regardless of proper documented status, 
due to limited budgets or as they are the recipients of government grants. Philanthropic 
foundation funding provides the nonprofit community with the freedom to provide services 
and advocacy without red tape or restrictions to their membership. According to CSSM, 
nonprofits’ provision of services from health to legal aid and as policy advocates leads to 
influencing public policy. Yet, this view leaves unclear how nonprofits engage in the 
public policy process leading to influence on the policy outputs within their community.  
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In the previous chapter, the analysis revealed that a negative association between 
the total philanthropic grant dollars leveraged within the county and immigration 
enforcement outputs. One possible explanation to the size of the effect is that there is not 
enough philanthropic funding to alter the deportation regime and of the funding that is 
given it indirectly affects enforcement policy outputs. This explanation will be probed 
further in this chapter to provide a more detailed view of the relationship between 
philanthropy and public policy. As the central actors and organizations engaging with the 
immigrant community at the local level, the nonprofit perspective provides greater insights 
into how funding can influence immigrants’ deportability in a way that the quantitative 
analysis is unable to illustrate.  
Research Design  
This research concentrates on understanding the link between immigrant-serving 
nonprofits and local immigration policy outcomes. My research is unique compared to 
previous research on immigrant-serving nonprofits, as it is the first to focus on 
interviewing recipients of foundation grants. I choose to interview nonprofit grantees as a 
way to link the indirect influence of philanthropic foundations on public policy outcomes. 
To provide insights into the role of nonprofits in influencing policy, the dataset of 
interviews for this research is analyzed using a theoretical thematic analysis (Braun & 
Clarke 2006). I acknowledge that the interviews are conducted years after the grants were 
received. To overcome the limitation of not having interviews in the years immediately 
following the grant making, I assume that nonprofits typically function and provide similar 
services across time with modifications to the services to increase their impact. It is 
unlikely that nonprofits would dramatically change their service provision if they are 
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focused on one particular sub-group of individuals like immigrants. Advocacy efforts may 
improve, and speaking to them between 3 to 8 years later would discuss the new methods 
of advocacy with the same underlying goal of serving the immigrant community. There is 
one significant difference that is obvious between when the grants were received and the 
time of the interviews, the presidential administration. On the minds of many service 
providers, especially legal services, was the possible termination of the DACA program.  
In conducting this research, I did not set out to find a way to maximize the impact 
of the philanthropic funding on immigration policy outcomes. Implementation and 
enforcement of immigration policy rest in the hands of bureaucratic agents shaped through 
many intersecting notions of power and social constructions of their mission and policy 
targets. I make no assumptions about the ability of nonprofits to protect the immigrant 
community from deportation, as they have no power to guarantee political citizenship to 
their members. My work seeks to help generate additional data as a means of producing a 
more concise and richer understanding of the role and influence that the philanthropic 
sector exerts on the policy environment and the public policy process.  
This research did not seek out to prove or disprove any of the hypotheses 
previously generated by the literature. Rather, the focus is on providing a conceptual 
framework that offers insights into how foundation grantees provide services and advocacy 
to the immigrant community. Additionally, to understand how these programs and services 
affect the immigrant community’s deportability. To accomplish this, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with 43 nonprofit organizations across 12 counties. The counties of 
interest were selected based off of the size of their foreign-born population. Counties with 
a foreign born population of more than 17% were selected for two reasons. First, it 
  
 
96 
coincides with traditional destination states which are more likely to have immigrant-
serving nonprofits (Hung 2007; Gleeson & Bloemraad 2013). Furthermore, a high foreign-
born population is considered a high policy target population as it is more likely to have a 
higher percentage of noncitizens. The one exception is the District of Columbia. As the 
nation's capital and hub for federal advocacy, it is important to include the perspectives of 
national nonprofit offices. Additionally, from 2008 through 2014, the District of Columbia 
was the number one funded county. The counties included in the sample all received 
philanthropic funding higher than the average $4 million granted to the 14% of the U.S. 
counties receiving philanthropic funds. These twelve counties are all in the top 60% of 
funded counties. Each of the counties where interviews took place received philanthropic 
funding during the era of Secure Communities, but not all nonprofits interviewed received 
funding during this time33. The following are the counties selected by state for 
interviews34:  
o    California: Alameda, Los Angeles, San Diego, San Francisco 
o    District of Columbia 
o    Illinois: Cook 
o    Texas: Bexar, Brazos, Harris, Hidalgo, Dallas, Travis 
The sample of nonprofits was created using the grant data from the previous chapter and 
Guidestar. The nonprofit organizations invited to participate in the interviews were 
                                                
33 This occurred as a function of not having grantees declining or not responding to 
interview request. So, using Guidestar, I searched the nonprofits in the counties of interest 
based on the keywords of “immigrants.” Guidestar provided a search results based off the 
nonprofits whose mission statements contained the words “immigrants.” 
34 Summary Statistics containing financial information and Secure Communities policy 
outputs by interview state and county can be found in the Appendix B.  
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selected because they identified as immigrant-serving nonprofits in grant dataset or 
received a grant for immigration services. An email invitation with a phone call follow-up 
was sent to all immigrant-serving nonprofits or nonprofit grant recipients with a grant 
activity of immigration services. Of the 43 responding nonprofits, I conducted semi-
structured interviews with nonprofit directors, Executive Directors or Directors of Program 
& Services. The sample of interviewed nonprofits is 43 organizations, but I conducted 50 
interviews. The majority, 68%, of the directors interviewed were women. The interviews 
lasted an average of an hour with most of them conducted at the nonprofit or a location 
close to the nonprofit office.  
The selection of nonprofits for this research deviates slightly compared to previous 
research on immigrant or migrant-serving nonprofits. Previous research selected their cases 
by focusing on organizational specific traits such as the ethnic composition of leadership, 
the name of the organization (ethnic sounding), or the percentage of immigrant/migrant 
clientele (De Graauw 2016; Martin 2012; Hung 2007; Cordero-Guzmán 2005; Cortes 
1998). I do acknowledge that previous research’s selection based off the specific 
organizational traits displaying an ethnic connection to the immigrant community would 
provide a larger sample of nonprofits to study. Instead, I relied on pre-aggregated grant 
making dataset from my previous analysis to ensure the link between the quantitative and 
qualitative analysis. In most cases, my coding scheme overlaps the coding schemes in 
previous research especially for immigrant-serving nonprofits as they prioritize serving the 
immigrant community displayed by listing immigrants or immigrants and migrants as the 
top served population and having leadership with ethnic or immigrant identity in positions 
of leadership. All organizations interviewed were registered 501(c)(3) organizations.  
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Unlike the previous research which limits their work to nonprofits with total annual 
revenue of $25,000, I did not begin with this limitation when selecting nonprofits for 
participation.  I removed this limitation based on the assumption that grassroots nonprofits 
for immigrants may not always meet the total revenue requirement, especially in areas 
where the community is lower income (Roth & Allard 2016; Roth et al. 2015; Gleeson & 
Bloemraad 2013).  The 43 interviews conducted are not meant to be a nationally 
representative sample, but I am working with the assumption the interviewed immigrant-
serving nonprofits share similarities with broader immigrant-serving nonprofits across the 
U.S., especially in traditional-destination states, as there is now national conference on 
immigrant integration since 2009 (De Graauw & Bloemraad 2017).  
Of the nonprofits interviewed, 81% are recipients of philanthropic grants anytime 
between 2008 through 2014 with 71% of the interviewees identified in the dataset as 
immigrant serving nonprofits. Only two of the nonprofits were one time recipients and the 
rest being awarded multiple grants throughout the years. Table 11 provides details on 
amount of grants awarded by instrumental grant category across the interviewed counties 
from 2008 through 2014.  Figure 9 illustrates the funding percentage of the 900 grants 
received by instrumental category for all nonprofit grantees’ interviewed. Compared to the 
previous chapter where yearly funding concentrated on providing for integration services, 
the interviewees’ received the most funding for political citizenship services with 
government advocacy coming in second at 24%. The funding for integration services was 
not far behind receiving about 21% of the funding awarded to 35 nonprofits interviewed.  
Table 12 illustrates the total aggregated financials from 2009 through 2014 for the 
nonprofits interviewed. During the tenure of Secure Communities, the sample of nonprofits 
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was fairly established at an average of 24 years of service with an average total revenue 
stream of about of $21 million. Not all the nonprofits receive government funding, of the 
nonprofits interviewed half of them did not receive government grants or contract fees. The 
average aggregated government funding to the nonprofits interviewed was $10 million and 
their total contributions received was a little more than 16 million dollars. The larger, more 
established nonprofits served as re-granting organizations. From 2009 through 2014, an 
average close to $2 million was re-granted to smaller nonprofits. These nonprofit grantees 
received an average of about $2.47 million from 2008 through 2014, of this total funding 
$1.38 million was awarded for political citizenship services. These nonprofits served an 
average foreign-born population of about 25% and a noncitizen population of about 15%. 
The Secure Communities era left its mark on these counties with an average disparity ratio 
from 2008 through 2014 of about 3 low priority deportable immigrants identified to every 
1 high priority deportable immigrant identified. A total enforcement per capita of about 
0.10. These counties had a low priority per capita identification rate of 0.07, about double 
rate of high priority per capita identifications. Compared to the 14% of all U.S. funded 
counties, the selected interview counties had higher enforcement outputs. For the selected 
counties, total enforcement per capita identification was higher by 0.07 and both per capita 
priority levels increased by 0.05 compared to the average of all funded counties. The 
enforcement disparity ratio was the same in both samples. While it is alarming that these 
counties had high enforcement outputs, they also had more than six times the average 
foreign born population and seven times the non-citizen population.  
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Qualitative Analysis 
To produce a holistic view of philanthropic influence on local immigration policy, I took a 
multi-method approach. In the chapter before, I systematically analyzed the quantitative 
data to see how total dollars leveraged within a county would influence local immigration 
policy outputs of deportable immigrants identified by local law enforcement. Although, the 
findings suggest an association between total grant dollars and immigration outputs, a clear 
picture of the mechanisms within the community that translate into reducing enforcement 
policy outputs remains unclear. This part of the research will explore this relationship by 
speaking with grantees. These interviews provide a complementary explanation to the 
results identified in the previous chapter. The interview data was collected after the 
preliminary quantitative analysis was conducted. 
The semi-structured interviews were analyzed using a theoretical thematic analysis 
to provide further detail into service delivery and advocacy as mechanisms alter 
immigrants’ deportability and affecting immigration enforcement outputs. The transcribed 
interviews are coded first by searching for two structural codes based on the previous 
literature that defines the roles of nonprofits as service delivery and advocacy. Once the 
interviews were coded based on the two structural codes, these sections of the interviews 
grouped and searched for the underlying concepts that affect the immigrants’ level of 
deportability on a micro and macro level. The final stage links the themes through direct 
manifestation or through an interpretative connection that associates the work by 
nonprofits to changes in immigrants' deportability (Saladaña 2015).   
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Nonprofits as Intermediaries of Change 
As meso-level (De Graauw 2016) mediating institutions, immigrant-serving nonprofits are 
distinctively positioned to create social change for the immigrant by using micro and 
macro-level strategies within the policy environment. Their position allows them the 
ability to reach across society and into the larger socio-political arena bridging the spheres 
of public and private life to initiate changes in immigrants’ deportability within their local 
community. These nonprofits create essential connections with the immigrant community 
built on trust and culturally responsive service delivery that may not always be present in 
non-immigrant serving agencies. As one director describes, "a lot of the feedback on the 
existing agencies [domestic violence shelters] is they didn't understand [the community] 
especially the legal issues, but [also] the cultural issues. There was no linguistic 
competency or ability to serve survivors. Without [serving] the immigrant rights, they 
didn't have a good experience, not as in bad, but they [immigrant survivors] just didn't feel 
like their needs were met35." With their connection to the immigrant community, as their 
link to vital programs and services, nonprofits can create micro-level changes within each 
immigrant’s level of deportability through the process of integration. Integration occurs by 
providing immigrants with access to attaining political citizenship and through the social 
citizenship conferred to them by the nonprofit. Social citizenship represents an acceptance 
by the local community that allows immigrants the ability to have access to the most basic 
life necessities without living in a state of heightened deportability or fear.  
                                                
35 Executive Director 
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Nonprofits acknowledge that " programs might not necessarily move at the rate 
[needed] to be able to make a difference everywhere we want to [change]36." As such, the 
second strategy targets social change by affecting the macro-level structures through 
advocacy efforts aimed at issue awareness or policy reform pressuring state actors to 
support anti-immigrant legislation or enforce immigration laws at the local level. As 
institutional actors with networks across the public and private spheres of community, 
nonprofits can engage in strategic coalition building and advocacy. Their advocacy efforts 
focus not only on policy change but on “building democracy in America [by] 
empower[ing] immigrants…rather than coming down from on-high with all the 
answers37.” This empowerment seeks to ensure that immigrants’ experiences become part 
of the narrative and the solution. No one other than the immigrant community truly 
understand how the current political system affects their lives. Through empowerment of 
immigrants, this advocacy seeks to change the dominant policy narrative, “a major 
component is shifting around who…[the] immigrant and refugee communities are, and 
really humanizing the experiences broken policies impact…Because so often, these stories 
are always framed as [the] good versus [the] bad immigrant38.” The advocacy efforts 
target changes in the environment and policy narrative to garner broad community support 
to reduce the focus on immigrants’ deportability and immigration enforcement leading to a 
push for immigration reform with a path way to citizenship. 
Nonprofits as Service Providers 
                                                
36 Executive Director 
37 Director of Legal Services 
38 Director of Advocacy  
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Unlike government agencies that are more selective in their service delivery, nonprofits 
extend citizenship to all of the immigrant community regardless of status. Bosniak (2008) 
discusses citizenship as a socially constructed concept given life through government and 
society. She illustrates citizenship as a concept with hard edges and a soft center. The hard 
edges represent political citizenship, the formal status to reside in the United States 
through naturalization or residency along with the rights and responsibilities that come 
with the respective status. Immigrants can only receive formal citizenship through the 
approval of their applications by a bureaucrat in the Department of Homeland Security's 
Office of Citizenship and Immigration Services. Yet, nonprofits serve as complementary 
agents in the process by helping immigrants with their status adjustments from 
documented to naturalized or undocumented to documented.  The soft part of citizenship is 
the membership created and extended through the work and advocacy that nonprofits 
engage in and on behalf of immigrants to help integrate immigrants or create inclusive 
communities on their behalf. Social citizenship, provides immigrants with access to basic 
life necessities, opportunities for self-development to advancement, and legitimacy as 
individuals and members of the community. The political and social citizenship provide 
legalization and integration into the broader community that provides micro-level changes 
in their policy target status. Together these synergistic citizenships help alter the size of the 
policy target population leading to a reduction in enforcement outputs.  
Political Citizenship 
Many nonprofits offer programs that help provide legal advice for status adjustments to 
labor rights representation. All nonprofits that offer legal services have expressed that their 
caseloads demands are more extensive than the supply of attorneys or certified legal 
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representatives available to assist in providing aid. Most nonprofits have waitlists and are 
only able to do intake forms and provide general information or referrals to other 
nonprofits or immigration attorneys. These legal services have risen in popularity due to 
their reduced prices compared to that of private immigration attorneys. With all the 
services provided by nonprofits, the political citizenship programs are acknowledged as the 
the best protection to avoid deportation. As one director of legal services noted, “I include 
those [pro-immigrant] perspectives when I talk to people in public meetings, but I’d be 
deluding myself if I think that’s going to be overarchingly effective. The most empowering 
thing I do for the kids is I win them [formal naturalization, permanent residency, asylum] 
status.”   
From current rhetoric to immigration enforcement directives, the dominant policy 
narratives serve to villainize the members of the immigrant community. Immigration law is 
complicated, and when cases involve residents with a record or undocumented immigrants 
applying for residency or naturalization, the process becomes even more complicated. 
While government grants may prohibit nonprofit organizations from serving the 
undocumented community or immigrants with criminal records, philanthropic funding 
allows nonprofits to exercise discretion and create inclusivity in their membership, 
regardless of status. Without the proper immigration status, no level of integration will be 
able to stop local law enforcement from identifying immigrants and ICE deporting 
immigrants that do not pose a threat to the community.  
With the current backlog of applications across sectors, nonprofits help ease the 
administrative burden by helping ensure accurate applications are submitted, and 
immigrants prepare for all portions of the residency and naturalization process as a means 
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of reducing the probability of a denied naturalization or residency application. With 
today’s climate, nonprofits are seeing “more complicated cases in [our] workshops.” The 
director explained further the imperative nature of knowing the full history of individuals. 
“People are coming in who have more tickets, more violations, more things we need to be 
aware of...given this president sharing everything now is just really crucial because 
withholding anything would definitely be counted against you. So as an attorney, if I know 
it now, we can try to deal with it and get the assistance they need as opposed to having it 
[withheld information] come up during the interview, then they are stuck39.” At best, 
immigrants are allowed to leave their interview, but as Gilbert (2008) points out that 
immigrants denied naturalization because of a past criminal record can be processed for 
deportation at the time they are being interviewed by USCIS representatives. Additionally, 
USCIS does not have to provide detailed explanations for denied applications and 
immigrants are rarely able to challenge the outcome in immigration court. Although it 
cannot speed up the process, it can reduce barriers to attaining naturalization. The legal 
services provided by nonprofits, especially to low-income immigrants, reduces the chances 
of denial and deportation for any incorrect or withheld information. Ultimately, nonprofit 
organizations are targeting a status change as they “look for the ability for our families to 
be able to thrive and [in] giving them the tools via services, education, or 
empowerment…we’re not looking for assimilation but we do want [the] ultimate protection 
from deportation, citizenship. We want people to be able to vote, so we are pretty active in 
                                                
39 Executive Director 
  
 
106 
trying to find legal permanent residents [that are eligible] to become citizens. It’s a big 
piece of what we do in terms of our immigration legal services.40” 
Social Citizenship 
The first five years of arrival for immigrants are the most important to establishing their 
path to integration. A period, during which even documented, and especially 
undocumented immigrants, do not have access to any public benefits only those provided 
by nonprofits (De Graauw & Bloemraad 2017). Social citizenship, provides immigrants 
with access to basic life necessities, opportunities such as self-development to social 
advancement, and legitimacy as individuals and members of the community. At the heart 
of social citizenship is the path to integration for immigrants. As one Executive Director 
views their role in the community, “We want Thais who are economically disadvantaged 
to access opportunities for economic mobility and be able to really become self-
sufficient… we do comprehensive, wrap around social and human services addressing the 
needs of low-income not just Thais.  We’re sort of multipurpose and what I call an 
ecosystem for social change.41” 
Immigrants access multiple services at their local nonprofit from language courses 
to workforce development, and family-focused services such as food pantries, youth 
development programs for their children. These services all help provide immigrants with 
access to mobility across the various measures of integration: social, economic, and 
cultural (Jiménez 2011; Jones-Correa 2011; Nee & Alba 2012). Integration is not a 
unidirectional process, but a bidirectional process between immigrants and the receiving 
                                                
40 Director of Legal Services 
41 Executive Director  
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community. The community encompasses all institutions from private to public, and 
nonprofits help facilitate the interaction with immigrants to promote inclusivity and 
advancement initiating the process of integration. One director mentioned, in regards to 
their strategic expansion from refugee serving to incorporate more of the immigrant 
community, “the health and social services are open to everyone... we have a health fair in 
partnership with local clinics and universities to address basic health issues to mental 
health issues. In partnership with the local community college, we have instructors coming 
here, to provide a range of education, so if an individual wants [to get] their GED, we can 
provide that, but we also do [provide] ESL…to more empowerment and entrepreneurship 
[courses], so with adult education, we can certify individuals to open up businesses.” 
Through their service delivery nonprofits attempt to resolve the tensions between their 
community norms and the norms of the immigrant community (Gilbert 2008). This serves 
as a stepping stone for immigrants to be able to understand the broader American culture 
and their community’s norms as a way of helping them live, work, and socially engage 
with other members of their broader community.   
By joining the political and social citizenship that nonprofits extend the immigrant 
community, nonprofits work to create individual micro level changes. Although the 
process is not instantaneous, the micro-level change seeks to protects immigrants from 
deportation through a formal change in their official political status. In the end, this micro-
level change alters the size of the population of deportable immigrants. The second change 
occurs as nonprofits empower and work to help immigrants reshape the immigrant 
narrative within the community and the broader policy environment. To reshape the 
narrative, nonprofits help provide immigrants with the necessary skills, education, and 
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leads them to be civically engaged as a way of showing their commitment to their 
community and life as an American. This integration process helps immigrants not only 
portray but actively engage and promote qualities of “good moral character.” In order to 
attain naturalization, immigrants must meet the requirement of “good moral character,” but 
this decision is ultimately left to the bureaucratic agent of USCIS. Through their entire 
repertoire of programs and services, the immigrant-serving nonprofit community works to 
help ensure that immigrant and their families are preparing and establishing a successful 
life in their communities by providing them with the skills and qualities deemed as 
American. As one Executive Director reflected on the mission of their partnership with 
local businesses to help the immigrant employees gain English Language training, he 
hoped that employers would understand and promote the view that “my immigrant 
workforce is contributing to my bottom line, learning English, and becoming American 
that’s the apple pie outcome of immigration, if you’re against that well you got issues.” In 
his view, his nonprofit was engaging not only immigrants in the community but their 
employers to show that the immigrant community is not only of “good moral character,” 
but they are providing to the local economy and incorporating into the community. As 
such, why should they be denied a path to citizenship? 
It is important to note that although integration and assimilation produce a negative 
image of immigrants becoming “American,” the nonprofits I visited encouraged 
immigrants to value their cultural knowledge and continue to be proud of it. These 
nonprofits helped the members of their organization to not only learn the key cultural 
qualities of being considered “American” such as English and self-sufficient, but not at the 
expense of their first cultural identity. One director mentioned a community room where 
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monthly events were held to celebrate cultural holidays or have cultural days to explore 
immigrants’ heritage with the broader community and immigrants’ extended family.  
Nonprofits as Advocates 
In their position as mediating institutions, nonprofits are situated best to serve as the bridge 
connecting the community with the larger socio-political structure that has defined their 
deportability. In this role, nonprofits are institutions of advocacy reacting to proposed or 
current changes in policy, but also as revolutionaries empowering and motivating 
immigrants to serve as advocates. Most, if not all nonprofits, engaged in advocacy efforts. 
If nonprofit directors responded in the negative when asked if they worked to advocate for 
their members, they elaborated with a response that equated advocacy to political lobbying. 
For the handful that viewed advocacy as lobbying, they made sure to mention they did not 
engage in advocacy efforts as it would threaten their 501(c)(3) status.  
Scholars have defined advocacy in multiple ways (Almog-bar Schmid 2014), but at 
its core suggests activities that pertain to defining, educating, and promoting issues in 
attempts to mobilize or alter the public policy process. Advocacy is fundamental to helping 
produce policy changes through reform or the creation of new public policy (Mintrom 
1997; Mintrom & Vergari 1996; Mintrom & Norman 2009; Sabatier 1988; De Graauw 
2007; Le Roux & Goerdel 2009; Chin 2017; Schmid et al. 2008; Vaughan & Arsneault 
2008; Kingdon & Thurber 1984). Achieving immigration reform with a path to citizenship 
would provide the largest impact to the immigrant community, but with no reform insight, 
advocacy efforts have prioritized local policy and education campaigns targeting all 
members of the community and political actors to affect immigrants’ level of deportability.  
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Nonprofits strategically engage in narrative reframing by working to alter the 
current socially constructed negative immigrant narrative which portrays the immigrant 
community as criminals who are undeserving of a pathway to citizenship, but should be 
punished with deportation. According to the theory of the social constructions of policy 
target populations (Schneider & Ingram 1993; Ingram & Schneider 1991), in order to gain 
public support to promote pro-immigrant immigration reform, the narrative must be 
reshaped to show the immigrant community as one deserving of assistance. As such 
nonprofits through their micro-level changes within immigrant community and their 
integration programs work to reshape the narrative from “bad hombres” to immigrants as 
contributing members of society who deserve a formal pathway to citizenship. Engaging in 
advocacy efforts at the local level entail garnering support and narrative reshaping to help 
promote state-level legislation that improves the quality of life for the immigrant 
community and reduces state mandated local cooperation with the federal bureaucracy, in 
addition to their public education campaigns on the impacts of punitive immigration 
enforcement. At both the state and the national level, nonprofits are depending on a 
strategy of policy feedback (Cambell 2012; Soss 1999; Soss & Schram 2007; Mettler & 
Soss 2005; Mettler 2005). Through the education issue campaigns and testimonies within 
public agencies and legislatures, nonprofits organizations provide citizenry and 
bureaucratic agents with feedback on policy as a means to motivate them to vocalize and 
support pro-immigration policy reform rather than anti-immigrant legislation. For example, 
specifically working with law enforcement, one director states “we are doing more 
legislative advocacy…but we are [also] dealing with trying to engage local law 
enforcement to understand the U-visa system in order to get the needed signatures for 
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[survivor] applications. They [law enforcement] have several misconceptions that [if they 
sign] they’re helping [promote ‘illegal”] immigration when, in fact, the [U-visa 
certification] component is designed to help law enforcement reach the criminal 
offenders42.” 
 Drawing on the work of De Graauw (2016) who points to administrative, strategic 
issue framing, and collaboration across the sector as strategies to help create policy 
changes for the immigrant community, I found similar themes in my interviews. These 
advocacy strategies are not just working to help pass new policy, but are working to create 
a new policy environment that is more receptive and welcoming to immigrants. In 
targeting policy and the environment, nonprofits are working to produce feedback that 
helps change the perspective and political positions of the community. The more that 
immigrant nonprofits can provide the right education to immigrants about their rights and 
promote pro-immigrant issues and perspectives alongside that of citizens, it is more likely 
that changes in deportability will occur at the macro-level. Advocacy feeds back to help 
create pro-immigrant policies, reduce the pressure and promote discretion by law 
enforcement when working with and policing immigrants, and changing the negative 
immigrant narrative and stereotypes associated with immigrant status.  
Administrative & Policy Advocacy 
For more than a decade, immigration reform has remained one of the yearly policy 
discussions, but reform has remained an elusive act. The federal government remains the 
only level of government able to extend formal political citizenship, but states and local 
                                                
42 Executive Director 
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governments retain the right to pass legislation influencing immigrant’s ability to reside 
and quality of life within their jurisdictions. In the absence of immigration reform, 
nonprofits refocused advocacy efforts to levels of government most proximate to the lives 
of immigrants. Nonprofits are focusing their advocacy efforts to push for policy changes 
across a spectrum of issues that effect the life of an individual from criminal justice to 
access to health. The policy areas targeted by the immigrant-serving nonprofit community 
do not solely focus on immigration reform, but intersect with immigration policy. Changes 
across policy areas such as health care, criminal justice, and environmental regulations can 
all impact the visibility of immigrants and increase their level of deportability. One 
example within criminal justice policy, a group of nonprofits was able to successfully 
reform legislation on mandatory sentencing that affects immigrants in a more punitive 
manner than citizens. As previously mentioned, immigrants facing a state misdemeanor 
sentence of more than 364 days increases their deportability drastically (Keenan 2007). An 
immigrant’s state misdemeanor has now become a felony conviction on their criminal 
record due to their lack of U.S. citizenship. This “felony” conviction now labels this 
immigrant as a high priority deportable immigrant. At least within California, one director 
recounts their policy reform victory, “we had a law recently that changed the sentencing, 
the [misdemeanor] mandatory sentencing, [from 365 days] to 364 days, so we are trying 
to get that replicated in other states. We are trying to make sure that these little tweaks 
that can have a massive impact go into effect in as many places as possible, and work with 
local government, [and] the local school board on policies.43” The criminal justice system 
                                                
43 Development Director 
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and our immigration regime are intimately intertwined, but are not set up to protect the 
immigrant community or their rights. With IRIRA’s unprecedented expansion of crimes 
that serve as the basis for inadmissibility, the change in the law in California affects the 
deportability of an immigrant by ensuring that their state charge is unaffected by IRIRA’s 
creation of a “criminal offender” by amplifying a low level crime (Bello 2016).  This law 
reduces the size of the population eligible for deportation by not allowing a state 
misdemeanor conviction to translate into a felony based on immigration status. The goal is 
to advocate across more states and localities to pass a similar law, but this might remain 
unattainable without financial support from foundations. This particular organization 
produces material to educate lawyers and service providers about the intersection of 
immigration and the criminal justice system. “We work with attorneys, immigration 
attorneys…and more broadly organizations and individuals who serve immigrants. 
Basically, immigration law is so complicated and so dynamic that any human mistake can 
get people deported.  So we want to make sure that doesn’t happen. We want to make sure 
that everyone who serves immigrants is aware of all the opportunities and the risk that 
immigrants face, and can therefore, as an attorney, serve them better44.” 
Furthermore, not all public defenders are trained or know to understand how taking 
a plea deal can affect the status and eligibility of immigrants. Increasing the funding to 
nonprofits with legal clinics promotes training as well as expands the number of attorneys 
that can provide pro or low bono legal services to all immigrants regardless of their status 
before a court of law. Legal aid clinics can only provide representation to documented 
                                                
44 Development Director 
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immigrants, but foundation support provides assistance for undocumented immigrants to 
receive legal representation.  
Nonprofits may have begun targeting their advocacy efforts towards their state and 
local governments, but this has not stopped the collaboration across regions. In fact, 
nonprofits that have a national office in D.C are more likely to have that office engage the 
most in federal level policy reform and tap their regional offices as sources of information 
about what issues need to serve as focal points for advocacy alongside the 
recommendations to advocate for at the national level. With one region office open and 
another set to open in a different state, this director of legal services stated, “There’s a lot 
of coordination and information sharing between local office service staff, so what they’re 
seeing on the ground in their communities is being collected in examples and stories to do 
policy advocacy at the federal level, but sometimes in support of local and state too45.” 
Representation & Collaboration 
The final two pieces of advocacy efforts led by nonprofits go hand in hand. The idea that 
policy creates politics, but only for those whose voices are heard, leaves out the 
disadvantaged and marginalized communities. As bridges, nonprofits not only create the 
opportunities for their members to engage with policymakers and the broader community 
but create the programs that lead to the empowerment of the immigrant community to use 
their stories and their lived experiences as campaigns to change their communities. With a 
lack of political power to cast a vote as part of the official electorate, nonprofits and their 
staff use their positions to cultiate relationships and networks in order to help open lines of 
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communication and drive policy reform. As one director put it, “This is what you do, you 
become a commissioner, you cash in personally, I cashed in for the movement, and said, “I 
want you [the mayor and commissioners] to work on immigration, you should work on 
DACA.” I pitched the mayor. I pitched his senior staff, I helped do a meet-and-greet with  
immigrant rights groups, who had mostly all been with (publically supportive of) his 
opponent46.” This nonprofit Executive Director helped bridge not only a partisan divide, 
but promoted that the mayor view undocumented immigrants as part of his electorate. 
Using more of a co-production method,  another Executive Director expressed her work as 
“working very closely with the Mayor’s Office of Immigrant Affairs…we’re on panels for 
them, we advise them, we provide consultations, they come to all of our different 
community town hall meetings…there’s no funding [there], but there are opportunities for 
collaboration and co-sponsorship47.” In both cases, each director used their networks and 
connection to bridge the community with actors holding political power to shape policy.  
In almost all nonprofits that had high advocacy efforts, acknowledged that in order 
to produce the proper policy reform, immigrants’ perspectives must be heard. At the end of 
the day, the policies will be affecting their lives, but the people making them are unlikely 
to understand the immigrant experience. Advocacy cannot occur without advocates. 
Nonprofits serve as critical organizations to empowering and developing the civic voice of 
immigrants. Many nonprofits had programs to individually develop the leadership abilities 
of immigrant women and men to act as canvassers, protest leaders, and promotoras of 
information clinics such as Know Your Rights or worker/labor rights. Some nonprofits 
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offering legal services even helped naturalized immigrants become accredited with the 
Board of Immigration Appeals. This accreditation in recognized nonprofits allows non-
lawyers to represent clients before U.S. immigration agencies, such as USCIS, ICE, and 
Immigration Courts (NYIC 2018). Not only do immigrants volunteer to be leaders in their 
community by providing information to fellow community members, but it comes full 
circle by training underrepresented individuals to effectively uplift their voice into the 
policy process that formally excludes them having the ability to elect officials passing 
legislation at all levels of the government. Policy advocacy spans all issue areas and uses 
the lived experiences of the community to discuss the current impact and possible impact 
that might occur in the event of the proposed policy change. For example, prior to the 
election the promotoras in this organization were conducting community outreach focusing 
on providing immigrants with information on naturalizations. After the election, they 
mobilized by expanding their base of advocates and vamping up their Know Your Rights 
Presentations and family planning in light of possible deportation. Along with their work 
for protection from deportation, the promotoras prepared to provide testimony in support 
of legislation that was about to sunset negatively affecting the life of their children. “So we 
had a campaign for a healthy Illinois, Our Healthy Illinois Coalition to reinstate and refund 
and assure that undocumented students, undocumented children, could continue to receive 
health insurance. Because we have our leaders that are trained in this, they were the 
spokespeople.  So, you have these documented and undocumented moms meeting with 
their legislators and talking about their children's diseases. Even though they [their 
children] are undocumented, they deserve to be able to see the doctor if they don't, they 
could potentially have life-threatening complications. Meeting with legislators and being 
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able to actually share compelling testimonials [is important], but also to try to get the 
general support through media.  Our state is supposed to be a welcoming state, and so you 
need to have these types of folks that are strong, that aren’t afraid of talking about their 
immigration stories to be able to get the general public support to pass bills like All 
Kids.48”  
Implications & Discussion 
During an interview with an Executive Director who did not receive any foundation grants 
from 2008 through 2014, he expressed “foundations don’t fund revolutions…that would 
lead to their self-destruction.” In the big picture, if foundations provided enough funding 
to throw a wrench in the U.S. deportation regime, it might in fact lead to their destruction. 
Government could seek policy change revoking their charitable status, restructuring their 
501(c)(3) status, or possibility limiting their financial contributions to the nonprofit 
community, especially in today’s political climate. Kerwin et al. (2017) notes that 
immigrant-serving nonprofits “working within the existing statutory and administrative 
frameworks of federal policy…achieved steady and significant gains in legal status for 
large numbers of immigrants over the past four years (1).” Despite, the limited resources 
that nonprofits work with everyday, this research adds to Kerwin et al. (2017)’s finding. I 
argued that immigrant serving nonprofits follow the civil society/social movement model 
to engage their community as a means of creating social change. I find support for this 
view as the immigrant serving nonprofits, I interviewed, are optimizing the resources they 
have and cultivating their membership to continue pushing for social change. With their 
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work in integrating the immigrant community, their advocacy efforts from policy to 
diffusing and reconstructing the immigrant narrative, nonprofits are continuously working 
to reduce the size of the policy target population and reduce efforts by law enforcement to 
enforce immigration. The nonprofit community is developing civically engaged leaders 
focused on altering the social relationship to create solidarity and support in favor of the 
immigrant community.  
The civil society/social movement model addresses each component separately, 
service and advocacy. On the ground, the mechanisms of service provision and advocacy 
are deeply intertwined. These roles are not mutually exclusive. The strategy to combine 
advocacy and service delivery illustrates nonprofits engaging in a systems change rather 
than focusing on each component individually. Dual-mission nonprofits are better 
positioned to serve the immigrant community as they target not just the problems currently 
faced, but in the structures that have allowed the problems to persist (De Grauuw 2016; de 
Leon et al. 2009; Cordero-Guzmán 2005). In order to create the right social movement and 
develop the capacity of the community to support the movement, nonprofits view their role 
as a “holistic [approach] model…It is critical to provide those direct services that can help 
individuals find safety, find justice, break cycles in their families and communities. But we 
also want to be working on systems [of] advocacy and trying to get broader community, 
policy makers, different systems, like law enforcement, to understand these issues better, as 
well, [as] to change laws, to change minds, and to change practices49.”  
                                                
49 Executive Director 
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If foundations and nonprofits want to engage in social change for the immigrant 
community, foundations need to show a stronger commitment to the nonprofit community. 
The monetary resources gained from government contracts limits who they are able to 
serve and their program revenue will only allow for so much expansion. Foundation 
funding is integral to helping produce protection for immigrants inside and outside 
sanctuary communities. If foundations are genuinely committed to helping change 
immigration policy, they should begin to invest in long-term commitment nonprofits 
beyond the large bureaucratic nonprofits. Grassroots nonprofits are the key to serving 
immigrants afraid of exposing themselves in this highly politicize climate calling for 
increased deportations. These smaller organizations are located closer and understand not 
only the immigrant identity but the racialized immigrant identity.  
Limitations & Future Research 
There are three limitations to this research. The first is this research does not take into 
consideration the gendered nature of immigration enforcement (Golash-Boza & 
Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). There are gendered immigrant experiences that are overlooked 
by the focusing generally on the immigrant identity. Nine out of ten deportees are male 
(TRAC 2014) leaving behind families without the support of the male breadwinner 
(Golash-Boza & Hondagneu-Sotelo 2013). The gendered nature of enforcement will 
impact the types of services that are needed by immigrants in the community especially 
those of mixed-status families. The process for policy feedback and changes in the 
individual immigrant's deportability might take different paths and lengths of time to 
achieve dependent on an immigrant's gender. The second, similarly, by discussing 
immigrant-serving nonprofits role in helping the immigrant community, this research does 
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not address any of the socio-political process and histories among the different immigrant 
groups or how immigration policy, services, and enforcement affects the different ethnic 
immigrant groups. To an extent, there is an oversimplification and generalization of the 
role of nonprofit organizations in influencing immigration policy outputs.   
Prior research in immigrant-serving nonprofits by Martin (2012), took the approach 
of observing the “hidden” work undertaken by nonprofits. She was able to capture the 
hidden intricacies and the intersectional nature of the issues faced by the immigrant 
community by volunteering and interacting with members of the nonprofit. Participant 
observation offers a richer detail into philanthropies influence on local immigration policy 
outputs that I was unable to capture by interviewing only the nonprofit administration. By 
interacting with members and observing the work that nonprofits engage in to create 
community, provide services, and influence the lives of immigrants would further provide 
insights into the mechanisms and strategies that are being deployed by the nonprofit 
organizations as ways to offer citizenship and sanctuary to their immigrant community.   
The next steps to build on this research should include quantitative analysis of the 
interview data. The thematic method allowed for greater depth in illustrating the roles and 
work of nonprofits, it also serves as a limitation as it does not provide further quantitative 
analysis to measure which strategy provides the most substantial influence on policy.  
Conclusion  
Although foundations don’t fund revolutions, they are financing the armory by which 
nonprofits act as revolutionaries and reactors targeting micro, meso, and macro level 
changes to influence the deportability of immigrants. This research contributes to the 
growing literature on philanthropy and immigration integration by developing a conceptual 
  
 
121 
framework on the mechanisms that connect philanthropy to public policy. The work that 
the philanthropic sector engages in takes time and resources to reach their end goal of 
influencing public policy. As the work of United We Dream illustrates, policy victories to 
create inclusive communities can occur, but will not happen over night. At the end of the 
day, foundations and nonprofits must choose whether they are working to create social 
change or provide immediate services. Their decision will impact the way their path to 
influencing public policy from implementation to outcomes.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
122 
CHAPTER V                                                                                                                  
CONCLUSION 
 
In his first week as president, Donald Trump reinstated one of the worst deportation 
programs in history. A policy move touted as helping secure the U.S. from the dangers of 
the "illegal bad hombres." While advocates and activists alike have worked tirelessly to 
help protect the immigrant community, Congress has continuously failed to provide 
support through any legislative action. With partisan divides standing between any 
immigration reform, the goal of comprehensive immigration reform has spurred an 
awakening as communities and organizations have mobilized at the local level to combat 
the effects of the federal immigration agenda. Leading to the question, what is the effect of 
local institutional efforts to deter the devolution of immigration enforcement? How does 
local effort shape the boundaries of citizenship and deportability within local 
communities?  
 To increase the effectiveness of the federal immigration bureaucracy in identifying 
immigrant "criminal offenders," the U.S. implemented a policy tool that created a 
multijurisdictional patchwork of immigration policy (Provine et al. 2016; Varsanyi et al. 
2012; Decker et al. 2009). The devolution to the local level allows new actors to influence 
the implementation of policy by altering the environment and policy targets' deportability. 
Deportability represents a state defined by an individual's lack of formal citizenship where 
any interaction with government or community can lead to their exclusion from the U.S. 
(De Genvoa 2002). In linking local law enforcement agencies with Immigration and 
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Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities has amplified the deportability of all 
immigrants living inside the borders of the United States. 
In the era of immigration devolution, this dissertation provides insights into how 
non-governmental institutions can influence local policy implementation and outputs. This 
dissertation contains two separate quantitative studies and one qualitative study focused on 
understanding how non-governmental institutions redefine citizenship and deportability, 
and its subsequent effect on immigration enforcement by local law enforcement agencies. 
First, I define institution as an established practice conveying identity, norms, values, and 
shaping power relationships within a community, in this case, language. The second 
definition of a non-governmental institution is an organization established to serve the 
community outside the bounds of the public sector, specifically the philanthropic sector.  
The first chapter centers on the intersection of representative bureaucracy and 
language as the means of expanding the boundaries of inclusion. Language is a social 
institution that conveys identity, culture, and values that shape power dynamics between 
individuals during interactions. In sharing a linguistic identity, individuals share a 
community identity and life experiences. For individuals with limited English language 
proficiency, their linguistic identity increases their deportability. Specifically, their 
deportability increases, significantly, as they encounter law enforcement agents who view 
their inability to speak the language of the "Americans," as a cue connecting them to the 
criminal immigrant narrative. An "illegality” stereotype that can be overcome when 
officers are able to communicate in the immigrant’s non-English language. By facilitating 
language convergence, officers are working to decrease the deportability of the immigrant 
by treating them as members of their community. I extend the theory of representative 
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bureaucracy to include language as a means for active representation. By combining the 
Local Law Enforcement Administration and Management Survey with the Secure 
Community Program reports, I test my theoretical argument of language as active 
representation leading to decreases in immigration enforcement and policy outputs. I not 
only test the effects of linguistic representation, but include a test of traditional passive 
representative bureaucracy. To test the effect of traditional representative bureaucracy, I 
include a measure of the racial and ethnic representation within a sheriff’s department from 
two of the largest immigrant groups within the U.S., Hispanic and Asian officers. The 
analysis reveals that passive representation by Hispanic and Asian officers influence policy 
outputs in opposite directions. Hispanic officers reduce the implementation of Secure 
Communities, while Asian officer representation promotes priority level enforcement. The 
second and most important contribution was the empirical test of language representation. 
Language communication theories articulate that language is important when there is a 
diverse linguistic landscape. The findings illustrated that commitment by the bureaucracy 
to promoting linguistic accommodation provides bureaucratic incorporation of the 
immigrant community in areas with a growing immigrant community. The same does not 
occur in communities with larger population shares of foreign born individuals. In 
traditional destination communities (communities with larger foreign born populations), 
linguistic accommodation increases the implementation of immigration policy by local law 
enforcement. By focusing on a punitive policy, this research illustrated that linguistic 
representation may not always extend membership to the immigrant community.  
The latter part of this dissertation evaluates the role of the philanthropic sector in 
influencing public policy. I took a multi-method approach to understand how philanthropic 
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funding shapes local policy outputs. I selected one of the most punitive local immigration 
outputs, the identification for deportation. My work contributes to the field of philanthropy 
and public policy by providing an empirical analysis of the role of philanthropic funding 
on public policy outputs. This multi-method research provides one of the first attempts to 
theoretically develop a model explaining the role of philanthropy in public policy by 
joining the theories of instrumental strategic giving to illustrate the role of philanthropic 
funding and the Civil Society and Social Change theory to explain the role of the nonprofit 
actors pushing for social change. Previous research focused on providing historical 
accounts on the role and strategies utilized by philanthropic foundations as a means of 
helping reform traditional policy issues such as health, education, or social welfare. Unlike 
any previous systematic analysis, my research used a new dataset on philanthropic grants 
made to immigrant-serving nonprofits or grants for immigration or immigrants. The 
descriptive analysis of the funding illustrates a geographic pattern to funding concentration 
along the coasts of the U.S. Most of the funding for immigration-related services 
concentrates in traditional-destination states and counties except funding related to policy 
advocacy granted to the District of Columbia. Foundations prioritized integration services 
by providing grants for activities that help give immigrants access to basic life necessities 
such as education, health, workforce development, even afterschool youth development 
programs. The empirical analysis revealed that counties receiving philanthropic grants had 
an average noncitizen population about 4% larger than counties who did not receive any 
funding. Furthermore, the average Secure Communities local policy outputs were lower for 
funded counties than unfunded counties. The regression analysis provided some support 
for the theoretical arguments. The effects of philanthropic funding in helping reduce the 
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per capita identification of deportable immigrants are minimal at best. Foundations 
wanting to influence immigration policy would have to increase the funding to counties by 
more than 100% to see a significant influence on the reduction of identifying deportable 
immigrants for Immigration and Customs Enforcement. This funding shift is highly 
unlikely as immigration-related funding is not a top policy priority. In many cases, for the 
foundations providing the grants, funding for the immigrant community comes as a by-
product of funding other policy issues such as women's health or education.  
 Due to their position in society, foundations are outside of the policy process. To 
gain influence on policy, foundations provide grants to nonprofit organizations working 
within communities. To provide a more detailed conceptual framework, the second part of 
my multi-method research focuses on analyzing semi-structured interviews with 
foundation grantees. Using a theoretical thematic analysis, I constructed a conceptual 
framework illustrating the tools that nonprofits use to alter the deportability of immigrants. 
By focusing on the micro-level, nonprofits use their service delivery to help integrate 
immigrants into their broader community and help them attain formal political citizenship 
status. At the meso and micro-level, nonprofits’ use their advocacy efforts to focus on 
altering deportability by changing the policy environment to be more receptive to the 
immigrant community and provide support for pro-immigrant legislation by re-framing the 
'illegality' narrative. Together, nonprofits' service delivery and advocacy roles, help create 
legitimacy and promote the social inclusion of the immigrant community decreasing 
immigrants’ deportability.  
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Limitations and Future Directions 
The three studies in this research provided the groundwork to study the intersection of non-
governmental institutions and punitive policy outputs, specifically immigration. Although 
the studies contribute to the fields of public administration, public policy, and the 
philanthropy and nonprofit literature, their generalizability is limited to large counties. I 
made the effort to ensure representation, but each chapter contains a selection bias 
dependent on size of the county and budget of the sheriffs’ departments and counties 
which receive large sums of philanthropic funding. For the sheriff's data, the 285 
departments that overlapped in both surveys, although randomly drawn from a stratified 
sample, share representative characteristics such as population size, demographic 
characteristics, social characteristics with a portion of U.S. local law enforcement agencies. 
In the qualitative analysis, the counties were selected based on the size of the noncitizen 
population and variation across political climate. These two selection criteria allow for 
generalizability to similar traditional destination counties and counties on the verge of 
having established immigrant communities. Furthermore, I focused on understanding the 
role of pro-immigrant nonprofits. By concentrating on immigrant serving nonprofits, I did 
not explore the role of anti-immigrant nonprofits and foundations work. This creates the 
image that all nonprofits are focused on providing political citizenship or integration across 
the communities with the United States, but this is not the case. In extending this research, 
to compare the strategies of new and old destination states, interviews should focus on 
counties with a growing immigrant population and the nonprofits serving the immigrant 
community. Additionally, I focused on punitive outputs of local immigration enforcement, 
this limits the effect of the nonprofit community to only one level of policy process. The 
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next steps should focus on understanding how the philanthropic sector influences the size 
of the applications for naturalization and permanent residency, along with the work of the 
nonprofit community in deportation defense hearings and in legal service provision once 
immigrants are detained.  
Additionally, the implementation of Secure Communities does not provide a clear 
indication of precisely the jurisdictional local law enforcement agency. Secure 
Communities outputs are reported at the county level where detainers are issued to the 
sheriff's department running the local county jail.  By focusing only on the sheriff's 
department, the co-production of enforcement by local city and state law enforcement 
agencies becomes overlooked. In the data for the analysis, I was only able to control for a 
small set of bureaucratic capacity. As outputs are a direct function of the ability of the 
bureaucracy tasked with implementing policy, this provides a limitation to the analysis. 
Future research is needed to parse out the co-production function of all local law 
enforcement agencies within a county to adequately understand the effect that different 
non-governmental institutions can exert on the policy implementation process within local 
communities.  
Contributions and Policy Implications 
Throughout my interviews, directors expressed concern over the hateful rhetoric targeting 
their members. They acknowledged that in previous administrations their role in the 
community allowed them the ability to be on the offensive and push policy and programs 
in favor of the immigrant community. The new administration has made the pro-immigrant 
philanthropic community pivot to implement a defensive strategy as means of protecting 
the small wins provided by the Obama administration. While their concern was heightened 
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they understood that no matter what administration is in place the immigrant community is 
always under attack, even in sanctuary states and counties, as long as American 
immigration policy focuses on punishment rather than integration.  
This dissertation contributes to the policy literature and the immigration literature 
by focusing on the role of non-governmental institutions in exerting bottom-up influence 
on the public policy process. Federal immigration policy reinforces the inclusivity of U.S. 
citizenship. For all immigrants without formal citizenship status, policy, state actors, and 
political rhetoric further demonstrate their exclusion from the American polity and 
community. In sharing a linguistic connection, street-level bureaucrats can exercise during 
discretion their interactions with the immigration to alter the implementation of an 
exclusionary policy by viewing immigrants as part of the community rather than focusing 
on their 'illegality.' In this way, linguistic connections provide a bridge between the state 
and the policy targets that helps create inclusion rather than increasing deportability of the 
immigrant community. A bridge that provides the ability to reshape was citizenship, and 
deportability means within the local community even if it stands at odds with the federal 
policy.  
The second contribution is to the field of philanthropy and the nonprofit literature. I 
show that the philanthropic community mobilizes to redefine the boundaries of citizenship 
in the community. By promoting their view of citizenship, the philanthropic community 
engages the policy process in an adversarial and complementary way to the federal 
immigration bureaucracies and the policies they enforce. Young (2000;2009) and Najam 
(2000) discuss the relationship between government and non-governmental organizations 
based on the divergence between each entities’ means and end goals. Foundations seeking 
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to use their philanthropic dollars to help immigrants incorporate into their communities 
and attain proper political documentation would fall along the continuum of an adversary 
to Immigration and Customs Enforcement Secure Communities policy outcomes as 
funding relates to the protection of “deportable” immigrants even those considered to be 
high priority, deportable immigrants. On the other side of the continuum is the 
supplementary relationship between the philanthropic community. In their supplementary 
role, the philanthropic community promotes integration by providing social citizenship 
through programs and services for the immigrant community in place of the inaction by the 
government. By offering legal workshops ensure applications for permanent residency or 
naturalization are correctly filled out, nonprofits work complements the work of U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services by reducing their administrative burden.  
Research has discussed the way that state policy feedbacks back to influence citizen 
civic participation and views of their position in society. This research contributes to the 
public policy literature by discussing how bureaucratic characteristics alter the 
implementation and outputs of punitive policy. The results contribute to the literature 
discussing the role of street-level bureaucrats in altering public policy outputs. 
Additionally, it provides insights into the role that the philanthropic sector plays in altering 
the implementation of policy, policy environment, and the effects it has on the policy 
target population.  
Conclusion 
As the current administration continues to take a hardline on immigration and expand the 
policy targets eligible for deportation, this dissertation provides insights into how language 
and community institutions function to redefine and alleviate local pressure for 
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immigration enforcement. As citizens, as community members, and as advocates, 
reforming public policy is not the only route to combating the immigration climate and 
enforcement. This dissertation provides support for community advocacy and bureaucratic 
incorporation as avenues by which local action can intervene in the public policy process. 
It addresses how the philanthropic community is working to combat local enforcement and 
removal of immigrants from the community.  
With its unprecedented level of deportations, the first era of Secure Communities 
caused devastation across the immigrant community. The executive order establishing 
Secure Communities of the Trump administration provided no bounds or priorities by 
which to guide its implementation and enforcement. It did the opposite. President Trump 
expanded the grounds for deportability from only immigrants with criminal convictions to 
any immigrant is an accused "criminal." My research serves to show the power of non-
governmental institutions in shaping policy and empowering those excluded from the 
political system to take part in the reshaping of public policy through the feedback process 
from citizen to state.  
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Figure 2: Secure Communities Yearly Total Matches
Data comes from ICE Interoperability Report December 2014
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Figure 3: Secure Communities Yearly Enforcement Disparity Ratio
Data comes from ICE Interoperability Report December 2014
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Table 4: The Effect of Incentive Pay for Bilingual Skills on Immigration Policy Outputs
Force Disparity
Multiplier Ratio
Hispanic Officers (%) -0.02⇤ (0.005) -0.008⇤ (0.03)
Asian Officers (%) 0.04 (0.03) -0.04⇤ (0.02)
Bilingual Incentive Pay -1.00⇤ (0.32) -0.004 (0.16)
Population Foreign Born (%) (Logged) -1.02⇤ (0.08) 0.11⇤ (0.04)
Interaction 0.46⇤ (0.13) 0.02 (0.07)
Sheriff’s Department Characteristics
Submissions (Logged) 0.51⇤ (0.01) 0.19⇤ (0.005)
Days as sComm Partner 0.0006⇤ (0.00009) -0.0002⇤ (0.00003)
Prosecutorial Discretion -0.78⇤ (0.08) -0.43⇤ (0.04)
Sheriff’s Budget (logged) -0.005 (0.08) -0.07 (0.04)
Sheriff’s Total Employees (logged) 0.28⇤ (0.11) 0.06 (0.05)
Local L.E.A Characteristics
Total Employees (logged) 0.04 (0.23) 0.52⇤ (0.12)
Total Budget (logged) -0.05 (0.21) -0.46⇤ (0.11)
Community Characteristics
Total Population (Logged) -1.01⇤ (0.06) -0.01⇤ (0.03)
White Population (%) 0.07⇤ (0.02) -0.02 (0.01)
Black Population (%) 0.07⇤ (0.02) -0.02 (0.01)
Asian Population (%) 0.11⇤ (0.03) -0.03⇤ (0.01)
Hispanic Population (%) 0.11⇤ (0.02) -0.02 (0.01)
Unemployment Rate -0.02 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01)
Median Income -0.27⇤ (0.21) 0.34⇤ (0.11)
Education (%) -0.02⇤ (0.008) 0.004 (0.004)
Republican (%) 0.003 (0.003) 0.004⇤ (0.004)
Public Assistance (%) -0.05 + (0.03) -0.02 (0.01)
Non-homeownership (%) -0.0006 (0.01) -0.003 (0.002)
Border County 1.16⇤ (0.26) -0.15 (0.13)
Constant -6.44⇤ (3.24) -1.09 (1.66)
Observations 1710 1710
R2 0.82 0.55
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05
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Table 5: The Effect of Incentive Pay for Bilingual Skills on Immigration Priority Level
Policy Outputs
High Priority Low Priority
Matching Matching
Hispanic Officers (%) -.02⇤ (0.004) -0.02⇤ (0.004)
Asian Officers (%) 0.11⇤ (0.03) 0.07⇤ (0.02)
Bilingual Pay Incentive -0.88⇤ (0.27) -0.88⇤ (0.24)
Population Foreign Born (Logged) -1.02⇤ (0.07) -0.92⇤ (0.06)
Interaction 0.33⇤ (0.11) 0.35⇤ (0.10)
Sheriff’s Department Characteristics
Submissions (Logged) 0.37⇤ (0.007) 0.55⇤ (0.008)
Days as sComm Partner 0.0001 (0.0001) -0.0001 (0.0001)
Prosecutorial Discretion 0.30⇤ (0.07) -0.14⇤ (0.07)
Sheriff’s Budget (logged) 0.05 (0.07) -0.02 (0.07)
Sheriff’s Total Employees (logged) 0.14 (0.09) 0.21⇤ (0.08)
Local L.E.A Characteristics
Total Full-Time Employees (logged) -0.36⇤ (0.19) 0.16 (0.17)
Total Budget (logged) 0.30+ (0.18) -0.16 (0.16)
Community Characteristics
Total Population (logged) -0.91⇤ (0.05) -0.95⇤ (0.04)
White Population (%) 0.08⇤ (0.02) 0.06⇤ (0.02)
Black Population (%) 0.07⇤ (0.02) 0.05⇤ (0.02)
Asian Population (%) 0.13⇤ (0.02) 0.10⇤ (0.02)
Hispanic Population (%) 0.11⇤ (0.02) 0.09⇤ (0.02)
Unemployment Rate -0.008 (0.01) -0.03⇤ (0.01)
Median Family Income (logged) 0.41⇤ (0.18) -0.07⇤ (0.16)
Education (%) -0.02⇤ (0.007) -0.01⇤ (0.006)
Republican (%) -0.003+ (0.002) 0.001 (0.002)
Public Assistance (%) -0.05⇤ (0.03) -0.08⇤ (0.02)
Population Non-Homeowners (%) - 0.004 (0.004) -0.002 (0.004)
Border County 0.90⇤ (0.22) 1.05⇤ (0.19)
Constant -7.50⇤ (2.74) -6.41⇤ (2.47)
Observations 1710 1710
R2 0.80 0.87
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05
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Figure 6: Foundations’ Total Immigration Related Giving 2008-2014
Data:The Foundation Center
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Figure 8: Foundations’ Total Yearly Instrumental Giving by Grant Activity
Data: The Foundation Center
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Table 9: The Effect of Instrumental Funding By Grant Activity on Immigration Policy
Outcomes
Total Enforcement Disparity
Per Capita Ratio
Grant Funding for Immigration Services -0.02⇤ (0.007) -0.01⇤ (0.003)
Grant Funding for Integration Services -.04⇤⇤ (0.006) -0.01⇤⇤ (0.002)
Grant Funding Related to Government 0.05⇤⇤ (0.008) -0.01⇤⇤ (0.003)
State Philanthropic Funds -0.07⇤⇤ (0.02) 0.01 (0.01)
Bureaucratic Capacity
Total L.E.A Budget (logged) 0.57⇤⇤ (0.07) -0.41⇤⇤ (0.03)
Total L.E.A Employees(logged) -0.78⇤⇤ (0.08) 0.40⇤⇤ (0.03)
Days in Secure Communities 0.0005⇤⇤ (0.00003) -.0001⇤⇤ (0.000)
Total Submissions (logged) 0.22⇤⇤ (0.01) 0.17⇤⇤ (0.002)
Prosecutorial Discretion 0.005 (0.04) -0.17⇤⇤ (0.01)
Community Environment
Non-Citizen Population (%) 0.03⇤⇤ (0.002)
White Population (%) -0.03⇤⇤ (0.002) -0.003⇤⇤ (0.001)
Black Population (%) -.02⇤⇤ (0.002) -0.002⇤ (0.001)
Asian Population (%) -.10⇤⇤ (0.008) -0.03⇤⇤ (0.003)
Hispanic Population (%) -0.04⇤⇤ (0.002) -0.004⇤⇤ (0.001)
Median Income (logged) -2.79⇤⇤ (0.07) 0.22⇤⇤ (0.03)
Public Assistance (%) -0.05⇤⇤ (0.01) -0.02⇤⇤ (0.004)
Education (%) -.005⇤ (0.003) -0.005⇤⇤ (0.001)
Unemployment -0.08⇤⇤ (0.004) -0.006⇤ (0.002)
Non-homeownership (%) -0.04⇤⇤ (0.002) .003⇤⇤ (0.001)
Republican (%) 0.01⇤⇤ (0.001) .003⇤⇤ (0.001)
Border County 0.65⇤⇤ (0.14) -0.22⇤⇤ (0.06)
Constant 35.42⇤⇤ (0.93) -3.39⇤⇤ (0.37)
Observations 18,586 18,586
R2 0.42 0.42
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05 ⇤⇤ p < 0.001
All Grant Amounts are Logged
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Table 10: The Effect of Instrumental Funding By Grant Activity on Priority Level Policy
Outcomes
High Priority Low Priority
Per Capita Per Capita
Grant Funding for Immigration Services -0.01⇤ (0.006) -0.02⇤ (0.007)
Grant Funding for Integration Services -0.02⇤⇤ (0.005) -0.03⇤⇤ (0.005)
Grant Funding Related to Government 0.05⇤⇤ (0.007) 0.05⇤⇤ (0.007)
State Received Philanthropic Funds -0.04⇤⇤ (0.02) -0.02 (0.02)
Bureaucratic Capacity
Total L.E.A Budget (logged) 0.79⇤ (0.07) 0.41⇤⇤ (0.07)
Total L.E.A Employees (logged) -1.05⇤⇤ (0.07) -0.70⇤⇤ (0.07)
Days in Secure Communities 0.0001⇤⇤ (0.0000) 0.0003⇤⇤ (0.0000)
Total Submissions (logged) 0.07⇤⇤ (0.005) 0.24⇤⇤ (0.005)
Prosecutorial Discretion 0.58⇤⇤ (0.04) 0.42⇤⇤ (0.040)
Community Environment
White Population (%) 0.02⇤⇤ (0.002) -0.03⇤⇤ (0.002)
Black Population (%) -0.02⇤⇤ (0.002) -0.02⇤⇤ (0.002)
Asian Population (%) -0.07⇤⇤ (0.008) -0.09⇤⇤ (0.009)
Hispanic Population (%) -0.04⇤⇤ (0.002) -0.04⇤⇤ (0.002)
Median Income (logged) 2.92⇤⇤ (0.07) -2.16⇤⇤ (0.08)
Public Assistance (%) -0.03 (0.01) -0.05⇤⇤ (0.01)
Education (%) -0.001 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002)
Unemployment -0.02⇤⇤ (0.004) -0.09⇤⇤ (0.004)
Non-homeownership (%) 0.05⇤⇤ (0.002) -0.04⇤⇤ (0.002)
Republican (%) 0.007⇤⇤ (0.001) 0.01⇤⇤ (0.001)
Border County 0.82⇤⇤ (0.13) 0.64⇤⇤ (0.13)
Constant 37.22⇤⇤ (0.89) 32.89⇤⇤ (0.88)
Observations 18,586 18,586
R2 0.44 0.50
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, ⇤ p < 0.05 ⇤⇤ p < 0.001
All Grant Amounts are Logged
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Figure 9: Philanthropic Allocations by Instrumental Funding based on Grant Activity
Data source: The Foundation Center
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Table 12: Financial Background of Interviewees & Grant Funding from 2009-2014
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Revenue (000) 43 21,365 31,419 0 158,692
Expenses (000) 43 20,188 30,203 0 157,879
Program Expenses (000) 43 17,712 27,969 0 147,313
Government Funding Recieved (000) 43 10,277 25,721 0 144,227
Contributions Received (000) 43 16,486 27,892 0 153,682
Grants Paid (000) 43 1,677 5,396 0 28,061
Philanthropic Funding
Total Grant Amount (000) 35 2,471 5,746 4 31,581
By Nonprofit Population Priority
Immigrant Serving (000) 35 2,293 5,784 0 31,581
Serving Immigrants (000) 35 37 120 0 498
By Grant Activity
Political Citizenship (000) 35 1,379 4526 0 23,731
Integration (000) 35 507.70 764 0 3,527
Government (000) 35 584 1,217 0 6,567
Secure Communities Outputs
Disparity Ratio 10 3.03 1.08 1.44 4.81
Total Enforcement per Capita 10 0.10 0.03 0.04 0.17
High Priority Matches per Capita 10 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.05
Low Priority per Capita 10 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.12
Foreign Born Population (%) 10 25.40 7.25 13.35 35.41
Noncitizen Population Population (%) 10 14.87 3.94 8.362 21.7
Nonprofits with Philanthropic Grants 35
Nonprofits without Philanthropic Grants 8
Data Source: The Foundation Center
Aggregated Yearly Financials from 2009-2014
All amounts are aggregated totals & 2016 constant dollars
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APPENDIX B
Table 1: Instrumental Funding: Political Citizenship
Immigrant rights
Immigrant services
Immigration and naturalization
Immigration law
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Table 2: Instrumental Funding: Government Advocacy
Census Freedom from slavery
Democracy Freedom from violence and torture
Foreign policy Freedom of association and expression
International development Housing law
International economics and trade Human rights
International exchange Individual liberties
International peace and security Justice rights
International relations Juvenile justice
Multilateral cooperation Labor rights
National defense Law
Public affairs Legal aid
Public/private ventures Legal services
Campaign finance LGBTQ rights
Election regulation Media justice
Corrections and penology Minority rights
Counterterrorism Organized labor
Elections Prisoners’ rights
Public administration Public interest law
Public integrity Public policy
Public safety Reproductive rights
Public transportation Right to free movement and asylum
Public utilities Rights of the aged
Child abuse Sexual abuse
Child advocacy Social rights
Children’s rights Tenants’ organizations
Civic participation Voter education and registration
Community organizing Voter rights
Conflict resolution Women’s rights
Courts Youth organizing
Crime prevention Civics for youth
Crisis intervention Civil protection
Cultural rights Free goods distribution
Disabled persons’ rights Marriage equality
Dispute resolution Patients’ rights
Diversity and intergroup relations Community policing
Due process Freedom of religion
Economic justice Right to privacy
Environmental justice Freedom of information
Equal opportunity in education National security
Law enforcement Customs and border control
Police agencies Gun control
Prison alternatives Democracy & civil society development
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Table 3a: Instrumental Funding: Integration Services
Gift distribution Gender and sexuality studies
Unknown or not classified Humanities
Archives and special collections Information and media literacy
Artist’s services International studies
Arts and culture Parent-teacher involvement
Arts exchange Alumni relations
Arts services Anthropology
Cultural awareness Business education
Dance Engineering
Design Ethnic studies
Ethnic museums Latino and Hispanic studies
European football Libraries
Festivals Linguistics
Folk arts Mathematics
Historic preservation Nature education
Historical activities Outdoor education
History museums Political science
Music Poverty studies
Performing arts Public arts
Photography STEM education
Spoken word Safety education
Theater School athletics
Art museums School-based health care
Arts administration Science
Boating Social work education
Children’s museums Sociology
Folk and indigenous music Teacher education
Maritime museums Vocational education
Orchestral music Agriculture
Digital collections Agriculture for youth
Opera Animal welfare
Painting Biodiversity
Performance art Community food systems
Playwriting Energy resources
Science museums Farm bureaus and granges
Scouting programs Farmlands
Sculpture Gardening
Visual arts Land resources
Vocal music Livestock and ranching
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Table 3b: Instrumental Funding: Integration Services
Adult education Natural resources
Adult literacy Sustainable agriculture
Adult numeracy Wildlife biodiversity
Basic and remedial instruction Agricultural cooperatives
Bilingual education Air quality
Black studies Bird preservation
College preparation Environment
Community college education Food security
Computer literacy Organic farming
E-learning Agriculture, fishing and forestry
Early childhood education Animal training
Education Climate change
Education services Energy efficiency
Educational management Forest preservation
Elementary and secondary education Fossil fuels
Elementary education Hazardous waste management
ESL and second language acquisition Recycling
Graduate and professional education Renewable energy
High school equivalency Rivers and lakes
Higher education Solid waste management
History Water pollution
Interdisciplinary studies Water resources
Labor studies Biomedicine
Languages Communicable disease control
Law education Community mental health care
Literature and writing Dental care
Medical education Developmental disability services
Middle school education Diseases and conditions
Multicultural education Exercise
Out-of-school learning Family counseling
Adoption Racquet sports
Food banks Combat sports
Food delivery Cycling
Housing rehabilitation Architecture
Adolescent parenting Clean water supply
Adult day care Community and economic development
Job benefits Community beautification
Orphanages Community development finance
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Table 3c: Instrumental Funding: Integration Services
Parent education Family disability resources
Performing arts education Health
Philosophy Health care access
Population studies Health care administration and financing
Psychology and behavioral science Health care clinics
Public libraries Health care management
Reading promotion HIV/AIDS
Secondary education Holistic medicine
Sexual education Hospice care
Social sciences Hospital care
Special needs education In-home aid and personal assistance
Student retention Independent living for people with disabilities
Student services Maternal and perinatal health
Traditional knowledge Medical support services
Tutoring Mental health care
Undergraduate education Mental health counseling
University education Nursing homes
Urban studies Nutrition
Vocational post-secondary education Occupational health
Women’s studies Out-patient medical care
Adult and child mentoring Patient-centered care
American studies Preventive care
Arts education Public health
Charter school education Rehabilitation
Child educational development Reproductive health care
Cooperative education Specialty hospital care
Educational exchanges Substance abuse treatment
Educational testing Surgery
Environmental education Abortion
Addiction services Transitional living
Cancers Vision care
Children’s hospital care Welfare
Community health care Youth pregnancy prevention
Diabetes Abuse prevention
Family planning Supportive housing
Health insurance Utility expense assistance
Home health care Buddhism
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Table 3d: Instrumental Funding: Integration
Hygiene Catholicism
In-patient medical care Christianity
Internal medicine Evangelicalism
Kidney diseases Interfaith
Managed care Islam
Nursing care Judaism
Orthopedics Methodism
Asthma Presbyterianism
Autism Protestantism
Breast cancer Religion
Depression Religion for youth
Diagnostic imaging Theology
Drug safety Baptist
E-health Episcopalianism and Anglicanism
Ebola Lutheranism
Electronic health records Orthodox Christianity
Endocrine, nutritional and metabolic diseases Spirituality
First aid training Banking
Geriatrics Consumer protection
Gerontology Credit unions
Heart and circulatory system diseases Economics
Hematology Financial counseling
Immune system diseases Financial services
Liver diseases Home financing
Medical specialties Microfinance
Mental and behavioral disorders Public finance
Obesity Social enterprise
Palliative care Business and industry
Pediatrics Business promotion
Pharmacies Benefits planning
Physical fitness Development finance
Prenatal care Foreclosure prevention
Residential mental health care Health care financing
Retirement housing Housing loss prevention
Single parent support Antidiscrimination
Smoking Bullying
Substance abuse prevention Basic aid emergency aid
Toxic substance control Basic and emergency aid
Traditional medicine and healing Disaster relief
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Table 3e: Instrumental Funding: Integration
Child care Philanthropy
Child development Rural development
Child welfare Sustainable development
Dining services Urban development
Domestic violence Urban planning
Domestic violence shelters Urban renewal
Economics for youth Venture philanthropy
Employment Voluntarism
Entrepreneurship Bicycling and pedestrian-oriented development
Family services Neighborhood associations
Foster care Community recreation
Home ownership Intergenerational mentoring
Homeless services Advocacy journalism
Homeless shelters Communication media
Housing for the homeless Constituency journalism
Housing services Investigative journalism
Human services Journalism
Human services information Media development software
Human services management Mobile media
Infant care Publishing
Job counseling Radio
Job creation and workforce development Technology
Job retraining Television
Job services Web media
Job training Websites
Patient social services Audio recording
Public housing Internet
Rent and mortgage assistance Media democracy
Senior services Citizen journalism
Services for offenders Content management software
Sexual assault victim services Data management software
Shelter and residential care Information and Communications
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Table 3f: Instrumental Funding: Integration
Community improvement Natural history museums
Community service Food sovereignty
Community service for youth Environmental health
Economic development Transport and storage
Foundations Urban sprawl
Goodwill promotion Disasters
Housing development Disasters and emergency management
Leadership development Food aid
Nonprofits Non-natural disasters
Paratransit Victim aid
Parks Disaster preparedness
Camps Disaster reconstruction
Fishing and hunting Earthquakes
Golf Fire prevention and control
Skiing and snowboarding Floods
Sports Storms
Sports and recreation Special population support
Equestrianism Tourism
Media access and policy Museums
Temporary accommodations Information communications technology
Vocational rehabilitation News and public information
Women’s services Social media
Youth development Telecommunications
Youth mentoring Film and video
Youth services Interactive games
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Table 4: California Interview Summary Statistics by County & Grant Funding
Variable Alameda Los Angeles San Diego San Francisco
Nonprofits Interviewed 1 7 4 2
Average Age 40.50 23.57 15.50 22.50
Financials $
Average Total Revenue 37,931.39 18,943.05 9,027.39 28,670.31
Average Total Expenses 38,425.43 18,814.86 9,164.73 25,079.50
Average Program Expenses 31,287.85 17,814.80 8,163.11 21,906.09
Average Government Funding 3,233.80 10,330.41 5,630.98 519.66
Average Contributions Received 4,826.89 14,737.84 7,804.40 22,547.44
Average Grants Paid 0.00 91.17 380.23 9,952.12
Philanthropic Funding $
Number of Grants Received 34 127 75 231
Total Foundation Funding 148.70 8,889.73 2,993.35 33,942.46
Total Immigrant Serving NP 148.70 8,889.73 2,509.56 33,942.46
Total Refugee Serving NP 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Other NP Funding 0.00 0.00 483.79 0.00
Total Political Citizenship 137.70 4,448.45 837.80 24,560.34
Total Integration 11.01 1,698.22 910.60 2,815.11
Total Government 0.00 2,743.06 1,244.95 6,567.01
Secure Communities $
Noncitizen % 14.83 19.11 12.27 13.62
Foreign Born % 30.69 35.34 23.16 35.41
Disparity Ratio 3.12 2.68 2.32 1.44
Total Matching Per Capita 0.08 0.10 0.17 0.08
High Priority Per Capita 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.03
Low Priority Per Capita 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.05
Activation 2010 2009 2009 2010
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Table 5: District of Columbia Interview Summary Statistics & Grant Funding
Variable District of Columbia
Nonprofits Interviewed 6
Average Age 20.5
Financials $
Average Total Revenue 14,932.11
Average Total Expenses 14,514.19
Average Program Expenses 11,524.38
Average Government Funding 1,222.93
Average Contributions Received 13,435.53
Average Grants Paid 618.238
Philanthrophic Funding $
Number of Grants Received 198
Total Foundation Funding 24,931.18
Total Immigrant Serving NP Funding 20,042.51
Total Refugee Serving NP 3,599.40
Total Other NP Funding 50.696
Total Political Citizenship 14,773.41
Total Integration 4,201.24
Total Government 5,956.54
Secure Communities
Noncitizen % 8.36
Foreign Born % 13.35
Disparity Ratio 4.19
Total Matching Per Capita 0.10
High Priority Per Capita 0.02
Low Priority Per Capita 0.08
Activation 2012
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Table 6: Illinois Interview Summary Statistics by County & Grant Funding
Variable Cook
Nonprofits Interviewed 6.00
Average Age 26.25
Financials $
Average Total Revenue 24,702.27
Average Total Expenses 21,889.11
Average Program Expenses 18,715.42
Average Government Funding 9,797.43
Average Contributions Received 14,497.30
Average Grants Paid 105.52
Philanthropic Funding $
Number of Grants Received 97
Total Foundation Funding 7,278.93
Total Immigrant Serving NP Funding 6,516.66
Total Refugee Serving NP 0.00
Total Other NP Funding 762.27
Total Political Citizenship 2,840.14
Total Integration 4,293.20
Total Government 145.59
Secure Communities
Noncitizen % 11.44
Foreign Born % 20.98
Disparity Ratio 4.81
Total Matching Per Capita 0.04
High Priority Per Capita 0.01
Low Priority Per Capita 0.04
Activation 2013
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Table 7: Texas Interview Summary Statistics by County & Grant Funding
Variable Dallas Harris Hidalgo Travis
Nonprofits Interviewed 1 3 3 2
Average Age 14.50 33.83 26.83 18.00
Financials $
Average Total Revenue 5,470.30 40,652.56 61,131.96 8,214.72
Average Total Expenses 4,818.59 37,511.13 60,122.75 8,192.27
Average Program Expenses 3,800.52 31,927.16 55,707.34 7,564.73
Average Government Funding 0.00 23,627.34 51,199.72 1,941.14
Average Contributions Received 5,282.80 36,022.87 55,989.31 7,764.32
Average Grants Paid 0.00 14,878.68 303.57 21.97
Philanthropic Funding $
Number of Grants Received 49 24 59 27
Total Foundation Funding 669.11 219.95 5,412.86 2,004.92
Total Immigrant Serving NP Funding 669.11 192.97 5,412.86 1,936.25
Total Refugee Serving NP 0.00 0.00 0.00 68.67
Total Other NP Funding 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Total Political Citizenship 0.00 198.74 472.85 1.06
Total Integration 669.11 21.21 2,656.28 493.42
Total Government 0.00 0.00 2,283.73 1,510.45
Secure Communities
Noncitizen % 17.14 17.04 21.72 13.20
Foreign Born % 23.08 24.95 29.19 17.91
Disparity Ratio 3.15 4.12 1.80 2.67
Total Matching Per Capita 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.11
High Priority Per Capita 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
Low Priority Per Capita 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.08
Activiation 2008 2008 2009 2009
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